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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores the dynamics involved in shaping the Anglo-Syrian 
relationship.  It argues that to understand UK relations towards Syria over the 
past century, they have to be viewed in the broader context of British policy on 
Middle East regional issues, and wider foreign policy priorities.  With no direct 
interests invested in Syria, it is both Britain’s continued involvement in Middle 
East affairs and Syria’s standing as a key regional power that assures a 
continuing relationship.  Consequently, the stance of leading UK politicians on 
the issues of post-World War regional order, international terrorism, military 
interventionism, arms sales, dictatorship and democratisation have 
circumscribed UK policy options in relation to Syria.  
 
Using the tools of Neoclassical realism this study considers British foreign policy 
behaviour, in terms of Britain’s attempt to mobilize the power to protect its 
interests.  It reviews Britain’s international behaviour in part by how it is 
affected by changes in the international system, as Britain has declined from 
being a great imperial power, to a European power.  Alliances are a key tool 
Britain has used to manage its decline, and this study identifies the impact that 
this has had on Anglo-Syrian relations with particular reference to the US and 
EU.  Finally, it demonstrates that understanding how the foreign policy process 
works in Britain is key to understanding its international behaviour.  In this it 
takes into account elite perceptions both of what these interests are and how 
best Britain can achieve them. This adds a layer of understanding as to why 
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foreign policy outcomes do not always conform with what would be predicted 
purely in terms of the pursuit of the national interest. 
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1 
Introduction 
 
The Middle East has been, and continues to be an area of priority for British 
foreign policy.  Syria is a key state to consider in bringing stability to that 
region.  Syria, for the British, could have impacted on major parts of other 
Middle East issues, central to British foreign policy throughout the past century: 
its control by hostile Vichy regime in World War Two could have significantly 
reduced Britain’s ability to protect its interests in the Middle East. Its failure to 
join the Baghdad Pact, cost the West an ally against Soviet influence in the 
region; engaging it on the issue of the Arab-Israeli peace process could have 
radically changed the dynamics of that process.  It has played a pivotal role on 
issues from the war on terrorism to Western conflicts with Iraq and Iran.  All 
interaction between Syria and Britain should therefore be seen with an eye on 
these other major policy issues. 
 
This study considers the history of Anglo-Syrian relations, the context and 
events that colour British foreign policy toward Syria, and how these relations 
are expanded and/or constrained by the pursuit of other British interests in the 
region.  It considers the effect of Britain’s alliances or other commitments, such 
as the so-called special relationship with the US and British membership of the 
European Community, on the pursuit of its foreign policy toward Syria and 
whether there is a distinctively British approach in this.  In this context, the 
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study will look at a series of junctures in time at which Syrian and British 
interests overlapped and the effect on the Anglo-Syrian relations.  It looks at 
the early decades of the 20th century when two world wars placed British troops 
on the ground across the Middle East, forced interaction between policy makers 
and Arab leaders, and the lasting legacy the short term wartime policy had for 
Britain’s long term policy making toward the region and Syria.  It reviews the 
Margaret Thatcher period (1979 – 1990) as international terrorism and the 
hostage crisis took centre stage, putting the British Government and the Syrian 
regime at odds.  The study continues with the foreign policy of Tony Blair’s 
government (1997 – 2007) billed as a significant change from the past, as 
Blair’s emphasis on the need for international intervention into conflicts led the 
country to participate in the intervention in Iraq, bringing it into conflict with 
the interests of Syria.  Finally, it analyses the consequences of the Blairite 
foreign policy for Britain’s reaction to the Arab Spring and specifically, how this 
shaped the Coalition government’s (2010 – 2015) response to the crisis in 
Syria.  
 
This study, thus, considers British foreign policy over a time period spanning 
from the First world war to the current day, to demonstrate key points of 
Anglo-Syrian interaction, how the assessment of threat and interest by decision 
makers has impacted foreign policy outlook, and how pursuit of Britain’s foreign 
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policy toward the MENA area in general and Syria in particular, has been 
affected by international pressures. 
 
Literature Review 
There are a number of issues to consider when reviewing the literature 
available relating to the topic of recent British foreign policy toward Syria.  The 
first of these is that literature on and about this subject matter is virtually non-
existent.  Current work on British policy in the Middle East tends to concentrate 
on more traditional areas such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, oil, Iraq, terrorism 
and Iran. However, because these issue areas reflect British foreign policy 
priorities, and past imperial relationships, analysing Britain’s relations with Syria 
require an attention to these topics and of how Anglo-Syrian relations are 
affected and defined by these issues.   
 
The second challenge is finding work on current British foreign policy itself 
relevant to the study of Anglo-Syrian relations.  Though some literature is 
available, much of the work being done in the area of British foreign policy 
tends to concentrate on important figures involved, such as Rentoul’s 2001, 
Tony Blair: Prime Minister, or Kampfner’s Blair’s War (2004), works which tend 
to be more narrative, historical accounts of Blair’s premiership than analytic 
reviews of policy.  Work on the making of British foreign policy, in many 
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instances written by ex-diplomats, foreign affairs advisers or civil servants, such 
as, for example, Percy Cradock’s In Pursuit of British interests, are informative 
but highly personalised accounts.  They are invaluable in giving insight in how 
the British System works since they are written by insiders with an intimate 
knowledge of the system but they carry all the associated bias or reflect 
bureaucratic rivalries that come from having been on the inside. 
 
Thirdly, the focus (though not exclusively) of this thesis on recent foreign policy 
adds another degree of difficulty in that official government documents are 
hard to come by.  Official government documentation, particularly in foreign 
affairs, is in many cases restricted information and it will be a number of years 
before it is released for general consumption.  Documentation on the Middle 
East, being a particularly sensitive policy area, is more often than not deemed 
too sensitive to be released to the public and even under the freedom of 
information act many documents are withheld for reasons of national security. 
Given these constraints, however, there is still a wealth of material available 
which provide context and information on which to base this study, including 
the Hansard text published online, statements given to the press, government 
policy documents, and reports to and from the Select Committees. 
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Literature on foreign policy 
For providing understanding of foreign policy analysis and specifically foreign 
policy process in Britain a number of texts are available.  Of particular interest 
are Clark and White (eds) Understanding Foreign Policy, which provides a good 
introduction to the foreign policy systems approach and Christophe Hill’s The 
Changing Politics of Foreign Policy.  These works underline the difficulties in 
analysing foreign policy in today’s international system.  The discussion of 
approaches, methods and level of analysis discussed in British Foreign Policy: 
Tradition, Change and Transformation, Michael Smith, Steve Smith and Brian 
White (eds) further compliments this work, and underlines the particular trends 
in approaches to British foreign policy, with Christopher Hill’s chapter on “The 
Historical Background” focusing on the importance of history and tradition both 
to the psyche of British foreign policy making, and the processes of making that 
policy.  The impact of this on the Middle East is perhaps particularly important 
in that Britain felt need to have a continued presence there for reasons of 
colonial guilt and in defining our role in the world. 
 
Foreign Policy making in Britain 
To understand better how foreign policy is made in Britain, and the influences 
upon it, Charles Carstairs’ and Richard Ware’s (eds) Parliament and 
International Relations offers insight into the working of the House of Commons 
and the House of Lords in both terms of formal and informal procedures in the 
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discussion of foreign affairs and making of foreign policy in Parliament.  With 
regard to the workings of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and its 
impact on policy making a number of accounts are available.  An in depth look 
into both the way foreign policy is made and Britain’s changing role is provided 
by John Coles’ Making Foreign Policy: A Certain Idea of Britain.  Sir John Coles, 
a retired diplomat who was Permanent Under-Secretary at the FCO until 1994 – 
1997, captures well the complexity of the policy making process, providing a 
detailed account at how the system within Whitehall should work, as well as the 
difficulties and challenges that it was facing at the time he left.  The work 
demonstrates that foreign policy today is far more complex than even half a 
century ago; indeed, with globalisation no state is in a position to make 
unilateral policy decisions with Britain “incomparably more reliant on the 
behaviour of other states and non-state actors to secure its aims”1.  Sir John 
provides a clear overview on the impact of both internal processes and external 
influences have on policy issues, but it is clear also that on “the involvement of 
No.10 in major overseas issues was close”.  This work contributes to any 
consideration of how foreign policy is constructed, and also why British foreign 
policy activity does not always seem to clearly link to stated priorities and 
objectives.     
 
                                                          
1 J Coles, Making Foreign Policy, London: John Murray (Publishers) Ltd, 2000 p107 
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John Dickie’s The New Mandarins: How British Foreign Policy Works picks up 
the story from 1997 and discusses the changing role of the FCO.  This 
continues to explain the role and problems faced by the FCO in this new age of 
media, and also, the impact of the events of 9/11 on policy making and how 
even now this event left an enduring impact in sharpening the focus on foreign 
affairs in Parliament.  In doing so, the work argues the need for the FCO to 
change to meet the challenges of an ever changing world and details the efforts 
made by the Blair government to do so, but also the dangers of imposing 
change or the difficulties that ignoring the advice from a highly skilled and 
established diplomatic service.  It both challenges some of the assumptions of 
how the Blair government worked with the FCO whilst helping to explain how 
errors in judgement in foreign policy making were made. 
 
Carne Ross’s account in Independent Diplomat: dispatches from an 
unaccountable Elite offers a highly personal, highly critical and at times slightly 
irreverent look at the inside workings of the FCO and the diplomatic service.  
What is distinctive about this is the picture of the FCO as a struggling, ill 
equipped, moribund organisation, so enmeshed in its own worldview of the 
“national interest”, of what “we” want, that it failed to question the 
assumptions all its policy making is based on.  While the author is writing from 
the standpoint of almost a personal epiphany, and this does very much dictate 
the theme of the book, it adds to the understanding of how British foreign 
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policy works abroad and the negative potential this can have on its 
effectiveness.  The work adds a layer of understanding to why some Prime 
Ministers may try to operate “around” the FCO when pursuing major foreign 
policy priorities in that they are unable to significantly challenge its inbuilt world 
view and bring it on board with new policy direction; the sense of the FCO 
having its own priorities to the extent of working against what an incoming 
government attempts to achieve is evident in both the Thatcher and Blair 
period.   
 
Ross’ work also adds a layer in the understanding of foreign policy processes 
now often being carried out on a multilateral basis.  Whilst many looking to 
analyse foreign policy argue that organisations such as the UN and other 
international institutions are loosening the grip of state centric foreign policy, 
the reality is somewhat different   Not every state within the organisation is 
equal.  Furthermore, he argues that these institutions make the process of 
foreign policy making more elitist not less, less accountable and democratic not 
more.  This then is an arena where the states that currently hold the power can 
essentially prioritise their own interests and are not held accountable and adds 
further understanding to British foreign policy decision within such institutions. 
 
This theme of increasing complexity as to how foreign policy is made, who 
makes it and the problems with holding policy makers accountable is further 
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explored in Paul Williams article “Who’s making UK foreign policy?” which 
particularly looks at foreign policy making in Blair’s government and the impact 
that government had on the policy making process.  Again this is a valuable 
contribution into showing how foreign policy is made and how contradictions in 
policy are almost inbuilt into the system.  Again in the case of the Blair 
government it demonstrates how the British system allows a particularly strong 
personality to dominate foreign policy making, and the affect this has on good 
policy decision making. 
 
For historical context, a useful account of key influences in British Foreign policy 
making is found in Otte’s (Ed) The Makers of British Foreign Policy: From Pitt to 
Thatcher, this concentrates mainly on individuals in any given time period.  
Prevalent in accounts of later leaders is the struggle with declining British power 
and influence in world affairs.  One struggle highlighted it the difficulty to find a 
balance between economic priorities in line with Britain’s membership in Europe 
and strategic priorities in line with the US alliance.  A more general approach 
can be found in Joseph Frankel’s British Foreign Policy 1945 – 1973, which 
analyses both the decision making approach and major foreign polices followed 
in this time period.  In considering these, some degree of consistency in 
Britain’s overarching priorities and challenges can be identified, notably the 
continuing idea of a world role for Britain.  The tensions between a European 
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focus and the importance of the American alliance is another reoccurring issue 
demonstrated in the texts.   
 
Peter Byrd’s, British Foreign Policy under Thatcher, contains a set of essays 
looking at key points of Thatcher’s foreign policy including an interesting, 
though not particularly critical, narrative on Thatcher’s Middle East policy by Sir 
Anthony Parsons.  Percy Cradock’s In Pursuit of British Interests complements 
this work, presenting a personal account of his time as Thatcher’s foreign 
affairs advisor.  Whilst the tensions of hostages in the Middle East and state 
sponsored terrorism were on the British radar, Cradock still asserts that the 
Middle East was not a high priority of Thatcher’s government.  Further 
supplementing the literature on this time period, Christopher Tugendhat and 
William Wallace’s Options for British Foreign Policy in the 1990s provides a 
contemporary outlook of British foreign policy issues.  These works add to the 
story of British foreign policy, providing insight into how policy decisions were 
made in the Thatcher period, and how, in particular, Thatcher’s own beliefs and 
views influenced the process.  Further insight is given as to the primacy given 
to economic and security issues in this period to explain sometimes 
contradictory or challenging decision making such as the primacy given to the 
special relationship when it came to security issues, and how this affected 
British Middle East policy. 
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For more recent British foreign policy making there are a number of sources 
available including Mark Curtis’ Web of Deceit: Britain’s real role in the World 
(2003), the main argument of which is that the public claims of the Blair 
government and its actual foreign policy were often miles apart.  This work, 
though perhaps overly sensationalised, is unstintingly critical specifically of 
Britain’s role in the international community, attacking British foreign policy as 
little more than a tool of the elite to upkeep their own interests, with little or no 
regard to either ethics or international law.  Despite claiming all his information 
is from open source data, Curtis argues that British governments, along with 
the media, conspire to keep the public unaware of the policy being pursued in 
their names.  This work certainly challenges the reality of New Labour’s explicit 
rejection of realpolitik.   
 
Steven Kettell in his work, Dirty Politics? New Labour, British Democracy and 
Invasion of Iraq offers a similar argument to Curtis in terms of the control of 
the elites over British politics; it argues that the British political system has 
evolved into a highly centralised system of government where authority is 
wielded, but wherein there is little oversight of that central power to allow for 
scrutiny or accountability.  It is this strong executive that defines and pursues 
the ‘national interest’, and the British public have been “conditioned” to accept 
this as “strong, decisive and responsible” governance.2  Both works contribute 
                                                          
2 S Kettell, Dirty Politics? New Labour, British Democracy and Invasion of Iraq, (London, 2006) 
p12 
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to understanding of why British foreign policy, in its pursuit of what elites see 
as British interest, pursue policy which does not necessarily reflect what recent 
governments, at least, term “British values”.  They highlight that while Britain 
has been seen to pursue economic liberalisation as a way to promote political 
reform, the terms are not always favourable to the states which they are 
targeting, such as Syria.  They highlight the way conflicting priorities are 
pursued means Britain presents an unpredictable face to states in the Middle 
East.  The pursuit of the short term goals of these elites, damages the long 
term security of the Middle East region, and the prioritising of these and 
traditional ties constrains British policy in the region, something further 
demonstrated in British failure to act in the recent Syrian crisis. 
 
Three particularly relevant works on this period are Paul Williams’ British 
Foreign Policy under New Labour 1997 – 2005, Johns Rentoul’s Tony Blair: 
Prime Minister, and John Kampfner’s Blair’s War.  Paul Williams asserts that 
New Labour had four main foreign policy commitments which were a 
commitment to multilateralism, to “Atlanticism”, to neoliberalism and to 
“moralism”.  Williams then goes on to explore New Labour’s foreign policy, 
Britain’s relationships in the period and a selection of issues Blair’s government 
faced in this time period with reference to these four commitments.  While, in 
essence, he finds these commitments were not necessarily contradictory, 
neither are they particularly complimentary, and at times prioritising one 
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commitment over another resulted in gaps between rhetoric and action, and 
accusations of hypocrisy.  Also clear is the central role played by Blair in foreign 
policy making, and his frustration at those who did not share his clarity over the 
issues.  Williams account offers explanation for Blair’s attempts to personally 
engage with Bashar al-Asad, but also his impatience with Syria in not coming 
into line after 9/11 and also offers a reason for why a more nuanced approach 
to relations with Syria was not taken after the Iraq invasion.  The intrinsic 
tension he describes in Britain’s two key relationships, with the US and EU, are 
also of interest in explanting British behaviour, for example, how Britain’s 
insistence on conditions demanded by the US in the EU Association Agreement 
negotiations with Syria blocked the agreement. 
 
John Kampfner’s Blair’s Wars concentrates on Blair’s use of the military arm of 
foreign policy complements the work above.  This is something also explored in 
Michael Clark’s chapter on foreign policy in Seldon’s (ed) Blair’s Britain 1997 – 
2007 which sets out the determinants internally for Blair’s policy and also 
highlights how external factors crystallised Blair’s thoughts on how the 
international community needed to act in the face of atrocities and how 9/11 
resulted in a shift in Blair’s perception of international relations.  Kampfner 
considers Blair’s central role in the decisions for military action, his growing 
confidence in the legitimacy of intervention and his close relationship with the 
military due to his early successes in Kosovo and Sierra Leone, which help 
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explain his later policies with regard to Iraq.  Early signs of his dissatisfaction 
with the UN’s ability to react to situations as they happen can be clearly seen in 
the events leading to intervention in Kosovo.  His willingness to go ahead with 
that action without UN ratification, and his surety that the action was legitimate 
as it was taken by the NATO coalition, not to mention that it was so clearly the 
“right thing to do”, all lay the foundation for later action in Middle East.   
 
The central role of Blair to Labour’s foreign policy is further explored in 
Rentoul’s’ Tony Blair: Prime Minister which considers the relationship between 
the Prime Minister, his Cabinet and the FCO.  It leaves the impression that 
these relationships were not particularly warm throughout Blair’s time in office, 
while his selected group of foreign advisors and personal staff were of vital 
importance – with Blair taking his foreign affairs advisors with him into 
important meetings while the official FCO representative was left to sit outside.3  
All three works support the assertion that Blair’s was a “presidential” style of 
leadership.  They suggest that, far from demonstrating a new open style of 
politics, in major foreign policy priorities the traditional elitism and the 
clandestine nature of policy making remained.  None of these works deal 
specifically with the Anglo-Syrian relationship at this time.  What they contribute 
is the context in which British policy toward Syria was being carried out.  This is 
significant both in their description of how foreign policy was being made at this 
                                                          
3 J Kampfner, Blair’s Wars (London, 2004) p195 
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time, and how that affected the Anglo-Syrian relationship, and the constraints 
put on it.  As they explain the process by which British foreign policy became 
more entwined with American policy they further demonstrate how this became 
a determinant in British foreign policy and served to limit its options toward 
Syria, putting Damascus and London on separate sides when it came to the 
crucial issue of Iraq. 
 
A number of key figures from the Blair period also have now published their 
own autobiographies including Blair’s own autobiography A journey (2011), 
Jack Straw’s Last Man Standing (2012), Clare Short’s An Honourable Deception? 
(2005), Lord Levy’s A Question of Honour (2009), Peter Mandelson’s The Third 
Man (2010) and Alistair Campbell’s The Blair Years (2011).  These offer an 
invaluable insight into the personalities and dynamics of the Blair government, 
and the justifications they give for the decisions they made, though the deeply 
personal perspective provided by these works must be kept in mind.  They 
provide key insights into how central figures in the British Government 
perceived key events and how it affected their decision making and behaviours 
in the policy making process.   
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British Foreign Policy in the Middle East 
The historical context of British foreign policy making in the Middle East is 
provided in David Sander’s Losing an Empire, Finding a Role: British Foreign 
Policy since 1945 (1990) which contains a good overview of British Foreign 
Policy since losing its status as a major power.  Of particular interest for this 
study is Eyal Zisser’s work on “Britain and the Levant, 1918-1946: A Missed 
Opportunity?”  This reviews British foreign policy toward the Levant, an area in 
the Middle East which British policy makers largely ignored before World War 
One only to find itself significantly invested after the war’s outbreak but unable 
to turn this investment into tangible successes long term.  These failures have 
led to a frosty relationship with Levant states with some impact to the current 
day.4   
 
Zach Levey's article “British Middle East Strategy: 1950-52: General Brian 
Robertson and the “small” Arab states” adds another dimension to this story, 
explaining British interest in these states to create a line of defence against a 
Soviet invasion, of which Syria alongside Iraq and Lebanon would be a part, 
whilst still holding onto their view that Egypt and the Suez base was a vital 
interest.  The article details the specific difficulties the British government had 
with involving Damascus in this plan: the instability in the Syrian government 
                                                          
4 E Zisser, “Britain and the Levant 1918 – 1946: A Missed Opportunity?” in Z Levey, E Podeh 
(Eds) Britain and the Middle East: From imperial power to junior partner (Brighton, 2008) p146 
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and the necessity it would have to supply arms to a country less concerned with 
the Soviets than with Israel and professing a position of “armed neutrality.”5  
Importantly it demonstrates the difficulty, even at this point, that the British 
had in convincing the Syrians that they were credible partners, and the lack of 
overlap in the interests of each state.  
 
Adding further insight to British policy toward Syria specifically, is Ivan 
Pearson’s “The Syrian Crisis, the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’, and the 
1958 landings in Jordan and Lebanon” showing an early joint Anglo-American 
approach to Syria.  Common interests such as its strategic location and concern 
over left wing political organisations in the region (above all the most active 
Communist Party in the Arab world) combined with the fears that the instability 
of Syrian government made it particularly susceptible to Soviet influence6 
propelled the American and British governments to collude in measures to 
address this.  
 
While it is not the purpose of this particular study to provide a complex history 
of British relations in the Middle East an overview is useful both to understand 
                                                          
5 Z Levey, “Britain's Middle East Strategy, 1950-52: General Brian Robertson and the 'Small' 
Arab States” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 40, No. 2 (Mar., 2004), p75 
6 I Pearson “The Syrian Crisis of 1957, the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’, and the 1958 
landings in Jordan and Lebanon” Middle Eastern Studies, 43:1 (2007) p45 
18 
the history of the Anglo-Syria relationship and provide a context for present 
relations.  A vast number of works exist considering the involvement of Britain 
in the Middle East and demonstrating the constraints and reasons for the 
current involvement including D.K Fieldhouse’s Western Imperialism in the 
Middle East 1914 – 1958, though the section referring to Syria is more 
concerned with the French relationship.  Further background reading in this 
area is found in Louis’s British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-51: Arab 
Nationalism, the US and Post War Imperialism.  Other works available include 
Roger Owen’s State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Middle East and 
William Cleveland’s A History of the Middle East.  All describe a declining British 
role in the region, a role which at all times was defined by a pragmatic 
realpolitik.  A major issue for Britain has been that, while its role may have 
declined, the Middle East area’s potential to impact on national interests and 
security did not similarly decline.  Hence both the desire to ensure US 
engagement in the region in support of British interests and the need, though 
not necessarily the ability, to influence this policy in whatever small ways that 
may be possible.  
 
Rosemary Hollis’s work Britain and the Middle East in the 9/11 era brings the 
story further up to date, demonstrating the Blair era as a definite change in 
British relationship with the Middle East.  Up to the Blair era, Hollis identifies 
four distinct phases of British relations with the Middle East and how New 
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Labour with its new world view and foreign policy outlook impacted on this 
relationship.  Combining in depth knowledge of the historical context of Britain 
in the Middle East with an in depth look at New Labour, its beliefs and its policy 
making process, Hollis identifies and explains what put Britain on the path to 
war with Iraq after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, and the consequences of this 
for following British Middle East policy, in terms of an over identification with 
the policy of the Bush administration, which damaged British relations in the 
Middle East from which Blair’s successors struggled to recover.   
 
For the purposes of this study these sources offer an understanding of the 
historical context of British relations in the Middle East, the legacy of which has 
resulted in the current Middle East predicament and arguably continue to place 
constraints on British foreign policy in the region.  Policy documents and 
statements will be used to supplement this reading. 
 
Britain’s relationship with America and Europe 
Among the literature available assessing the impact pursuing a European-
American balance has on British foreign policy are a number of key texts.  
Michael Smith contributes a significant chapter in British Foreign Policy under 
Thatcher presenting an interesting analysis of the relationship.  One of the most 
enduring perceptions of the Thatcher government was the importance placed 
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on the “special relationship”.  Whilst Smith does not reject this, he presents a 
fuller picture of the relationship demonstrating that on a number of occasions 
Thatcher skilfully managed pursue to British objectives successfully in the face 
of US pressure to do otherwise without incurring too much recrimination.   
 
Robin Niblett’s (2007) “Choosing between America and Europe: a new context 
for British foreign policy” argues that the balancing of these priorities needs to 
continue, though with a more considered approach to perhaps overly-close 
relations with the US.  Inderjeet Parmars’s article “‘I’m Proud of the British 
Empire’: Why Tony Blair backs George Bush” examines why Blair so religiously 
followed Bush’s foreign policies, lying it at the feet of Blair’s “Liberal 
imperialism.”  In a speech given at the Chatham House Foundation Annual 
Member’s conference discussing new foreign policy directions for Britain, Lord 
Wallace of Saltire takes another look at this policy, challenging its assumptions 
and pointing out that our interests are not necessarily the same as America’s.  
This literature will aid in understanding if and how Britain’s relations with the 
EU and US, and its perceived bridging role between the two entities, impacted 
on UK policies towards Syria.   
 
The question of the special relationship is examined in almost all substantial 
works on British foreign policy since the Second World War, and finding a 
balance between Britain’s relationship with the US and Europe is always a topic 
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of interest.  Interestingly, while the majority of Prime Ministers since the end of 
World War Two have tended, inadvertently or not, to lean closer to American 
policies, many analysts acknowledge that the future needs to be European for 
Britain.  In the Middle East there is particular tension, with British interests, 
realistically, closer to those of her European partners.  Nevertheless, the most 
defining act of British foreign policy in the region in recent times, the Iraq war, 
was firmly and unashamedly linked to US foreign policy.  In relation to Syria the 
dichotomy of this approach, and its impact, needs to be further investigated.  
Britain’s relationship with the US has often put British interests at odds with 
Syria, for instance, support for Reagan’s intervention in Lebanon, or Blair’s 
decisions to back Bush over Iraq, putting a constraint on Britain’s ability to 
pursue an independent policy on Syria.  Balanced against this, the British 
interest in advancing the Middle East peace process (MEPP) has resulted in 
attempts to influence the US in ways which could benefit the Syrians; here 
Britain’s special relationship with the US could enhance the Anglo-Syrian 
relationship, but only if the British government is able to balance its 
relationships in such a way to exert this influence. 
 
Literature on Syria and its relations with Britain 
A number of texts are available to inform research into Syria, its regional and its 
international relations.  For anyone studying the early years of Syria’s 
independence as it struggled to consolidate as an independent state, Patrick 
22 
Seale’s work The Struggle for Syria provides a detailed picture of the external 
forces vying to bring Syria into their sphere of influence, with contributions 
from a number of figures involved showing just how convoluted the politics of 
the time could be.  Of particular interest is the British interaction with Syria and 
her neighbours, and British collusion particularly with Iraq in trying to influence 
Syria to align with the West.  The centrality of Syria to the success or failure of 
British attempts to shore up a Cold War defence pact against Soviet influence, 
and the fact the failure to do so contributed to hastening the withdrawal of 
Britain from the area underlines the often-underestimated importance of Syria 
for British interests in MENA.  This further adds to the understanding of an 
antagonistic history on Anglo Syrian relations. 
 
Seale’s follow up work Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East provides a history 
of the development of Syria from its creation to the late 1980s and the central 
role of Hafiz al-Asad, with much insight provided from interviews with key 
figures involved.  This work provides insight into how Hafez al-Asad set and 
sought to pursue his foreign policy agenda with its central criteria to achieve 
strategic parity with Israel, with the ultimate aim of recovering the Golan 
Heights from Israeli occupation. Underlining Hafiz’s goals of ensuring that Syria 
was not overlooked in outside powers’ intervention in the Arab-Israeli conflict 
and peace process, and his central tenet that the Arab states should never 
enter into any negotiation either individually or when they would be bargaining 
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from a position of weakness, Seale’s work provides much insight into Hafez’s 
regional manoeuvring, and provides further insight into the Hindawi affair 
during the Thatcher period. 
 
When looking at the motivations and goals of Syria under Bashar again there 
are a number of valuable works to take into account.  Volker Perthe’s Syria 
under Bashar al-Asad looks at the early successes of Bashar in trying to meet 
the demands of modernisation in terms of social, economic, political and foreign 
policy.  This describes a Syrian leader looking to Europe to support this process 
of reform, providing opportunity for Britain to work with European partners to 
build a stronger relationship with Syria.  David Lesch’s The New Lion of 
Damascus also looks at the advent of Basher to power in Syria and the new 
modern context the regime found itself in, evaluating Bashar’s role in pursuing 
a reformist agenda and prospects for the future, perhaps somewhat uncritically.  
A possibly more balanced account can be found in Flynnt Leverett’s Inheriting 
Syria which reviews Bashar’s role, but also the constraints he faces within, 
caught between trying to pursue the policies he inherited from his father in 
terms of his own character, other regime figures and the failure of western 
policies to engage with and support his reformist leanings.  These works 
demonstrate that there was a potential window of opportunity for a British 
government looking to promote good governance and democracy, to use its 
influence and, with the EU, support a process within Syria for reform.  They add 
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substance to the decision by Blair to attempt to engage more constructively 
with the Syrian regime. 
 
On the complete opposite end of the spectrum is Barry Rubin’s The Truth about 
Syria, highly critical of the Syrian regime, unfailingly sceptical about its 
intentions to reform, or come to terms with Israel in a peace deal, and 
disparaging of Western attempts to engage with the regime.  While perhaps 
overly sceptical, the work highlights the challenges for any British government 
trying to pursue a different kind of relationship with the Syrian regime, in terms 
of accurately assessing whether or not the regime had real desire to modernise 
or change its behaviour.   
 
This literature helped inform my research in terms of what Syria’s priorities 
have been and are currently, therefore informing why British policy approaches 
may have failed in the past and may need to change in the future.  They also 
inform as to why Syria is a particularly important state to engage with in any 
dialogue in the region.  These works generally concentrate on Syrian foreign 
policy decisions in the region and the ongoing fight against Israeli 
expansionism, or Syrian policy vis-à-vis the US.  This is important to consider 
when looking at British foreign policy making and the constraints placed on it by 
the actions and interests of Syria itself, and other actors in the region. 
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Sources of primary information 
Primary texts for this period include House of Commons research paper (2008) 
British Foreign Policy since 1997, reports from the House of Commons Foreign 
Affairs Select committee plus several transcripts of speeches and web chats 
given on policy in the Middle East and Syria that help demonstrate the approach 
taken toward Syria in this period, though obviously they are highly politicised.  
These reports provide a record of parliamentary monitoring of the government’s 
foreign policy, even in this, it is mainly the implementation of policy rather than 
the policy itself which is discussed, and the scope of their inquiries can be 
determined by the government and how much they cooperate.  It should be 
kept in mind that although committees tend to contain a government majority, 
they still give insight as to opposing views in parliament and what parliament 
might see as particular issues.  These documents provide an “insider” viewpoint 
on foreign policy which is informative and useful – although it is interesting to 
note that many of the footnotes and information sources quoted even in these 
documents are external media resources rather than internal documentation.   
 
There have been a number of inquiries held relating to the time of the Blair 
premiership, and these have resulted in an unusual amount of information 
being made available in the public domain.  Though more focused on aspects of 
British Iraq policy this does hold implications for anyone studying the British 
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government’s interaction with Syria.  The FCO also published its key priories in 
its December 2003 white paper “The UKs International Priorities,” looking at 
what these will be in the approaching decade, what role the FCO has in relation 
to these and how they can organise to meet them, followed by the March 2006 
whitepaper “Active Diplomacy for a Changing World: The UKs International 
Priorities” which reviewed progress to date building on the first document. 
 
A further source of information can be found in newspaper archives and 
currently on line news sites.  Whilst it must be kept in mind that these are news 
items and must be read with the normal caveats in mind – that not all the facts 
may be available to journalists (or publishable) or that the journalist is not 
neutral and stories are being written to support a certain point of view or 
political leaning - items are nevertheless useful in getting a sense of the way in 
which events were perceived at a particular time and often for summarising the 
different points of views of actors involved.  They also are useful in a practical 
sense, highlighting times and dates of key speeches or House of Commons 
debates.  Today’s news media sites are also useful often providing links to key 
documents or speeches which have featured articles.  A number of them also 
carry comments sections, such as in the Guardian and the Telegraph.  These 
allow key people and officials in government to comment on current events or 
policy decisions, and offer opportunity members of opposition and other actors 
to criticise government policy, providing their own insights to policy decisions.  
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Again such items are often highly politicised but are useful in trying to obtain a 
fuller picture of official positions and policies. 
 
A valuable resource is being able to speak to some of the people involved in the 
making of British foreign policy at the time, or in its implementation.  The focus 
of this thesis has been mostly on quite recent foreign policy which has 
implications as a number of figures who might be able to provide insight are 
still restricted in the information that can be shared.  However, it has been 
useful to speak to two former ambassadors to Syria, Henry Hogger and Peter 
Ford, and engaging in email communication with two others, Basil Eastwood 
and Ivor Lucas, who have provided more insight into the context in which they 
were working, the constraints on Anglo-Syrian relations and differing outlook 
over how relations between Syria and Britain could have been developed.  A 
meeting with an official from the FCO was also informative in terms of 
expanding on how the informal foreign policy making process can work. 
 
The main difficulty with the literature on relations between Britain and Syria is 
that there is very little material available specifically looking at the topic.  The 
aim of this study, then, is to consider the position taken in British foreign policy 
with regard to Syria, whether this has been consistent, sustained and distinct or 
whether Anglo-Syrian relations are simply subsumed by other British interests in 
the region. 
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Theory & Framework 
When attempting to explain the foreign policy behaviour of any given state 
critics of overarching International Relations theories often argue that they offer 
little assistance in explaining why specific foreign policy decisions are made.  In 
response, a number of IR theorists would argue that that is not the purpose of 
IR theory, which looks at the systemic level to explain state behaviour.  In this 
sense they seek to explain the environment in which states interact and how 
factors such as the relative power capacities of states, for realists, affect their 
behaviour or, for liberals, how economic interdependence constrains the 
behaviour of decision makers.   
 
Realist theories which hold the state as the main actor in international relations, 
and consider the concepts of national interest, of power, of competition, of 
security, often do so without attempting to fully define what these are.  When 
talking of the national interest, for example, it is as if this is a tangible object, 
something which just is.  They often pay little attention to how states define 
their national interests, and rather describe the mechanisms by which they 
pursue it in terms of power balancing such as alliance making.   
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In analyses of British foreign policy towards Syria many of the tenets of the 
state centric realist school of thought hold true.  This argues that states are 
concerned primarily with security issues and national interests (however these 
may be defined); the system is anarchic and with many foreign policy decisions 
based on the power balance.  These set the context within which British foreign 
policy decisions are made, but fail to explain foreign policy behaviour which 
does not optimize these interests. 
 
For structural realists, little attention is paid to the elites, politicians, interest 
groups and other individuals who come together to construct foreign policy – 
though in the traditional viewpoint the assumption, stated or otherwise, it that 
this is the preserve of the state elites.  This is of course the province of a sub-
discipline within IR, Foreign Policy Analysis.  It is also frequently taken account 
of in liberal and constructivist frameworks and in neo-classical realism.  This 
thesis will draw on neo-classical realism in explaining the international 
environment in which British foreign policy is conducted and how features of 
the state and elite interact with it, on the liberalism’s concept of complex 
interdependencies in considering how Britain’s relationships, for example with 
the EU, feature in its foreign policy toward Syria and use a FPA approach to 
consider the factors which shape British foreign policy making. 
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For this study the neoclassical realist approach offers considerable scope for 
understanding foreign policy decisions.  Neoclassical realism accepts the main 
tenets of Realism as described above but goes further, stating that “the scope 
and ambition of a country’s foreign policy is driven first and foremost by the 
country’s relative material power.  Yet it contends that the impact of power 
capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic 
pressures must be translated through intervening unit-level variables such as 
decision-makers’ perceptions and state structures.”7  In this neo-classical 
realists consider a state’s power relative to its foreign policy decisions, but look 
at individual states internal structures to answer the following questions: 
 
  “How do states, or more specifically the decision-makers and institutions 
that act on their behalf, assess international threats and opportunities?   
 What happens when there is disagreement about the nature of foreign 
threats?   
 Who ultimately decides the range of acceptable and unacceptable 
foreign policy alternatives?   
 To what extent, and under what conditions, can domestic actors bargain 
with state leaders and influence foreign or security policies?   
                                                          
7 G Rose, World Politics, 1998 cited in Lobel, Ripsman, Taliaferro, Neoclassical realism, the State 
and Foreign Policy, p 5 
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 How and under what circumstances will domestic factors impede states 
from pursuing the types of strategies predicted by balance of power 
theory and balance of threat theory?   
 Finally, how do states go about extracting and mobilizing resources 
necessary to implement foreign and security policies?”8 
 
In answering these questions, this theory of international relations begins to 
support understanding as to why a state’s foreign policy may not reflect the 
optimum output expected in terms of power capabilities.  This theory helps 
explain Britain’s international behaviour in terms of power capacity, and the 
alliances and relationships it pursues in order to maximise that power in the 
international arena in order to pursue its interests, but allows that state-level 
factors are involved in translating this into foreign policy.9 
 
For neo-classical realists, taking account of these state level factors provides 
explanations as to why two states which are similar in terms of power levels 
and geography may pursue very different goals.  Here the concept of “national 
identity” is significant as it in turn informs what a state, or rather the elites in a 
                                                          
8 S Lobell, N Ripsman, J Taliaferro, Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign Policy 
(Cambridge, 2009) p2 
9 Beach, Analysing Foreign Policy, (Basingstoke, 2012) p64 
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state, might consider the states national interests.10  In order to help explain 
how national identities are created and, over time change, a number of 
neoclassical realists have turned to constructivism, including theories which look 
at how groups identities are constructed by depicting what are the differences 
between that group and other groups (the “self” and the “other”)11.  
Constructionist theory considers the role history, society and political culture 
has in creating a specific agent’s identity, and the importance of this in the 
sense that an agent’s identity will be associated with a set of norms that will 
affect the behaviour of a state12.  Furthermore, far from being “absolutes” the 
elite’s notions of national interests are constructed through interactions and 
discourse, taking into account their perceptions of the world and its issues.  
 
In terms of explaining British foreign policy toward Syria, a simple calculation of 
relative power does not fully explain the relationship.  The strength among 
Britain’s elites of Britain’s identity as a power with a traditional world role, a 
historical relationship with the Middle East and a responsibility towards the 
Middle East and the peace process all impact on British foreign policy decision 
making and the Anglo-Syrian relationship in a way that cannot be explained 
looking at purely security or economic national interests. 
                                                          
10 Ibid, p65 
11 Ibid, p67 
12 T Flockhart, “Constructivism and Foreign Policy” in Smith, Hadfield, Dunne, Foreign Policy, 
(Oxford, 2012) p86 
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Increasingly foreign policy behaviour cannot be explained simply in terms of 
state to state interaction.  Christopher Hill argues that organisations such as the 
UN, and even more so for Britain, the European Union, blur the line between 
what is domestic and what is foreign.  Communications, trade, agriculture, 
defence policies to name but a few, all have international elements to them.  
Liberalism offers insight into how these transnational institutions and 
interdependencies impact on states behaviours.   
 
Theories of liberal institutionalism and complex interdependence share a similar 
understanding of the international system to realists in that they too see the 
international system as essentially anarchic and states as the major actors.  
“Weak” liberals argue that interdependence and internationals institutions can 
soften the worst effects of the anarchic system, encouraging states to recognise 
common interests and cooperate for mutual gain.  Going further than this 
“strong” liberal theories posit that the anarchic international system can in fact 
be transformed by increased interdependence, institutionalisation and 
democracy13.   
 
                                                          
13 Beach, Analysing Foreign Policy, p21 
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These interdependencies mean that not only do elites interact formally in 
international organisations such as the EU and the UN, but also at the trans-
state level with bureaucracies, NGOs and other forums interacting across state 
boundaries and affecting the policy process.  In fact, many civil servants may 
find they have more in common with their counterparts in other state 
governments than with their colleagues in other Ministries in Britain, 
relationships further solidified by civil servants from Britain taking up 
placements and secondments in other European capitals.  For a trading nation 
state such as Britain, economic interests are global and have a further powerful 
constraining effect on policy options.  This complex interdependence builds 
collaboration and cooperation between states, the consequent agreements to 
abide by overarching norms, principles and rules even while there is no 
overarching global hierarchy imposes constraints on state behaviour reducing 
the reliance on the use of military force and balance of power politics.  
 
One of the consequences of these complex interdependencies then is the 
creation of a zone of peace among liberal states, holding the potential for a 
more general peace by promoting more liberal democratic governance.  This 
zone of peace, however, holds true only among the community of liberal states, 
the record against non-liberal states is not as good, with liberal states having 
been both the aggressor and defender against non-liberal states in numerous 
conflicts.  This theory, then, offers insight into policies which promote good 
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governance and democracy building, as a way to extend a zone of peace and 
therefore increase the security for existing liberal democracies.  At the same 
time, it helps explain the more aggressive stance of liberal states towards those 
not holding similar values or adhering to similar norms.  
 
Building on these two overarching theoretical approaches foreign policy analysis 
examine in detail the factors which influence the foreign policy decision making 
process within a state.  Within the state’s executive, foreign policy analysis 
considers how decision makers respond to the international environment.  FPA 
offers understanding of unit-level variables and how these affect the decision 
making process and outcomes, looking at elite perceptions which are shaped by 
their world views, the role of the leader in making foreign policy and how his or 
her personality and perceptions may affect the decision making process any 
interest groups which may hold influence over their decisions, their domestic 
ability to mobilise the resources to carry out their polices (or constraints that 
prevent them from doing so) and the role of bureaucratic politics and public 
opinion in both policy making and policy implementation. 
 
Foreign policy analysis provides the tools to allow scholars to further investigate 
foreign policy decision making and processes.  Considering states as rational 
actors is a powerful tool for investigation, by focussing on the central 
assumptions that states act on national interests and make decisions based on 
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this.  Approaching decision making this way, foreign policy can be viewed as a 
process where an issue is identified, a state may have a number of aims when 
dealing with the particular issue and will rank them appropriately, then will 
make decisions based on this, the information available at the time, and the 
resources they have available enact the chosen course of action.  However, for 
many this is too simple an analysis, for the decision makers also must be taken 
into consideration, their perception, knowledge, skills and experience will have 
a bearing on how they view particular issues, and on their opinions on what 
particular course of action is necessary. 
 
In her work on foreign policy analysis Valerie Hudson, for example, states that 
there are certain instances which make it more likely that the assessment of a 
leader’s characteristics will “matter” when it comes to foreign policy decision 
making. For instance, the type of regime provides a constraint to the amount of 
influence a leader may have of the policy making process, thus it may be more 
imperative to assess the characteristics of a leader in a dictatorship as their 
influence may be more direct or in a highly centralized government, such as 
Britain.  Another factor is how interested a given leader is in foreign policy.  A 
leader who is not interested, preferring to concentrate on domestic policy, may 
delegate substantial authority to a subordinate, the views and perceptions of 
that delegate then may hold more importance.  Policy dealing with crisis 
situations is by necessity dealt with at the highest levels of government, thus 
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leaders will be involved in decision making and while some leaders will make an 
attempt to curb their own predispositions in these situations, it is much more 
likely they will fall back on old biases and perceptions.  Similarly, a leader’s 
influence may be more apparent in ambiguous situations when, if advisors are 
unable to come to a decision on a course of action for lack of reliable 
information, a leader may be referred to in order to pass judgement.  A leader 
who possesses diplomatic experience or has expertise in a specific area may 
also may have a greater influence on particular matters of decision making, and 
leadership style may also play a role in determining how much a leader will 
influence foreign policy decision making.14 
 
As Hudson states above, a leader may well be involved more in foreign policy 
decision making at times of crisis.  Similarly, top levels of government might 
involve themselves more when the issue at hand is one which they consider a 
“high” priority for the state, a priority perceived to be crucial to national 
interests15.  Where this is not the case then some analysts turn to bureaucratic 
politics models to explain foreign policy decision making.  Here foreign policy is 
not as the output of a unitary actor but “the result of political compromise 
among competing bureaucratic and political elites16”, this model considers the 
influence of not just decision makers in government but the bureaucratic 
                                                          
14 V Hudson Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and contemporary theory, (Plymouth, 2007) p37-38 
15 C Aran & C Alden, Foreign Policy Analysis: New approaches, (Abingdon, 2012) p37  
16 D Sanders, Losing an Empire Finding a Role (Basingstoke,1990) p273  
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departments also involved.  Each bureaucracy may have a different perspective 
on a single foreign policy issue. For example, the FCO may see the sales of 
arms to a particular country as detrimental to their long term aims of stability in 
that region, the Department of Defence consider it in terms of national security 
and the Ministry of Trade purely in terms of national wealth, looking through 
the lens what is a priority for that department.  Added to this is the idea that 
each of these has an identity, for instance the FCO has been accused of being 
Arabist in its point of view, leading to it pursuing a certain line of policy in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict.  Adding to the complexity of how bureaucracies impact 
foreign policy is their potential impact in implementing any decisions made.  
Their interpretation of a decision and whether or not they approve of the 
decision may influence how they implement it thus can have bearing on how 
successful the policy ultimately is.  The bureaucratic politics model provides 
further explanation of foreign policy decision making, particularly in non-crisis 
situations or where issues are of lower priority. 
 
While the leaders in government and elites in the state may have a more 
immediate influence on foreign policy decision making, foreign policy analysts 
also look for wider influences.  Looking at public opinion and foreign policy 
making, Piers Robinson states there are two main perspectives – the pluralist 
model and the elite model.  The first assumes no group or set of interests has 
priority over another since power is spread evenly throughout society, with 
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media and public independent of political influence meaning they strongly 
restrict the behaviour of the executive.  The second model posits the opposite, 
that power is concentrated within political and societal elites making public 
opinion and media subservient to these elites, and far less independent than 
the pluralistic model suggests.17 
 
The role of the media is contested by academics, Christopher Hill remarking 
that on this “commentators are long on opinion and short on evidence”18.  Hill 
calls the media role in foreign policy as that of a “gate keeper”, with its 
influence manifest in two ways, influence over the public and influence over the 
decision makers.19  Put another way, the perceived role of the media includes 
agenda setting, being a (neutral) source of information (here there is a distinct 
split in Britain between the television news media such as the BBC assumed to 
perform a function of unbiased reporting versus the print media often affiliated 
with a particular political party or point of view20) and also, of being a 
“government propaganda tool”.21   
 
One more role can be added to this, sitting adjunct to its agenda setting role, 
the media is a vehicle by which the government can be held to account – again, 
                                                          
17 Robinson “The role of public opinion and the media” Smith, Hadfield, Dunne, Foreign Policy, 
p169 
18 C Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, (Basingstoke, 2003) p273 
19 Ibid, p247 
20 Robinson, “The role of public opinion and the media”, p173 
21 Alden & Aran, Foreign Policy Analysis p56-57 
40 
to be effective in this role the media must be free of political influence.  While 
demonstrating the roles the media plays in foreign policy making is one thing, 
assessing its impact is another.  It should be noted that, despite the so called 
“CNN effect”, the 24-hour news broadcasts, access to far off corners of the 
world giving the media the capacity to force action on particular issues22, 
foreign affairs do not dominate its agenda, even in non-tabloid papers foreign 
affairs accounts for 33 – 45% of space, with a similar ratio in television news 
media.23 
 
Explanation of British foreign policy must be approached on a number of levels 
to be fully explained.  Partly, this is the international system and the constraints 
that this puts on the policy maker, such as having the power capacity to pursue 
certain policies.  On another level, British international political and economic 
behaviour must be viewed through the lens of liberal interdependencies, its 
power to pursue certain policies both enhanced through membership of 
organisations such as the UN and EU, but constrained by the application of 
principles and norms this implies, and the need for consensus on policy 
direction within these institutions.  Lastly, the tools of FPA must be used to 
assess the role of internal state agents have on constructing foreign policy in 
reaction to the international environment, such as the perception of decision 
                                                          
22 Ibid p56 
23 Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, p275 
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makers, potential competitive role of government departments, the role of the 
media and public opinion.  
 
FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS: UK POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST 
AND SYRIA 
FOREIGN POLICY DETERMINANTS 
 
The international system 
 
Over the past century British power capacity has declined significantly, this is 
the context in which it has pursed its foreign policy.  Having entered the 20th 
century a great power with a significant empire, British foreign policy, initially 
defined by its attempts to maintain that power position, turned to managing its 
decline from power.  It has done this against a background of having to defend, 
at first, major international commitments in both its formal and informal empire 
then, latterly, in terms of maintaining and securing its considerable international 
interests including its economic interests in the Middle East, and ensuring the 
security of these through bilateral ties, defence agreements and in encouraging 
the MEPP, seen as a key to stability in MENA. 
 
As British power has declined, alliances have become central to maintaining 
security and allowing Britain to “punch above its weight”.  The creation and 
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maintenance of the US-UK special relationship, despite the inherent imbalance 
of power has been a central tenet of UK foreign policy.  Britain has continually 
sought to engage the US in the international arena in order to bolster its own 
interests.  It was the Bevin government, quick to fear Soviet expansionism 
following World War Two, that sought to engage the US in taking a bigger role 
in the Middle East.  Originally used to preserve British access to India and 
defend British interests, UK military bases in the Middle East were maintained 
long after their original purpose was gone in order to supplement the efforts of 
the US against the Communist threat and only decommissioned when they 
could no longer be justified either in terms of cost or maintaining Britain’s 
security.  The commitment to the special relationship remained, different 
governments viewing it as central to their key priorities, for example, the 
Conservative Thatcher government seeing the US as central to European 
security.  The Labour Blair government justified the decision to back the Iraq 
war, as necessary in order to ensure the US did not “go it alone”, and as an 
attempt to maintain some influence over US policy.   
 
Despite the closeness geographically and the economic interdependence that 
ties Britain to Europe, in terms of security it would appear Britain still sees the 
US as its major ally which has implications for its relations in the Middle East.  
Close alignment to the US therefore impacts on how Britain behaves 
internationally, and the close security relationship carries the risk of embroiling 
Britain in America’s often unpopular interventions in the Middle East. 
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Britain has also sought over time to balance its decline in power through its 
membership of multilateral organisations, in particular the EU, but also in the 
UN (specifically its position as one of the five permanent members of the 
Security Council), the IMF, the WTO and the G8.  Membership of international 
organisations and alliances have been a key component intended to allow 
Britain to continue to exert influence on international relations allowing it to 
pursue and protect British interests above and beyond its economic and military 
capacities.  Moreover, Britain’s role as a permanent member of the UNSC 
arguably draws it into international crises, for better or worse, in a way that 
would not otherwise be likely for a mere middle power. 
 
At the same time membership of these organisations provide a constraint to 
foreign policy behaviour as influence is indirect, and also membership requires 
member states accept and maintain certain agreed upon norms.  Additionally, 
to act through these organisations and alliances requires gaining cooperation 
and compromise from the other members, not always something within in 
Britain’s capacity to influence, and sometimes makes policy less effective.  
Reconciling policy when two allies or organisations are at odds with each other, 
when to prioritise which alliance or organisation depending on the issue at 
hand, and what to do when the interests of other member states within an 
organisation are completely at odds with what Britain sees as in its interests, is 
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an additional challenge to membership.  Furthermore, making the wrong 
decision can not only undermine Britain’s own position, but the credibility of the 
organisations of which it is a member.  (Such was the case when the Blair 
government prioritised Britain’s alliance with the US over its duties as a 
responsible member of both the EU and UN).  These interdependencies then 
bring with them their own influence on the foreign policy behaviour of Britain. 
 
Together with Britain’s decline in status as a great power with the ability to 
pursue its goals unilaterally, these alliances and interdependencies have 
relevance when considering British behaviour in the Middle East.  Whilst the 
methods of achieving them may have changed over the years, British national 
interests in the Middle East, as seen from Whitehall, have been fairly consistent 
from the realist perspective.  There have been two overarching interests 
governing British activity in the region, firstly control of the oil resource, 
secondly, the need for regional stability.24   
 
Access to the immense oil and gas resources is a priority in terms of security, 
both of energy resources and economic interests.  A core concern for security 
has been a priority, initially in the sense of its physical interests in the Middle 
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East, latterly in terms of the threat to British security posed by international 
terrorism and always, in the general sense that maintaining stability in the 
Middle East protects British interests in that it is better for trade and the 
economy.  Membership of alliances and international organisations has 
impacted on how Britain has pursued its policies there, most important in this 
sense however, is the fact that high-level British involvement in such 
organisations has dictated British involvement in the Middle East region.  
Britain’s status as a permanent member of the UNSC is not reflective of its 
current power status, for example, but to maintain its relevance and seat Britain 
must stay involved in the world, and be seen to be working toward resolution of 
global level issues including those involving the Middle East. 
 
Britain in the Middle East, Regional Context 
British foreign policy is driven by the need to protect and promote the national 
interest.  While the scope of what is considered to be “national interest” may 
have become a more complicated and broader concept over time, central to 
British national interest, alongside the security of the state, is the protection of 
its economic interests abroad which, partly as a legacy of empire and British 
trading history, are extensive.  For the most part protecting British interests has 
meant an active concern in maintaining peace and stability and in the Middle 
East, generally, this has led to policy designed to preserve the status quo.  As a 
result, there have been numerous and repeated accusations that British 
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governments act only when their economic interests in the Middle East are 
threatened, rather than following a fair and even handed foreign policy for the 
best interests of the region itself (though the two are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive).  This has impacted on the perception of how far Britain can behave 
as a credible partner in the Middle East. 
 
A further consequence it that British foreign policy has been largely reactionary 
foreign policy, where action is only taken when a threat to the stability or status 
quo in the region is perceived which would be detrimental to British interests.  
This has given even more credence to criticisms that over the years Britain has 
had no Middle East policy or no consistent policy, as well as numerous criticisms 
that British policy in the Middle East is unethical or hypocritical.  In maintaining 
the status quo and protecting its economic interests Britain has, for example, 
maintained relationships with questionable regimes it deems friendly to its 
interests.  This has led to close bilateral relations and trade agreements with 
states which have questionable human rights records, whilst at the same time 
criticising other states with similar records but where British interests are not at 
stake.  This behaviour has damaged the Britain’s reputation, and the behaviours 
it demonstrates allows other regimes in the area, such as the Syrian regime, to 
bolster their legitimacy by using this as an example of imperial arrogance. 
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The contemporary relationship Britain has with the Middle East, generally, and 
more specifically with Syria, has been built on and in many ways constrained by 
the events surrounding the origins of the modern state system in the region.  
The construction of this state system was considered, not in the light of what 
was good for the people inhabiting it, but in the first instance, Britain’s 
immediate needs in terms of the British war effort, and in the second instance 
the longer term protection of British interests in the region and the Far East.  In 
fact, it is the British role in the creation of the modern Middle East, and British 
machinations in the area as the “great power” in the region--until that mantle 
was passed onto the Cold War superpowers--that has continued to define 
relations ever since, both where relations are somewhat more friendly, with 
states such as Jordan, and more antagonistic, such as the relationship with 
Syria.   
 
The relationship between Britain and Syria has, to a large extent, been defined 
by these flawed foundations despite the country never having been a British 
mandate.  Arguably the Levant region, with the exception of Palestine, was 
never a primary strategic priority of Britain in its own right but only in so far as 
it affected other British interests in the area, for example, its relationship with 
Iraq or, more recently, Britain’s continued interest in the MEPP.  This in itself 
resulted in a relationship between Britain and Syria which has been for the most 
part strained and at some points in the last century practically non-existent.  
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Memories of direct impact on Syrian history, of the British having broken their 
promises over “greater Syria” and the British role in the creation of the state of 
Israel have created an imperial legacy that has soured Anglo-Syrian relations 
from the start.  The anti-imperialist mandate of Arab nationalism, championed 
by the Syrian regime and providing legitimacy for its rule, ensured that these 
strained relations continued. 
 
On the occasions when the pursuit of the British interest has focussed on Syria 
it has tended to be as an adjunct to other more important imperatives, for 
example, to counter French or Soviet influence, to preserve access to Iraqi oil 
or the Suez Canal, to help progress the MEPP and facilitating an Israeli-
Palestinian settlement.  The perception, not unfairly, being that consideration 
for the Syrian people in these affairs is at best an afterthought, and certainly 
less important than the policy priority itself.  A lack of real interest in Syria and 
her people for their own sake, either economically or culturally in the same way 
as, for example, France cultivated in the years preceding it being awarded the 
Syria and Lebanon mandate, has led to a dysfunctional relationship.  This in 
many ways has benefitted successive Syrian regimes evoking Arab nationalism 
as a means to legitimise their rule, more than it has furthered the interests of 
United Kingdom. 
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Elites; the construction of national interests and world view. 
In Britain, foreign policy is traditionally seen to be an ‘elite’ arena of policy 
making in which relatively few people have any input and where there is less 
political argument in contrast to what is seen in domestic politics.  Some of this 
stems from the nature of foreign policy where often information is limited, 
access to intelligence is restricted and decisions are made very much in secret.  
For example, Mrs Thatcher’s decision to allow US Air Force to use bases in 
Britain when carrying out bombings on Libya25 was a decision taken by and 
known of by Mrs Thatcher and only a few close advisers (at least until after the 
event).  In Blair’s government it is alleged a number of foreign policy decisions 
were formed by a close-knit group of advisors and selected ministers on key 
issues outwith the more rigid Cabinet process, so much so his way of working 
was labelled by some observers as a “democracy”26 or “sofa style27” 
government.   
 
British foreign policy decisions are taken in light of what is seen, or at least 
asserted, by policy makers to be the national interest, leaving aside the extent 
to which these perceptions are shaped by the personal or political interests of 
the decision-makers.  In Britain the structure of politics is such that it is the 
government of the day that defines British national interest, through their 
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privileged access to information and their perception of the international 
system, and their estimation of the power Britain can bring to bear through 
various alliances and membership of international institutions.  
 
A fundamental factor in this is the perception that Britain should have a role in 
the world.  Britain’s status as a great power has declined over the past century 
as its economic and military resources diminished, this saw Britain’s physical 
withdrawal from its empire with policy designed around managing this.  Yet the 
idea still held by many elites of this world role has constrained Britain from a 
substantial withdrawal from world affairs.   
 
The strength of this perception was still evident after almost three decades of 
decline when the recommendations of the Berrill Report which reviewed British 
overseas interests, published in 1978, were rejected by the government.  This 
recommended a significant realignment of British interests; that a large amount 
of resources in pursuit of the Commonwealth idea was unnecessary; that 
Britain, a European power on par with three other medium-sized countries in 
the EC, would increasingly pursue its interests through influencing the policies 
of that organisation; a refocus away from non-Communist developed countries 
where there was really no requirement for them meant there should be 
reductions in diplomatic staff abroad; and a reduction in the deployment of 
defence staff overseas amongst other recommendations.  The general thrust of 
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the review called for a great reduction in Britain's international presence and 
was unpopular both within and outwith Parliament, and was rejected by the 
Government which stated that British interests extended around the world and 
it had to defend and promote its interests overseas28.  A constructivist analysis 
of this elite discourse, and its dissemination via the press, would go further in 
understanding what Britain takes to be its “national interest” than a mere 
examination of geopolitics. 
 
This idea that Britain has something “unique and exceptional” to contribute29 
holds sway in regard to its relations with the Middle East.  In particular, the 
belief Britain has a shared history and understanding with the countries of the 
Middle East.  This, the argument goes, gives the British government both a 
unique role in and a responsibility to the region, thus there is an expectation 
that Britain has a role to play in events in the Middle East.  This is evident, for 
instance, with regard to the peace process.  Despite, or because, of the British 
role in the creation of Israel there is the perception among certain elites of a 
continuing responsibility and of a unique understanding of the parties involved.  
At the same time there is the recognition that Britain does not have the 
capacity, alone, to make progress on the peace process with the prevailing 
opinion being that the US needs to be kept involved.  This concept was 
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demonstrated in Britain's behind the scenes involvement in the 2000 
negotiations with Peter Hain describing Britain’s “unique credibility” from being 
close to both the Palestinian and Israeli leadership at the time.30   
 
It is important, also, to recognise the importance of the school of thought policy 
makers most relate to as this informs their policy decision.  British elites have 
often been criticised as being from the Realist school, of taking a pragmatic 
realpolitik approach to foreign policy making.  The Cold War period can be seen 
in this light, with the Western bloc locked in a balance of power battle against 
the Soviets.  Yet Britain is one of an ever growing number of liberal democratic 
states and for many the end of the Cold War signalled a victory for liberal 
democracies.   
 
Traditionally Labour elites are associated with the tenets of liberal 
internationalism, that is: 
 States share common interests and values in mitigating worst effects on 
international anarchy by building international institutions to regulate state 
interaction 
 All states obligation to forgo pursuit of narrow national interests and work 
toward common good 
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 Foreign policy should be based upon democratic principles and universal 
norms 
 Collective security systems represent a more stable and constructive 
approach to international affairs than balance of power theories 
 Anti-militarism 
 Belief in solidarity between workers of the world31  
The practicality and interpretation of these liberal assumptions have been a 
source of debate for the Labour party.32  In terms of foreign policy Blair’s 
government did, however, go further than just nodding in the direction of this 
world view particularly regarding the first four assumptions.  Explicitly rejecting 
the idea of realpolitik as a way to guide foreign policy decision making, Foreign 
Secretary Cook quick to set out his vision “ethical dimension” to British foreign 
policy.  This gave rise to the idea that New Labour would bring a new outlook 
to British foreign policy not simply based on security and pursuit of national 
interest. 
 
There are risks of overestimating the effect this actually had on British foreign 
policy.  The most prevalent criticism being that not much of Labour’s actual 
foreign policy, once the spin had been taken off, was actually new.  In fact, 
continued mercantile policies necessary to support the British arms industries 
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underlines the difficulty for any government, not to mention lack of will, to 
eschew so-called “national interest” based foreign policies and replace this with 
ethical or human rights based policies.   
 
For example, supporting the democratically elected government in Sierra Leone 
ignored the questionable credentials of Kabbah (though in the eyes of many he 
wasn’t as bad as the alternative) and ignored the fact that Kabbah required 
Nigerian help in order to restore his position, a government notorious for its 
human right abuses.33  More significantly supplying arms to the government in 
exile was in contradiction of a British sponsored UNSCR which had put an arms 
embargo in place34.  This demonstrates a highly selective application of ethical 
responsibility that led some observers to suggest New Labour foreign policy is 
business as usual.  It is, then, not without justification that the reasoning 
behind British involvement in the Middle East has been treated with suspicion. 
 
Where Labour’s “new” liberal priorities – democracy building and the defence of 
human rights for example - come in conflict with the more traditional aspects of 
its foreign policy, economic interests, security of global energy supplies, the 
tendency seems to have it that Britain’s more traditional concerns win out.  In 
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the Middle East, this is seen in the continued support of states with 
questionable human rights record in exchange for stability, or resources.  
 
In the case of Syria, while New Labour was abundantly clear on its desire to see 
political and economic reform in Syria, this clashed with the interest it had in 
intelligence sharing with Syria (a change to a democratic government would 
invariably place constraints on its intelligence services).  Furthermore, while 
successive British governments have denounced Syrian support for terrorism, 
Syria’s relationship with terrorist groups offers a modicum of control on their 
actions that could benefit Britain.  Syria has been able to help with the release 
of British hostages on a number of occasions and the Syrians act as a go 
between with these groups with regard to the Peace Process – in the short 
term, then, the British need a Syrian relationship to deal with these groups. 
 
Despite an expressed commitment to multilateralism, in practice there is 
evidence that New Labour foreign policy undermined its aims.  Blair’s “effective 
multilateralism”35 could be seen as an example of this.  Unconvinced of the 
ability of the UN to be reactive to international crises Blair argued for the 
legitimacy of ad-hoc coalitions to react to events when the UNSC was unable to 
pass a resolution for action.  
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This difference between rhetoric and action brings to the fore other questions 
on how British foreign policy is made.  These discrepancies may be explained 
by the reactionary nature of foreign policy (therefore the constraint is the 
international arena), owing to the inconsistencies of leadership perceptions and 
goals, or as a consequence of outside influences such as interest groups, non- 
governmental organisations.  Looking at the interaction of the policy makers, 
and the influences over them can provide clarity to the foreign policy decisions 
taken. 
 
The Decision-making Process 
The structure of Government in Britain is such that a strong Prime Minister, 
(particularly with a large majority in Parliament) has considerable scope to 
influence foreign policy decision making.  John Rentoul quite concisely writes, 
“Prime Ministers always run their own foreign policy, a fact of British political 
history which often make the Foreign Secretary’s one of the more difficult of 
the great offices of the state to hold”.36  This one sentence sums up not only 
the who of foreign policy making, as well as capturing the inherent tension in 
the roles of two great offices of state.  Paul Williams also underlines this factor 
writing that there is “persistent tension between the executive’s desire to lead 
and... centralise policy-making, and the desire of secretaries of state to retain 
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autonomy for their own department”37.  This tension has been exacerbated in 
recent times as the number of international summits and meetings a Prime 
Minister has to attend has increased, for example meetings of the European 
Union, the G8, the Commonwealth heads of government summits all “lock the 
incumbent inescapably to a considerable amount of foreign affairs activity.”38  
As a result the Prime Minister, rather than the Foreign Secretary, has become a 
focal point in the international arena. 
 
Both Thatcher and Blair have been able to exert the influence of their office 
over foreign policy making, and both have brought strongly held personal 
perceptions which shape its output.  Whilst, their input may not be felt across 
all aspects of British foreign policy, the Middle East region has held particular 
interest for British Prime Ministers – for historical reasons it is a region Prime 
Ministers have conceived Britain should have a role, it is a region in which 
several crises, with implications for British security, have arisen requiring UK 
action, and a region in which Britain has important commercial interests in and 
whilst they may not always relate directly to Syria, Syria can affect them and 
policy toward Syria is often determined by them.   
 
                                                          
37 P Williams “Who’s Making UK Foreign Policy?” International Affairs  80:5 (2004) p912 
38 Coles, Making Foreign Policy, p93 
58 
Steven Kettell writes that “the British political system combines the worst 
elements of supreme executive power with a relative paucity of effective check 
and balances on its use”.39  This is to some extent true given Britain’s first past 
the post electoral system wherein a government with a minority of votes can 
get a majority of seats, and the impact of party discipline, in which the ruling 
party normally backs the government and the opposition has little chance to 
constrain it.  It can be shown there is potential for the Prime Minister, certainly, 
to have considerable impact on the decision making process but there are also 
restraints, such as the Cabinet, Parliament and public opinion. 
 
One of the primary bodies in determining Britain’s primary national interests 
and policy choices is the Cabinet.  The Cabinet, made up of the Government’s 
senior ministers, and its subcommittees are seen to be at the centre of policy 
making in government, and should be pivotally placed to influence foreign 
policy making.  Writing even as early as 1988, however, Michael Clark wrote the 
reality of the Cabinet system is a “network of at least 25 secret sub committees, 
powerful secretariat, the PMs own office, untold numbers of civil servant 
“shadow committees”, liaison committees and ad-hoc procedures between 
officials in different departments ... highly centralised but curiously informal”.40  
How this system works is dependent on what role the incumbent Prime Minister 
and his or her colleagues want it to play.41  This means that the system is open 
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to manipulation to reduce the impact the Cabinet can have.  Further, the power 
of the Cabinet has over foreign policy making has reduced over time as the 
scope of what foreign policy is has widened, making it practically impossible for 
that one body to oversee all foreign policy decision making.   
 
As a result, the Cabinet, to some observers, has become little more than a 
rubber stamp to decisions already made.  This is not the same thing as saying 
that Cabinet ministers do not have a say in foreign policy making.  It is true 
that various Prime Ministers have worked with various smaller groupings on 
specific issues, commonly when it comes to crises, but these have often been 
official sub-committees of the Cabinet or groupings of the Ministers relevant to 
the issue at hand.   
 
Whatever the grouping – the Cabinet, a subcommittee or a small group of 
senior officials and advisors – the expectation is that it should act to curb or 
balance potentially arbitrary choices in foreign policy decision making.  In fact, 
what can occur is what foreign policy analysts term “group think”, where group 
members are reluctant to go against the general consensus.  This may occur 
naturally just as a dynamic of a group, however, a leader is also in a position to 
orchestrate it.  The Cabinet, made up of senior ministers all of whom owe their 
position to the Prime Minister who selects them, could almost be said to 
formalise this group think concept, especially when the Prime Minister in 
question is a particularly strong leader.  Going further, once a decision is taken 
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ministers must take collective responsibility for that decision, so given the 
secrecy in which the Cabinet operates it can seem like there is little dissent.42  
Still, even a strong Prime Minister can face difficulties if he or she fails to listen 
to his or her cabinet – Mrs Thatcher, for example, was significantly damaged by 
the resignation of three members of her Cabinet.43  This can act as a constraint 
on a Prime Minister as resignations from the Cabinet can prove damaging. 
 
Parliament itself can also influence foreign policy though its role historically has 
been relatively subordinate.  It can provide another restraint on foreign policy 
behaviour and does have opportunity to debate foreign affairs issues, and also 
to question the Prime Minister at Question Time, but as Britain’s international 
role has declined so has interest and knowledge of international affairs among 
members of Parliament with domestic interests taking priority.44  While there is 
information available on foreign policy issues, it is not always comprehensive 
and time set aside for discussion of foreign policy within the legislature is 
limited.  There are two exceptions to this, firstly, European Union policy which 
has a potential domestic impact (seen by some as an extension of domestic 
policy rather than purely foreign policy or at least sitting uncomfortably 
somewhere between the two) and, secondly, in reacting to international 
crises.45   
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In fact, arguably, the British legislature has traditionally had very little impact 
on the making of British foreign policy.  There is a very limited, very formalised 
structure which allows scrutiny of decisions which have already been made 
rather than a structure that allows Parliament to inform the policy making 
process.  This is not to discount the impact of Parliament but that impact is 
probably more felt at times of acute crises in foreign affairs or when the 
Government in question is a minority government and is thus more vulnerable 
to the tide of opinion in Parliament.  In general, the simple fact is that foreign 
policy is rarely something that MPs constituents are interested in, therefore, 
there is little push to change the current systems to make foreign policy more 
responsive or accountable in Parliament 
 
Potentially a more powerful check on the Government’s behaviour are the 
Select Committees, and two committees of special note in terms of general 
foreign policy are the Foreign Affairs Select Committee (FAC) and the 
Intelligence and Security Select Committee (ISC).  The FAC, established by the 
House of Commons in 1979, has been the major body to scrutinise foreign 
affairs issues; its members generally have a certain expertise in the area of 
foreign policy, and to some extent it can hold the government and FCO 
accountable for policy.  While it’s prominence has grown over time, and its 
reports are important in the sense of reflecting how Parliament views the 
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governments conduct of foreign policy, it’s impact is limited as it remains under 
resourced and only able to examine a few issues every year.46   
 
On those issues the FAC investigates, its functions are limited with its main 
powers being inquiry and monitoring of decisions already taken.  When scrutiny 
by Parliament or public pressure results in real inquiry into foreign policy the 
Government of the day retains the power to limit the scope and fix the 
framework of the inquiry, limiting both the findings and the impact of such 
inquiries. This is a criticism which has been levelled against several recent 
inquiries both the Hutton Inquiry, which investigated the circumstances around 
the death of Ministry of Defence (MoD) employee David Kelly, who had been 
the source of BBC reports alleging that the Government had deliberately misled 
the public on Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction in its September dossier 
leading up to the war; and the Butler Report, which was tasked with examining 
the intelligence on Iraq’s WMD before the war and the discrepancies between it 
and the intelligence discovered since the war; it also covered more broader 
issues relating to the intelligence available on WMD programmes in countries of 
concern and the global trade in WMD47.   
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The FAC also suffers from its rivalry with other committees.  For instance, the 
Commons European Scrutiny Committee increasingly takes an interest in issues 
traditionally seen as a FAC area of interest, this can result in resentment in the 
institutions being scrutinised as they are being asked for the same information 
by two different sets of MPs,48 a consequence of which can be a lack of 
cooperation making investigations more difficult and therefore less effective. 
 
Perhaps even more important is the FAC’s ongoing war for influence with the 
ISC.  This committee was set up by former Foreign Secretary Lord Hurd under 
the Intelligence Services Act 199449, with members from both Houses of 
Parliament who were appointed by and reported directly to the Prime Minister.  
At the time, Hurd assured the House the establishment of this committee would 
not limit the role of any existing committees yet since it was set up “successive 
Secretaries of State have on more than one occasion refused to allow FAC 
access to the agencies, on the grounds that Parliamentary scrutiny of those 
agencies is carried out by the ISC”50.    Meanwhile the FAC has on a number of 
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occasions expressed frustration at being denied permission to speak to officials 
or access to information on grounds on national security. 
 
Arguably the impact that Parliament and its Select Committees have is growing.  
Whilst Parliament, and indeed the general public, have been seen to have little 
direct impact on foreign policy making, the very fact that New Labour published 
open dossiers (now much maligned) and took the Iraq intervention to a 
Parliament vote has set a precedent that will now be difficult to overturn, and, 
as seen in the Syrian case, provide a large obstacle to independent foreign 
policy making by the government of Prime Minister David Cameron.  
Information is also much more widely available, so both MPs and members of 
the public are much better informed on international affairs making it more 
likely they would want to influence government policy.  This too has an impact 
on the power of Select Committees, whose findings are made public, which 
adds to their power to constrain government behaviour. 
 
Central to foreign policy making in Britain has always been, naturally, the 
Foreign Office.  Given Britain’s historical global role and interests, this Office has 
traditionally been powerful, as has the Minister who holds the post of Secretary 
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.  For those studying how 
foreign policy is made in Britain, then, the FCO, with its Middle East department 
and Ambassadors in situ, is a key instrument to review.   
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As controllers of information, providers of advice and implementation of policy 
they have considerable influence on British foreign policy.  Again however, the 
FCO has seen its influence decline in numerous ways over the past century.  A 
decrease in British power abroad has seen a similar decline in the influence of 
the FCO.  Membership of the European Union, the norms and legislation 
inherent within that has considerably blurred the line between domestic and 
foreign policy, meaning a number of “domestic” ministries now have direct 
contact with their counterparts in the European Union, cutting down FCO 
influence there.   
 
This has been compounded by the FCO’s inability to advocate for itself and the 
work it does especially in terms of value for money to the Treasury.  As a 
result, its budget has come under attack51 (though this can also be seen in 
terms of interdepartmental rivalry as the Chancellor of the Exchequer is the 
third of the “big” offices of state alongside the PM and Foreign Secretary).  The 
rivalry between the Treasury and the FCO for influence in the government was 
important in more than simple financial terms with the former department 
being seen as a “separate elite” having the “pick of the cream of the recruits,”52 
again casting restrictions on the power of the FCO to press its influence on 
decision making.  New Labour’s creation of the Department for International 
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Development (DfID) further added to the FCOs problems giving its control of 
the aid budget to the new department, removing a powerful tool for foreign 
policy.   
 
Looking into explaining how this can impact foreign policy decision making, 
bureaucratic politics comes into play.  Even where the FCO takes the lead in 
many aspects of foreign policy making and implementation, other ministries 
have a role also, such as the Department for Trade and Industry (DTI), the 
MoD, the security agencies among other, the latter especially in terms of 
controlling information.  Priorities for these ministries may not be the same as 
those in the FCO and may lead to implementation of policies not in keeping 
with the general thrust of British foreign policy.  In spite of these constraints, it 
would be wrong to say that the FCO is simply reduced to implementing 
decisions taken elsewhere.  Staff in situ give the FCO privileged access to the 
relevant political and social elites in the countries in which they are based, 
alongside relevant and up to date data.   
 
The FCO has clear and established lines of communication and procedures it 
follows when advising Ministers.  Policy advice in the form of written 
recommendations and policy options, flow through layers of officials before it 
reaches ministers who decide whether to accept, adapt, or reject it.  This advice 
is commonly given at the request of the minister, or the minister asking if 
advice is needed on a particular issue, but “the guiding principle is that while 
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officials advise, ministers decide”53.  This is the formal procedure for seeking 
and giving advice and as such probably is most applicable to the “day to day” 
running of the FCO.  If a FCO official is asked to explain how foreign policy is 
made, this process is perhaps the easiest answer to give yet it does not give a 
complete picture.  One FCO official stated that it is the informal process that 
can be more important, and this can be based on the personal relationships 
between special advisors, senior civil servants and members of the Cabinet.  
Dependent on the issue at hand, the personalities of the Prime Minister and 
Foreign Secretary, and how they relate to each other, can have a substantial 
impact on policy formulation.54  In urgent situations, the importance of these 
informal relationships is heightened, as the formal policy process is “short 
circuited” with the Foreign Secretary calling on relevant advisors and officials 
for quick policy advice. 
 
While the civil servants in the FCO are not the decision makers, their 
involvement in the process is significant, as is the overall worldview of the 
institution itself.  Civil servants are expected to be politically neutral or 
independent (indeed there is currently an ongoing debate in Whitehall over the 
importance of an independent civil servants with some in Government arguing 
for the power to appoint their own choices to Senior positions in the civil 
service) the FCO can be seen to have its own general outlook, or to put it 
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another way, British foreign policy can be seen to have a traditional way of 
addressing issues.55  Individual civil servants will also use their own knowledge, 
experience and opinions, and these will influence how they present information 
and option on different issues.  Both these factors inevitably influence any 
advice given when policy is being decided on; latterly they will impact how 
policy decisions are implemented by officials and diplomats tasked to carry it 
out.   
 
This is demonstrated by what Jonathan Rynhold and Jonathan Spyer describe 
as the two orientations of British foreign policy in the Middle East.  One 
orientation, generally associated with the FCO, is more pro-Arab and supportive 
of the EU, the other is more aligned to support for the special relationship with 
the US, sympathetic toward Israel and is more often linked to the office of the 
prime minister.56  This provide some explanation as to why, on some occasions, 
British policy has been censured for being too pro-Arab only to be accused of 
being pro-Israeli on others, depending on whether it is the office of the Prime 
Minister, or that of the Foreign Secretary which is in the ascendency in making 
foreign policy at the time.  Over the longer term it has perhaps served as a 
balancing factor to foreign policy behaviour towards the Middle East as one side 
serves as a check to the other. 
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While much has been made of various Prime Ministers and their use of special 
advisors in recent times, often these advisors have a background with the FCO 
providing another avenue by which it can influence decision making.  In having 
access to and control of pertinent and timely information through a 
considerable diplomatic network, and given Britain's need to use avenues of 
soft power, the FCO is still positioned to have significant impact on decision 
making. 
 
A final factor to consider in the foreign policy decision making process is public 
opinion and, with this in mind, the role of the media.  It is of course a central 
tenet of a liberal democracy that the government is responsible to the 
electorate it represents.  On the domestic scene this is not a straightforward 
concept as decision-makers represent more than simply those who voted them 
in.  On the foreign front, this must be broadened to include allies, internal 
organisations, even colleagues in similar parties in other countries.57  Even 
taking account of the need to balance these sometimes conflicting groups to 
whom decision makers are responsible, there is the notion that the decision 
must be taken in the best interest of these constituents, something which does 
not necessarily mean a decision will be popular.  In foreign policy this means 
acting in the national interest which as previously discussed is problematic in 
terms of definition.  The assumption here, that the decision makers make 
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decisions based on information not open to the general public, is taken by some 
to mean there is less need to take account of public opinion when making 
foreign policy. 
 
For many analysts, the difficulty of assessing the role of public opinion in 
decision making lies around information and interest.  It is perhaps easier to 
provide evidence of a role for interest groups - lobby groups or single interest 
groups - that campaign and are knowledgeable about specific issues (in fact 
members of these groups may be invited into the government’s decision 
making process to share their expertise).  What is more contested is the role of 
public opinion in terms of the general public.  While a direct way of holding a 
government to account is through elections, it is difficult to: 1. Find many 
examples of elections in Britain being fought on foreign policy issues58 and 2. 
Demonstrate where a party has lost an election due to a foreign policy issue.  
Labour may have lost the election in 2010 but it would be hard to say whether 
this loss was a direct result of foreign misadventure, or the fact the economy 
was in crisis, or, perhaps, the idea that Gordon Brown was not the man to turn 
things around for Britain. 
 
Added to this is the central issue of just how interested and/or informed the 
general public is on foreign policy issues.  Some experts put this figure as little 
as five to twenty percent of the general public having any interest in or keeping 
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up to date with matters of foreign policy. Even then this is dependent on the 
issue at hand, with economy or issues of war and peace being more likely to 
illicit their interest than everyday diplomatic issues.59  A normal source of 
information and agenda setting for the general public, given this lack of interest 
or effort when it comes to foreign affairs, is the media. 
 
Whilst the jury might be out over the actual impact that public opinion has on 
the decision makers, there is evidence to suggest that decision makers are 
aware of the need to control public opinion (implicitly this suggests they feel 
that public opinion is important).  The decision early on in the Blair government 
to strengthen the press office under the strong lead of Alistair Campbell to 
establish a Strategic Communications Unit60 can be seen to underline the 
importance the government put on getting out the right message to the public.   
 
This impulse to control the media continued when NATO’s failure to counter the 
negative media coverage of the Kosovo campaign led to a series of public 
relations disasters for the organisation.  Blair, convinced NATO’s actions were 
right and justified, and frustrated at NATO’s blundering with the press sent 
Alistair Campbell to deal with the problem, a strategy which, whilst somewhat 
successful was set back by the reality of NATO bombing non-military targets by 
mistake during the campaign.61  They also went to great lengths to ensure that 
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their argument for bombing Iraq, that Saddam had WMD and was a real threat 
to Britain, was prevalent in the media62.  With such emphasis on media 
strategy, the Blair government quickly became synonymous with the concept of 
“spin”.  Clearly this can be seen as evidence of decision makers’ interest in 
getting their own message out to the general public, implicitly giving weight to 
the argument that public opinion matters, but also to that of the elite model 
perspective when looking at the role of public opinion in foreign policy. 
 
Yet the Blair government went to war in Iraq knowing that according to polls 
taken at the time the British public was against it, 63% of the public against 
Britain joining US action against Iraq without a UNSC resolution63 according to 
one poll taken on the eve of the war casting doubt on the level of impact public 
opinion has on decision makers.  Furthermore, despite its aggressive media 
strategy, Downing Street still accused the BBC, a state funded but independent 
news media, of bias in its reporting of the Iraq war.    
 
The Parliamentary votes in 2013 and 2015 on the decision over whether to 
bomb Syria or not, might be used to link public opinion to decision making.  A 
poll in 2013 indicated 60% of the British public coming out against military 
action against the Asad regime in Syria.64  Similar polls prior to the Parliament 
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vote in 2015, showed support for strikes against ISIS in Syria at 48% for and 
31% against.65  It could be seen that the vote against action in 2013 and in 
2015 followed the trend of public opinion but what is difficult to judge or 
evidence is how much this factor weighed into decision makers minds over 
other factors such as the different context in which the votes were taken (the 
Paris attacks and migration crisis for example), the different targets (ISIS as 
opposed to Asad) and the difference perceived in the direct threat posed to 
Britain by ISIS rather than Asad, the different political context in Parliament 
(Conservative rather than coalition government), to name but a few.     
 
In cases where the media could be seen to be setting the agenda playing a role 
in holding the government to account such as, for example, its coverage of 
British arms fairs, of British arms exports or its relationship with states which 
have questionable human rights records such as China and Saudi Arabia, other 
interests, mainly economy and security, seem to be given priority.  Long term, 
the media plays a role in helping to shape the social discourse in nations so 
altering the public perception in terms of national identity66, changing the 
societal idea of what is acceptable and what is not acceptable of our decision 
makers.  This, then, may ultimately adjust the broad constraints that public 
opinion provides to decision making limiting foreign policy behaviour.     
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It should be noted that while all the above factors play a role in the British 
foreign policy making process, with the exception of the role of the executive 
their impact is likely to be less in terms of direct Anglo-Syrian relations given 
this has never consistently been an area of priority for Britain in terms of either 
political or economic interests. 
 
FOREIGN POLICY OUTPUTS:  
Phases in policy outputs toward Syria 
Several phases and watersheds in UK policy can be identified and change and 
continuity in these can be explained by changes in the above foreign policy 
determinants. While this will constitute the substance of the chapters that 
follow, here, a brief overview is provided. 
 
British foreign policy toward Syria has been influenced by the broader context 
of British Middle East policy and its wider interests and interdependencies.  At 
various times Britain has tried to engage with Syrian elites in order to pursue 
these policies and interests with the result, more often than not, being 
detrimental to both the Anglo-Syrian relations and unhelpful in achieving the 
outcomes sought by Britain government.  During the early part of the century 
the need to preserve British influence in the Middle East took priority leading to 
contradictory policies and promises, and left a legacy that in fact, alongside 
Britain’s economic and military decline, made it difficult then impossible for 
Britain to achieve that outcome.   
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This era is explored in Chapter one which considers the impact of two world 
wars on British policy toward the Middle East region and Syria.  It looks at how 
these wars were causal factors in foreign policy decisions that produced 
contradictory and counterproductive agreements and policies.  The impact 
these had on Britain’s ability to effectively pursue its interests in both political 
and economic terms is also considered. 
 
On the international level, Britain was a major power attempting to maintain 
power balance in own favour.  While the First World War can be seen as a war 
of empire, of maintaining its primacy as a great power the Second World War 
can be seen arguably as an existential war.  In the Middle East this meant 
maintaining British assets during world wars and ensuring balance of power in 
British favour.  The necessity, during both wars, to mobilise all possible 
resources in the war effort and protect British interests in the Middle East from 
being overrun was a major influence of British policy making.  It also, on both 
occasions, resulted in a British military presence on the ground in Syria adding 
another dimension to Anglo-French great power rivalry.  
 
Layering over these considerations were the different parties involved in policy 
making, those in situ in the region, closer to the main players, those involved in 
negotiating deals with other European powers through traditional diplomatic 
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negotiations and those elites in London who again differed in opinion on how 
best to protect British interests.  All these factors necessarily playing a part in 
policy making toward the region, and Syria itself, while never placing Syria at 
the heart of that policy. 
 
In the period following the Second World War, the international system had 
irreversibly changed for Britain.  Once a great power with a vast empire, Britain 
had exhausted its resources, lacked the capacity to hold onto its empire and 
facing the growth of the two new superpowers, and particularly how to counter 
the threat the Soviets posed to its interests on the Middle East.  Britain’s 
policies in this period became about managing that decline, holding on to what 
influence it could, and ultimately maintaining security both of Britain itself and 
its worldwide assets and interests. 
 
Acknowledgement of Britain’s reduced power position in the international 
system necessarily meant re-evaluating Britain’s relationship with the Middle 
East in order to meet the perceived threat was apparent in Britain’s post war 
Foreign Secretary’s approach, “Bevin emphasized from the start his desire to 
eradicate old-style imperialist exploitation and develop a partnership with the 
Arabs which would modernize the economies of the region and increase the 
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prosperity of the ordinary people”67.  In other words, Bevin backed Arab 
nationalism as a way to further British interests without considering whether 
the interests of Britain and those of the new Arab leaders would necessarily be 
the same. 
 
The embodiment of this was British support for first the Arab League then 
latterly backing for the creation of the Bighead Pact.  Syria’s geopolitical 
position again meant that British foreign policy makers would have to take Syria 
into account when pursuing these policies, with their success or failure 
becoming contingent on Syrian participation.  Failure to realise the 
consequences of prior policy in the region, combined with evidence decline in 
capacity as a security or political partners for the states in the region marked 
clearly Britain’s decline in power, a decline which was hastened by the Suez 
fiasco but also by Syria’s refusal to join a pro-Western pact, which led Britain to 
sponsor, with the US, several failed coup attempts against nationalist Syrian 
governments, naturally leading to a worsening of relations. 
 
Still the decline of British power during the first half of the twentieth century 
and gradual withdrawal of British presence there meant it was not until the 
1980s that Anglo-Syrian relations would again come to the forefront of British 
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policy makers’ minds.  Chapter two concentrates on this period, with the 
government of Margaret Thatcher, and her foreign policy during this period.  
After years of declining influence in the region, as Cold War rivalry played out 
and British power waned, Thatcher’s government saw the re-emergence of 
confidence in British foreign policy.  Of significance during this period was, not 
only the re-emergence of confidence in British foreign policy, but changes in the 
international system which favoured the British establishment much more than 
they did the Syrian regime.  With the Soviet economy failing, the Cold War 
between the two superpowers came to an end with Britain being on the 
“winning” side, the Syrians conversely lost their main sponsor, problematic both 
in terms of economy and arms supply.  This would affect foreign policy making 
in both states, setting them on confrontational paths.   
 
Thatcher’s foreign policy toward Syria at this time, and the differences between 
it and policy toward other countries in the region, cannot be viewed purely in its 
bilateral relationship with that country.  Consideration must also be given to 
Thatcher’s alliance with the US and antagonistic relationship with the European 
Union.  The impact of Thatcher’s own very personal leadership style, her own 
prejudices and opinions not only on the socialist government in Syria and 
terrorism, but her relationships with both Europe and America and how this 
impacted her Middle East policy and specifically Anglo-Syrian relations.   
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Restraint on policy extremes which may have come from Whitehall in the past, 
was side-lined as Thatcher conducted foreign policy from No 10 rather than the 
FCO.  This strong aggressive leadership meant dissent was, at least publically, 
discouraged and was significant in the handling of a number of terrorist attacks 
perpetrated by groups with links to the Middle East.  As terrorist incidents on 
European streets increased, evidence indicated a number of Middle East 
regimes were involved in state sponsored terrorism including that of the Asad 
regime in Syria.  For Britain, one consequence of this was the complete 
breakdown in relations with Syria.   
 
This chapter reviews how Thatcher’s tough stance on international terrorism 
came to define Anglo- Syrian relations with special focus on the Hindawi affair 
that resulted in London cutting all ties with Damascus and the consequences of 
doing so on other British interests.  The links between the handling of this affair 
and the hostage crisis that also arose in this period are further investigated with 
specific attention to the impact of Thatcher’s role in British foreign policy 
making along with the role of other actors.  The chapter, then, reviews the 
factors that shaped Anglo-Syrian relations in this period, and how events 
shaped a response from the British Government that lasted four years, a 
situation which only came to an end when a state leader left office. 
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During the Thatcher period there were a number of views on the relative merits 
of dealing with Syria, several voices advocating a different approach was 
necessary than the one used, for example, to deal with Syria. 68  These voices 
were echoed in the Blair government in the aftermath of 9/11 and war in 
Afghanistan (it could also be seen in the reaction of many British observers, 
academic, political and others, as the events of the Arab Spring 2010 led to the 
current civil war in Syria).  Whilst adamant that the need to “deal with” Iraq 
could only be met by military action, forcibly removing Saddam Hussein, and 
despite the labelling of Syria as a rogue state, the British position still seemed 
to reflect the above opinion, that Syria was a state that we could “do business 
with”.  As long as Blair continued to hold to the idea that Syria could be 
pressured diplomatically then, intervention was not an option. 
 
The focus of chapters three and four is the foreign policy of the Blair 
government.  Almost a decade on from the end of the Cold War, the 
international system as the Blair government came to power in a unipolar 
international system, firm in the belief of the primacy of liberal democracy as a 
means to peace and security.  Rather than adhering in the belief that a strong 
Europe could be a counter balance to the power of the US, the Blair 
government strongly backed a continued close relationship with America, seeing 
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the US as having a continued relevance in maintaining security both in Europe 
and the wider international system.   
 
The Blair government also saw the more favourable international environment, 
and strong domestic positions as providing the opportunity to forge a new, 
stronger role for Britain in the world.  With membership of various international 
organisation, including being a permanent member of the United Nations 
Security Council, Britain was seen to have both the means and a responsibility 
to be involved in resolving some of the more intractable global issues and 
conflicts including the MEPP, encouraging democratic reform and good 
governance, and promotion of human rights.  More, with the end of the Cold 
War, there was opportunity for a more constructive role for organisations such 
as the UN, which had in the past been stalemated on various issues down Cold 
War lines. 
 
Chapter 3 specifically looks at the process of how foreign policy decisions were 
made and who makes them, whether there is anything distinctive about Blair’s 
foreign policy and what makes it distinctive, or whether it was simply a 
continuation from previous British governments.  This is explored particularly 
with reference to the Blair government assertion of pursuing a new kind of 
foreign policy, and establishing Britain’s role in the world.  It examines how 
Blair’s foreign policy decisions impacted on policy decisions in regard to the 
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Middle East region and what, if any, effect that had on Anglo-Syrian relations in 
the latter years of Hafez al-Asad’s government. 
 
The belief that Britain did have a role on the international stage, and could and 
should perform it was central to Blair’s foreign policy.  In terms of Syria, this 
would be of particular relevance in terms of the promotion of democratic values 
and good governance through the EU, and also in Blair’s push to reengage the 
Americans in the Middle East process.  At the same time, the Syrian regime was 
also having to deal with this unipolar international system which was not in its 
favour, looking to Europe to provide some balance for the Arab side of the 
peace process and as a source of potential stability for its economy.  Syria’s 
interest in securing EU support for its ailing economy and seeming interest in 
embarking on new talks on the peace process once again saw some 
convergence in Anglo-Syrian interests with the potential for positive forward 
movement.   
 
Chapter four explores the period after Bashar al-Asad became President.  This 
chapter reviews the expectations Blair had for Asad, and the policies that 
followed which arose from Blair’s early commitment to a new foreign policy 
path for Britain, to the export of British values and commitment to promoting 
good governance and human rights.  Anglo-Syrian relations were exposed to 
two changes in this period.  The first being Bashar coming into the Presidency 
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in Syria, which appeared to open the door to normalisation of relations with 
Syria.  More significant however was the impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on 
America on the perceptions of threat and security in the international arena.  
 
This chapter demonstrates the link between how foreign policy decision-making 
had come to be constructed in the years prior to the terrorist attacks, as 
explored in chapter 3, came to shape the policy decisions that followed.  It 
examines the impact of the foreign policy decisions that led to the Iraq war 
alongside the physical presence of British military personnel on the ground in 
Iraq affected or changed British interests in the region, and what the 
consequences of this was for Anglo-Syrian relations.  In doing so it considers 
what, if any, constraint this had on British foreign policy decision making in the 
region, particularly toward Syria, and how far British policy diverged from 
American policy once it was involved in the occupation of Iraq.   
 
Chapter 5 reviews British policy after the Arab Spring and the outbreak of the 
Syrian civil war.  While the international setting is still that of a world dominated 
by one superpower, it is one in which perceptions of threat, security and 
vulnerability have all been changed firstly by the terror attacks of the previous 
decade both on America and Europe, then by the disastrous Iraqi campaign 
which highlighted for many the weakness of military power as a response to 
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this kind of attack.  In turn it considers the effect of this to the approach taken 
to international crises and problems. 
 
British foreign policy in this period is viewed in the context of how decisions in 
the previous decade continues to influence policy makers.  Again it looks at how 
British foreign policy to the region as a whole has impacted on the relationship 
it has with Syria and any potential Syrian policies it follows.  It also considers 
Britain’s role in international institutions such as the UN and its “Responsibility 
to Protect” policy and what impact this has had, if any.  The chapter asks 
whether the foreign policy decisions leading to interventions in Libya and Mali 
had any impact on British policy toward the Syrian crisis.  In this it considers if 
there is a distinctive British interest to the latter two interventions that is not 
evident in its Syrian policy or that the crisis in Syria is inherently different which 
constrains British activity over the crisis.   
 
Summary of Approach 
The thesis will examine British policy toward Syria, broadly through the lens of 
neo-classical realism, and although the aim is to take this theoretical paradigm 
as a tool to guide the analysis, arguably its utility in understanding British-
Syrian case, supports claims that it is a significant advance on other 
approaches. 
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The argument of this thesis is that to understand UK relations towards Syria 
over the past century, they have to be viewed in the broader context of British 
policy on Middle East regional issues, and wider foreign policy priorities.  With 
no direct UK interests invested in Syria, the stance of leading UK politicians on 
the issues of post-World War regional order, international terrorism, military 
interventionism, arms sales, dictatorship and democratisation have 
circumscribed UK policy options in relation to Syria.  
 
As neo-classical realism would predict, a state’s position in the international 
system is the most important broad determinant on its foreign policy. In this 
respect Britain Middle East policy is shaped by the significant interests 
established in the region when Britain was a global empire, combined with its 
considerable subsequent decline in the power to defend those interests. 
 
 Britain has little in terms of direct national interest with Syria nor do any 
of its domestic interests have a significant stake in Syria. Moreover, a history of 
perceiving the other as unfriendly has also biased relations between Britain and 
Syria. Syria’s strategic geographic position in the Middle East has meant, 
however, that Syria periodically attracts UK attention in pursuing its other 
interests in the region, in fact Anglo-Syrian relations are to some extent defined 
by wider British interests in the regions and the perceived impact that comes 
from Syrian intransigence or usefulness with regard to securing these interests. 
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 Britain’s policy toward Syria will therefore be shaped by the ability of 
Syria to impact on Britain’s Middle East interests, yet also highly constrained by 
its declining power and interdependences such as its relationships with the US 
and with Europe.  Combined with Britain’s lack of direct interests, moreover, 
Britain’s importance to Syria and ability to influence is tied to its ability to work 
through these interdependencies.  Thus the strength of Britain's relationships 
within the EU has an impact in its ability to forward its foreign policy through 
that organisation.  Similarly, the utility of having strong relations with the US, 
other than in terms of security, is related directly to how far these strong 
relations allow Britain some influence of US foreign policy decision making.  
Syria’s interest in stronger relations with Britain, too, are directly related to how 
useful a partner Britain can be in influencing with the US or the EU toward more 
pro-Syrian policy making. 
 
Since so few groups have a stake in UK policy to Syria, the impact of the 
foreign policy process in potentially channelling societal interests into the policy 
process will be truncated.  The result is that Syria policy will be highly 
concentrated and centralized, in the hands of the Prime Minister and FCO.  The 
FCO Middle East section (and ambassadors), the main source of policy 
proposals, which however, will be filtered through the prime minister’s broader 
agenda.  As neo-classical realism predicts, thus, how a state reacts to its 
international geopolitical position, is shaped by elite perceptions and their 
capacity to mobilise resources for their agendas.  The foreign policy process 
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will, therefore impact on policy toward Syria insofar as the elites’ broader policy 
agenda and decision making sets the context for Anglo-Syrian relations.  
Therefore, it is necessary to understand decision making on foreign policy more 
generally, and the wider impact of this, to be able to understand British foreign 
policy behaviour toward Syria. 
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Chapter 1 
Historical Context of Anglo- Syrian relations 
The beginning of the 20th Century saw Great Britain at the height of her 
imperial power.  A Great Power at the start of the century with the largest 
empire in the world, the next fifty years saw Britain initially struggle to maintain 
her place in the international power structure whilst her resources to do so 
steadily declined, then latterly pursue policies and alliances to both manage and 
limit the decline, and meet the expectancy of elites that Britain remain a world 
power.  British imperialism in the Middle East was a big part of this story.  
Whilst struggling to maintain its grip on its large empire worldwide, British 
empire in the Middle East continued to grow even after the conclusion of World 
War I, being important to British interests in terms of economy, access to 
resources, security, and access to other parts of the empire via the Suez 
Canal69.   
 
The historical foundations of the Anglo-Syrian relationships still reverberate 
decades later.  The British government at this time, viewed their actions in 
terms of protecting their interests both in terms of wealth and security, and 
many legitimised their imperial control of territories in moral terms as a 
guardianship of peoples who were less civilised than themselves, a kind of 
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imperial paternalism.  The combination of both protecting British interests and 
the assumption that the British policy was best influenced the policies they 
pursued, for many the perception of a strong relationship with countries in the 
Middle East continues today.  In Syria, too, the imperial legacy remains, but 
unlike British policy makers who have tended to hold up this joint history as an 
example of how Britain “knows best” when it comes to Middle East policy 
making, the legacy remembered is one of betrayal and oppression, and one 
that has been used both to legitimise the regime in Syria as a defender against 
imperialism, and a weapon to delegitimise attempts by Britain, and the West 
more generally, to pursue their own interests at the expense of the Arab 
population in the region, imperial oppression by different means. 
 
Britain, the Levant and the First World War 
For the British government, on the approach to World War One, the hope was 
that the Ottoman Empire would align on the side of the allies or, at least, stay 
neutral.  Thus the status quo in the Middle East would remain.70  This reflected 
British policy throughout the 19th century, that the best policy was to leave the 
region under Ottoman rule (in contrast to French policy in the Levant which 
dated back to the 1535 Capitulations Treaty with the Ottoman Empire71).  So 
central was this thinking that it wasn’t until 1915 that the British government 
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formed an interdepartmental committee to consider British aims in the region in 
the event the Ottoman Empire collapsed.  The decision by the Ottomans to 
enter the war on the opposing side was concluded on August 2nd, 1914 in the 
secret Ottoman-German alliance against Russia, and activated by the 
bombardment of Russian ports by the Ottoman Fleet in the Black Sea on 
October 29th72 leaving no alternative for the British government to prepare for 
the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and to work assiduously toward that goal.  
 
Accusations of a British betrayal of the Arab people date back to this period.  
Aware of unrest among some of the Arab population against Ottoman rule, 
British policy to oust the Turks focused on encouraging the Arab Revolt against 
them by supporting Arab nationalism and pledging to back demands for Arab 
independence.  Fighting a war that crossed continents, which Britain was by no 
means guaranteed to win and with the Ottoman Empire now on the opposing 
side, the British had a number of competing priorities to pursue to have any 
hope of winning the war.   
 
These priorities included the need to defeat the Ottomans quickly, essential to 
maintaining British trade and communications access to the east.  The most 
effective way to do this was to mobilise the Arabs, and the French would need 
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to be convinced of this.  Simultaneously, elements of the British government 
had also become convinced that the Zionist movement, their cause skilfully 
championed by the Russian chemist and adroit diplomat Chaim Weizmann, was 
important to the war effort both in sustaining efforts on the Russian front and 
in galvanising the American’s to join the war on the allied side73.  A further 
concern was that the collapse of the Ottoman Empire would create power 
vacuum in the region, with the potential a rival might use this to increase their 
power, to the detriment of British interests something the British government 
needed to prevent.   
 
The consequence of these competing priorities was the establishment of three 
conflicting promises and agreements known as the 1915 – 1916 McMahon-
Hussein Correspondence, the May 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement and the 
November 1917 Balfour Declaration.  From these agreements the modern 
Middle East would emerge, one created artificially by great powers, more 
concerned with their own interests in the region than traditional boundaries or 
tribal areas.  The modern Syria that emerged paid no heed to historical or tribal 
ties, nor was it the territory that the Arab population had expected as part of 
the McMahon-Hussein agreement.  The pursuit of Greater Syria would be 
significant in terms of legitimising Syrian regimes to come, but also stand in the 
way of settlement with Israel.  Further, while the new borders cut off territory 
                                                          
73 K Schultz, The Arab-Israeli Conflict, (Harlow, 1999) p6 
92 
Syrian leaders traditionally viewed as Syrian, traditional relationships remained, 
significantly these facilitated and justified cross border “meddling” such has 
been seen, for example, in Syria’s involvement in the Lebanon, further 
undermining regional stability. 
 
The decision to support Arab nationalism and their fight for independence was 
taken in light of intelligence and existing contacts the British had with regional 
actors at this time.  These officials advised that there was significant support 
for this course of action.  Specifically, that Sharif Hussein, Emir of Mecca, who 
had used his time in office to build a network of tribal alliances, was open to 
British overtures74.  Indeed, several months before the war broke out the British 
government had been approached by Sharif Hussein’s son, Abdullah, for help in 
the Arab cause but had declined to assist since as at that time the Ottoman 
Empire was considered a friendly power75.   
 
As the war began, in light of the Ottomans joining the Central Powers, the 
British government authorised its High Commissioner in Cairo Sir Henry 
McMahon to begin negotiations with Sharif Hussein.  In doing so the elites in 
London gave McMahon a great deal of autonomy in those discussions.  During 
1915 – 1916 a series of letters were sent between the two, the biggest issue in 
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the negotiations being the question of borders, with the most significant letter 
was sent on 24 October 1915 which detailed the agreed boundaries.76  The 
letters led to the expectation that the British would support the establishment 
of Syria as an independent Arab state (including the area of Palestine though 
not specifically mentioned), subject to some border modifications, in return for 
the Arabs revolt against their Ottoman rulers.   
 
Whilst the British believed this would be the quickest way to instigating a revolt 
against the Ottoman Empire, they in no way believed Sharif Hussein to be 
representative of all Arabs or that he would inspire a complete Arab rebellion.  
Arguably this was a traditional divide and conquer policy, aimed at weakening 
the Ottoman Empire in the region enough for it to be overcome.  The British 
assessment of support for Hussein was correct, whilst Hussein managed to gain 
some clandestine support in parts of Syria it was not unanimous, with some 
leading Arab figures labelling him a traitor77.  Yet the main British objective was 
accessing Hussein’s tribal allegiances and resources, thus they were happy to 
negotiate with Hussein as if he was the representative of the Arabs in order to 
achieve this.  Practically, the needs for the British war effort would be served, 
while the ambiguous wording of the correspondence left be room for 
renegotiation depending on the outcome of the war, a common practice in 
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diplomatic circles.  Similarly, Hussein likely anticipated some revisions of the 
boundaries discussed but there is no doubt he had reason to believe that he 
would emerge from the war with an in dependent Arab state. 
 
The British understood the need to provide the Sharif with enticements to 
facilitate a rebellion but also had to secure French support for the British plan.  
The French, occupied at home and unable to defend their interests in the 
Middle East, were already uneasy with the British presence there.  Formal 
negotiations were required to appease them, culminating in the Sykes-Picot 
Agreement of May 1916 in which the two powers carved out spheres of 
influence.  France got rights over Syria and Lebanon, providing for a “buffer 
zone” between British interests in the region and Russia’s.  
 
The dissection of the Middle East after the war may bear some resemblance to 
the boundaries the powers agreed but, in fact, the Sykes-Picot Agreement was 
never enacted in its original form.  Once the Anglo-French negotiations 
concluded Sykes and Picot travelled to Moscow to continue negotiations with 
the Allied Powers third Partner.  Russia approved the agreement, now the 
Tripartite Agreement, with some slight alterations.  The Bolshevik revolution of 
1917 however saw not only the Russian departure from the war but the 
revelation to the world of the Sykes-Picot agreement by the Bolsheviks.   
95 
 
The very fact that these instances of secret negotiations took place is used as 
evidence of British duplicity.  This charge is strengthened by evidence that the 
French were ignorant of British negotiations with Hussein until only a few weeks 
prior to the Paris Peace conference of 1919.  Thus the French argued they did 
not have to abide by British agreements with Hussein since they had not been 
involved in any negotiations, stating Britain had made this undertaking alone78.  
For his part, Sharif Hussein had no knowledge of the Anglo-French negotiations 
with even his British contact, McMahon, initially unaware of them despite being 
given leave to make substantial promises to Hussein. 
 
A third agreement to which the British committed themselves was the 
November 2nd, 1917 Balfour Declaration which endorsed the establishment of a 
Jewish homeland in Palestine.  This declaration has wrought the most damage 
to British relations with the region, a legacy which has proved difficult to 
overcome.  For Syria, the creation of Israel was viewed as a great betrayal and 
put a significant enemy on its doorstep, occupying Arab lands.  Opposition to 
the existence of Israel, and the defence of Palestinian rights, became part of 
the Syrian narrative of Arab nationalism and anti-Imperialism.  Britain’s part this 
was not forgotten.   
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At the time the declaration was simply another move to ensure mobilisation of 
resources to the British war effort.  It was not the promise of a Jewish state as 
many Zionists took it to be, again vague diplomatic language allowed each side 
a different interpretation.  Those arguing for the commitment to be upheld, 
maintained the British had a moral obligation to the Jews.  More practically, the 
land promised to the Jews could provide an alternative base for British troops 
and access to the coast, therefore upholding the agreement could serve British 
interests.  After the war, Britain set a high priority to securing the mandate of 
Palestine at the cost, arguably, of the Levant.  In effect, though, by claiming 
the mandate Britain stood accused of reneging on its prior agreements to both 
France and Hussein, who had reasonably expected this land to go to them. 
 
If the primary outcome of these agreements and negotiations was in the 
interests of British success in the war, then they can be judged as successful.  
Britain appeared to have gained a particularly powerful position in the Middle 
East.  British troops in the region were a physical representation of that, 
present not only in territories designated to be British mandates, but also in 
Palestine, Syria and Lebanon.  Furthermore, Britain showed no sign of 
withdrawing from these areas until a peace treaty was agreed.  This gave 
France significant cause for grievance, whilst also giving the Arabs hope that 
the promises in the McMahon-Hussein correspondence would be upheld.  The 
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impression that the British were not necessarily committed to withdrawal from 
Syria was not based just on the military occupation.  It was reinforced in that 
they had endeavoured throughout their time there to strengthen Emir Faisal’s 
position as an Arab leader, for example, General Allenby had allowed Faisal to 
take over administration of the Syrian territory from Autumn 191879. 
 
This perception of British intent was neither wholly paranoia on the part of the 
French nor wishful thinking on the part of the Arabs.  Some in the British 
establishment did have reservations regarding the potential impact French 
influence in Syria would have on British interest in the region.  Those 
advocating that Britain should not hand over control in the Levant, particularly 
those with knowledge of the region, argued that acquisition of Syria would “put 
the seal on British predominance throughout the Arab countries; would render 
Great Britain paramount in Islam; and would safeguard the Eastern 
Mediterranean and the routes to Mesopotamia and India by securing control of 
the Aleppo – Mosul line”.80   
 
British government attempts to renegotiate the terms of the Sykes-Picot 
agreement continued for two years after the war ended, to the point where the 
                                                          
79 D Fromkin, A Peace to end all Peace, (New York, 2001) p435 
80 J Fisher, “Syria and Mesopotamia in British Middle Eastern Policy in 1919” Middle Eastern 
Studies, Vol 34, No.2 (1998) p142 
98 
French accused the British stationed in Syria of inciting anti-French sentiment.  
This was a reversion to pre-war great power rivalry in the area rather than a 
show of full support for Faisal’s claims.  Those backing Faisal did so for various 
reasons; some arguing moral principle, others saw him as a figure who could 
protect British interests in the region.  Prime Minister Lloyd George himself 
argued the case for keeping Faisal as head of state on a number of occasions, 
including at the 1919 conference, contending that there would be no Syria 
without British troops and King Hussein’s mobilisation of forces.  Further, he 
argued, the French had implicitly agreed when they signed the 1916 agreement 
stating they were “prepared to recognise and uphold an independent Arab State 
of Confederation of Arab States in the areas A. and B. Marked on the annexed 
map under the suzerainty of an Arab Chief”.81  He was unsuccessful in changing 
French opinion, which was that they had committed to Faisal being the Arab 
Chief.   
 
Meanwhile Faisal’s perceived loyalty to the British combined with his inability to 
secure Syria’s independence weakened his position in the region.  Trying to 
stem unrest among his Arab allies he agreed to take unilateral action and so, 
without British support, the Arabs declared their own independence in Syria, 
naming Faisal as King.  Consequently, Faisal lost international support for his 
position.  Until peace negotiations concluded these lands were considered 
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occupied territories, hence accepting Faisal’s declaration would undermine 
British interests elsewhere, especially in Iraq where there were serious 
challenges to the British presence; on the French side it proved the perfect 
opportunity to remove him from his position. 
 
British power in the region was illusory.  The war had dramatically weakened 
Britain and her economy meaning quick settlement in the Middle East, was a 
priority.  One tactic the British had used to mobilise the Arabs was to support 
the growth of Arab nationalism to galvanise the uprising.  This was a pragmatic 
response when it became clear the Ottomans were siding against them, but 
now Britain that faced nationalist uprisings across its own empire.  This 
featured in British reluctance to press its claim in the Levant particularly when it 
was already facing issues in its own mandated area, especially Iraq.  The British 
need to secure stability in the region meant a compromise with the French, the 
only other power with the capacity and will to exert influence in the area.   
 
The French were determined to hold the Levant and Britain did not want the 
Syrian mandate (or were not prepared to fight for).  Lloyd George made it clear 
again at the 1919 conference saying “just as we disinterested ourselves in 
1912, so we now disinterested ourselves in 1919.  If the Conference asked us 
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to take Syria, we should reply in the negative”.82  Some held faint hope that the 
US might take on the Mandate, or extend their presence in some way, but they 
had no desire to do so.  Britain eventually withdrew their troops when France 
threatened military action.  Eyal Zisser considers whether this was a “missed 
opportunity” for the British, certainly, there were some within the British 
establishment who advocated that keeping the Levant under British influence 
was in its strategic interests.  With British withdrawal, French occupation of the 
Levant was inevitable.  Any support Britain had provided toward achieving Arab 
nationalist aims was eclipsed by this betrayal exacerbated, perhaps, by those 
closest to the Arabs having made every effort to further their cause, hoping for 
a fait accompli, only to be let down by politicians in London being unprepared 
to back their cause either politically or militarily. 
 
One interpretation of why British policy was so uncoordinated, and 
contradictory, is that Britain never intended to keep any of its promises.  There 
are several other interpretations, including the role of those involved in decision 
making and the impact of the war on Britain’s capacity to protect its 
international interests.  The number of different agencies involved in the foreign 
policy process also factors in.  The Foreign Office, War Office, India Office and 
the Admiralty all had a stake in policy making in the region, along with various 
diplomats and individuals who influenced government decision making.  All had 
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differing, not necessarily compatible, objectives they perceived as necessary to 
ensure success in the war.  They also had differing levels of autonomy in 
pursuing these, with agreements being made independent, and often in 
ignorance of each other.   
 
The differing agreements supported Britain’s overarching priority in two ways, 
firstly, each aimed at mobilising support or resources to that end; secondly, 
they ignored (if they knew of them) any potential contradictions and might 
have suspected they would lead to difficulties for British interests in the future, 
but this was a secondary issue to that of ensuring that the war was won.  Not 
having made these agreements would potentially have cost Britain at least her 
assets in the region, at worst, the war.   
 
Some argue that the promises made were not even seen to be contradictory at 
the time.  The Balfour declaration whilst promising a Jewish “homeland”, it did 
not promise a Jewish “state”, a deliberate wording.  The British use of the word 
“independent” in reference to an “independent Arab state” in the McMahon-
Hussein correspondence was not necessarily seen as contradicting anything 
agreed in the Sykes-Picot agreement.  The British did not see the imposition of 
a mandatory power in the role of “adviser” as incongruous to this end.  This 
view of a mandatory power as a necessary guiding hand reflected the same 
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elitist attitude as the British idea of the “common good” that had permeated its 
empire building policy since the mid-19th Century.83   
 
Likewise, by independence the British meant freedom from the Ottoman Empire 
not the creation of an independent Arab state.  This is more difficult to defend, 
the McMahon correspondence explicitly refers to an independent state, but 
echoes the imperial elite assumption that the peoples in Middle East were too 
backward to be self-governing at this time, thus needed the oversight of a more 
developed society.84  The deliberate double speak considerably harmed the 
credibility of the British, creating the paranoia and distrust that has to some 
extent marked the British relationship with Syrian regimes over the decades. 
 
The consequences of British foreign policy in the Middle East during this period 
were not all immediately apparent.  Its policies contributed to the successful 
conclusion of the war for the British but the impact on the British relationship 
with the emerging states of the region was much less positive.  The British 
government of the time argued that it met its obligations but it left a legacy of 
betrayal which has had lasting implications for British Middle East relations, 
particularly with Syria.  The growth of Arab nationalism challenged British policy 
as the Arabs in British mandated areas were emboldened in their demands for 
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independence.  Longer term, Britain sought to continue its influence through 
more formal alliance arrangements but was hampered by accusations of 
imperialism and past betrayals, which became part of the foundations of this 
Arab nationalism.   
 
The British establishment by now were concentrated on securing primacy over 
Palestine and Mesopotamia, those arguing maintaining influence on the Levant 
would aid in this goal unable to convince the government that the military risk 
would be worth it.  British policy still favoured support for Arab nationalism as a 
way of maintaining influence but a British interpretation of Arab nationalism.  
This elite perception that the Arab nations needed great power supervision to 
survive, would greatly limit the effectiveness of British policy making in the 
decades to follow.  Arguably it still influences those who think that Britain has 
something unique in its relationship with states in the Middle East.  Conversely, 
helps explain why British political speeches describing the export of common 
values and norms are viewed with distrust, seeming to reflect the idea that 
somehow Western values are better.  In this period the formal embodiment of 
this attitude was the creation of the mandated territories in the Middle East. 
 
The San Remo Resolution of 1920, confirmed by the League of Nations in 1922, 
conferred the mandates of Palestine and Iraq to Britain.  The League moreover 
accepted a British request that Transjordan be exempted from the provisions of 
104 
the Palestine Mandate, becoming a second Hashemite kingdom, under Abdullah 
I, another British mandate.  The interwar years thus saw the British 
preoccupied with their own mandated areas and priorities in the Middle East, 
which no longer included Syria.  Using its influence in these areas the British set 
about agreeing treaties favourable to its own interests in the region.   
 
Most problematic for the British was the Mandate of Palestine, in which it had 
the duty to enact on the promises of the Balfour Declaration.  Britain was faced 
with the task of reconciling promises to the Jews whilst trying to uphold the 
rights of the native Arabs in Palestine.  The land, historically southern Syria, 
had been promised to the Arabs as part of McMahon correspondence though 
the argument here hinged on whether the land lay “to the west” of Damascus, 
Hama, Homs and Aleppo, causing a further rift in Anglo-Syrian relations.  The 
loss of the lands, particularly to the Zionists, was a further betrayal.  Today, it 
would be easy to consider reconciliation of all the British promises an impossible 
task yet had it not been for World War Two, British policy could have been 
successful, as they worked to limit Jewish immigration to Israel and favoured 
supporting the Arab population there.  The outbreak of war in Europe derailed 
British policy making in the region making it reconsider its Syrian policy once 
again while it placed further strain of British resources.  
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Impact of World War Two 
The outbreak of World War Two in Europe was an existential threat to Britain, 
put British interests in the Middle East at risk and also brought the fate of Syria 
back into British sights.  The 1940 armistice signed by Vichy France with 
Germany was a direct blow to the British war effort in Europe but also 
problematic for the campaign in the Middle East.  It was feared Vichy Syria may 
fall to Italian or German influence weakening the British position.  Britain 
hesitated in taking immediate action, tactically, unprepared to launch a 
campaign since elements of the French navy were still out of range and posed 
significant threat.  Politically, the issue of staging the liberation of Syria was 
problematic.  It would be difficult to liberate Syria without encouraging 
demands from the territories under British control for the same outcome.85  
Despite this concern both Churchill and Foreign Secretary Eden recognised that 
eventually they would have to overthrow the Vichy Dentz regime in Syria.   
 
With Rommel’s advance into Egypt and having just suppressed Rashid Ali’s 
revolt in Iraq, by 1941 the British were ready to act to prevent German 
influence in Syria.  This episode of British interactions with Syria and the Levant 
has been characterised by many in the light of great power competition 
between Great Britain and the French, a sideshow to the wider war.86  In 
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advance of their incursion into Syria the British had been in talks with de Gaulle 
and his Free French army to launch a joint action hoping that this would spur 
an insurrection of French troops leading to a quick victory, a view that had been 
encouraged by the Free French.  Just before the invasion the opposite was 
found to be true - that in fact Vichy forces were loyal to Petain, worse, they 
were larger than the British and Free French armies, occupied the better terrain 
and would fight to the last. 
 
Differences between the British and Free French over future political 
arrangements emerged even before the invasion began.  The French stance 
was that the matter was a French one only while the British argued they 
needed a political justification for their military action.  When it became clear 
that the Vichy troops would not join the Free French army in the fight, the 
British insisted a declaration must be made to the Arabs.  The British statement 
promised independence to the Syrian and Lebanese peoples, with the British 
aiming to secure the support of the Arab people in those countries for their 
action against the Vichy Dentz regime but also hoping to offset the impact of 
their unpopular Palestine policy.87  The Free French made a similar 
proclamation but qualified it, stating a future treaty relationship between France 
and the Levant countries would be negotiated. 
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At odds before they began military action, with continued accusations on the 
part of de Gaulle that the British were trying to usurp their position in the 
Levant despite Churchill’s continued assurances Britain had no such designs, 
the situation between the two erstwhile allies continued to deteriorate following 
the victory over Vichy forces in Syria.  The Armistice agreement negotiated by 
Vichy commander General Dentz and British commander, General Maitland 
Wilson (assisted by General Cartoix of the Free French army) escalated tensions 
further.  Wilson primarily wanted military victory secured, to get the Vichy 
French forces out and secure the area under his command.  The resultant 
agreement sent the Vichy troops back to France and transferred authority over 
Syria and Lebanon to the British, with no mention of the Free French, and was 
met with condemnation from de Gaulle who denounced the armistice from 
Cairo on radio, his condemnations eventually wringing concessions on the 
armistice agreement88.  
 
With the allied forces occupying Syria the arrangement was for the French to 
have administrative authority.  Yet British troop presence meant it had strategic 
control leading to a strong clash of interests.  Britain continued to insist on 
independence for the Arab population, Churchill particularly insisting “Our policy 
is to give the Syrian Arabs independence… the Arabs bulk far more largely in 
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our minds then the Free French”89.  Keeping the Arab population onside was 
the priority, both in the immediate sense of its importance to the war effort and 
longer term, there remained the ongoing problem of Palestine meaning buying 
some goodwill from the Arabs was important, much more so than the French at 
that time.  The British once again seemed to be following contradictory policies 
whereby the British demanded the French to give Syria independence, and the 
Syrians give the French a preferred status, whilst at the same time maintaining 
a hold over British territories in the Middle East90.   
 
De Gaulle’s decision to reinstate the French mandate administration despite the 
earlier promise brought him into conflict not only with the people of Syria and 
Lebanon but the British91, on whom the French administration depended to 
maintain control.  British policy was that the French should conclude a treaty 
similar to its1930 Anglo-Iraq treaty, giving Syria independence but the French 
special terms with Syria.92  With rising tension between the two sides, the 
British government sent General Sir Edward Spears, a personal friend of 
Winston Churchill known also for his friendship toward the French and his 
experience working with them, to bring about accord and oversee British policy 
in the area.   
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The task proved impossible.  The two objectives were incompatible and, if 
anything, Spears managed to increase tensions, certainly becoming seen by 
many of the French as the villain of the piece who cost them their mandated 
territories93.  He played a central role in demanding France allow free elections 
in Syria and Lebanon leading to overwhelming nationalist victories in both 
countries.  In November 1943 he encouraged the Lebanese government to 
announce the cancellation of provisions in its constitution requiring 
subordination to the French mandate.  When the French authorities reacted by 
suspending constitutional life there, Spears led the British intervention forcing 
the French to acquiesce.  Furthermore, he encouraged both countries not to 
sign friendship and defence agreements with France.  More a problem than the 
solution Churchill insisting on Spears’ removal in 1944.  The central issue, 
independence, remained, reaching crisis point in 1945 when France moved 
more troops to Syria and launched a bombardment on Damascus to quell 
Syrian unrest.  This led to a major British military intervention to stop the 
fighting, and impose a solution.  The ensuing negotiations led to a simultaneous 
withdrawal of both British and French forces, and independence for Syria and 
the Levant.  
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While British policy was a contributing factor in Syria achieving its 
independence, again its aims were much broader.  Britain had entered the 
Levant in a continuing war against the Axis powers.  On the eve of the invasion, 
British opinion was that the Free French added little to the campaign to take 
the Levant.  On the other hand, once again, they did need the Arabs.  Thus 
maintaining the promise to the Syrian and Lebanese people was more 
important to the war effort than keeping on side with the French; thus the need 
for a promise of independence.  Yet the vigorous role Spears played as 
“guarantor for Allied promises to the local populations”94 was destructive to the 
British position elsewhere, as British promotion of democratic elections in Syria 
and Lebanon and independence from France but not in the areas under British 
mandate control was questioned by local forces.95 
 
The French distrust of British motives can be seen to have some basis in truth.  
There were those in the British establishment who, again, recognised the 
importance of the Levant for British interests; with the Syrian frontier only 
twenty miles from the principle source of oil for British forces in the 
Mediterranean, Haifa96, this was something that had to be secured.  The 
contradictory British policy in the areas under British control and those under 
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French also struck the French (not to mention the inhabitants of those areas) as 
completely hypocritical.   
 
On the other side, the British, while holding de Gaulle in high regard over his 
unwillingness to accept the surrender of Vichy France, found him difficult, with 
Churchill and de Gaulle having a particularly contentious relationship, leading to 
a number of attempts to collaborate in some way with elements of Vichy France 
until this route was closed to them.  The Americans joining the war further 
complicated the relationship, the Americans were the lynchpin of Churchill’s 
strategy for the wider war but Roosevelt disliked de Gaulle specifically, and 
distrusted the French generally.  Churchill did not share this view, seeing a 
strong France as essential to take part in the occupation of Germany and as 
part of the counterweight to the Soviet Union (SU)97.  Still the sometimes 
vacillating behaviour of the British to de Gaulle in the Levant can be seen in this 
wider context. 
 
While the British did wish to fulfil the promises on the eve of the Syrian 
campaign, the overriding concern was to show support to Arab nationalism, 
hoping that this would boost British influence in the region.  The failure of the 
decision makers was that they did not recognise the argument that it would 
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actually do the opposite.  That the policy they pursued reduced the influence of 
France, a great power rival, in the Middle East was seen to be in British 
interests, assisting in their efforts at forming closer political ties between the 
Arab states (the Arab League) through which they planned to secure British 
interests.  Thus the French influence would be removed, a potential barrier to 
British interests, and be replaced with a friendlier power with which the British 
could work. 
 
Adding to British difficulties was the impact of the war on its mandate 
responsibilities in Palestine.  Attempts to resolve tensions between Jewish and 
Arab populations in Palestine had been taxing British capabilities before the 
war, these now became insurmountable.  Before the war the British were 
reassessing their Palestine policy, recognising the impact it was having on their 
relationship with other Arab states and consequently on its oil and security 
interests in the region.  This is evident in White Paper of 1939 which stated 
“unequivocally” that the British Government opposed a Jewish state in 
Palestine, would limit Jewish immigration to 15,000 a year for five years after 
which no immigration was to be allowed unless the Arab community agreed it, 
imposed restrictions to land transfers and promised independence to Palestine 
in ten years.98   
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The fate of the Jews at the hands of Hitler’s regime dashed any hopes the 
British had to impose the terms of the White Paper, internationalising the issue 
as never before.  Britain’s decline in power made maintaining its colonies, 
mandates and protectorates increasingly beyond its capability; the growth of 
the US as a world power combined with a powerful American Jewish lobby and 
general international sympathy for the survivors of the holocaust and a large 
scale refugee problem in Europe made limiting Jewish immigration and 
restrictions on land transfers impossible.99   
 
By the end of the war any hope of pursuing an independent foreign policy in 
Palestine concluding in a negotiated settlement acceptable to both sides was 
beyond British capabilities.  Meanwhile simply maintaining peace between the 
two sides was too costly, both to British lives and resources, to continue.  
Moreover, the continuing crisis was undermining British influence in the region, 
causing significant damage to Anglo-Arab relations and critically affecting British 
ability to protect its interests there.  Consequently, the British government 
referred the matter to the UN for arbitration, then took the unilateral decision to 
withdraw from Palestine.  The Jews immediately declared the independence of 
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the State of Israel leading to the 1948 Arab-Israeli war.  The catastrophic loss 
of this war suffered by the Arab states was laid at the feet of the British.  
 
Despite Britain on two occasions championing the cause of Arab nationalism 
during the two wars and playing a significant role in Syrian and Lebanese 
independence, the taint of betrayal over conflicting agreements, particularly the 
Balfour Declaration, has had lasting consequences in the region for British 
foreign policy.  Further, even today British decision makers consider they have 
a moral obligation to play some role in the peace process, problematic given 
this history of animosity and the lack of capacity to actually make any real 
difference. 
 
During the war British policies aimed to protect and preserve its influence in the 
region and to deny the territory to its enemies; following it Ernst Bevin 
expressed a clear determination that these interests would be maintained.  In a 
statement on Middle East policy, he asserted that a loss of economic and 
financial standing in the region would result in a fall in the British standard of 
living.100  The same month a Labour leaflet also clearly acknowledged that the 
British had emerged from the war seriously weakened, that it needed to reduce 
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its foreign commitments and adjust its policy to match its resources.101  Britain 
no longer had the capacity (if it ever had) to exert its influence through power 
and force alone, policy makers continued to look to exerting influence through 
friendly relations with Arab leaders in the regions, in order to mobilise support 
against its enemies in the region and prevent a power vacuum there that could 
be filled by great powers other than Britain – such as the SU.  That this 
approach would be welcomed by Arab nationalist leaders, and that they would 
recognise their interests to be best served by this relationship with Great 
Britain, was taken for granted by those policy makers backing this approach. 
 
The Arab League & Baghdad Pact 
In 1941 British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden stated, “many Arab thinkers 
desire for the Arab peoples a greater degree of unity than they now enjoy.  In 
reaching out towards this unity, they hope for support...His Majesty’s 
Government for their part will give their full support to any scheme that 
commands greatest approval”.102  The strength of this sentiment increased 
throughout the war as Britain recognised the importance of the Arab collective 
will.  The first practical expression of this collective will was the Arab League 
which found British support, not totally altruistic, as Britain wanted to ensure 
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the outcomes of this movement for Arab unity were compatible with British 
interests.103   
 
The thinking behind the support for Arab unity had multiple layers.  The 
immediate aim at the time was to garner support of the Arabs in Syria and 
Lebanon for the imminent invasion, and to offset accusations that Britain was 
anti-Arab due to its Palestinian policy.  Long term, it was thought that 
encouraging Arab cooperation would result in regional stability and economic 
development by cutting through inter-Arab rivalries.  Such a federation of Arab 
states would be stronger, so less inclined to view British policy in the region 
with suspicion.  Unfortunately, such thinking, writes Albert Hourani, was based 
on one major assumption: that the Arab governments would regard their major 
interests as identical to British interests. 
 
The first impetus for an Arab unity scheme came from Iraqi statesman Nuri al-
Said who envisaged a scheme which, initially, would centre on the Fertile 
Crescent, and was endorsed by Emir Abdullah of Transjordan.  This fit into 
Abdullah’s ambitions of a Greater Syria, the lands promised to the Arabs by 
McMahon, under his leadership.  He was less convinced of the second part of 
the plan which involved this Greater Syria joining Nuri’s Iraq in an Arab 
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League.104  The British maintained their position that they did not support the 
Greater Syria project.105  Syrian nationalists were unmoved by the scheme, 
committed to remain a republic not to come under Hashemite rule.106  A major 
factor in Syrian reluctance in joining this union was that these two countries still 
retained treaties seen to bind them to Britain, Syria had no desire to “become 
entangled with countries still firmly to “imperialist” Britain”107.  Nuri’s scheme 
faltered quickly coming up against two main obstacles; the first being the 
exclusion of Egypt from Nuri’s vision; the second being the distrust of any 
scheme being led by a member of the Hashemite dynasty, held in disregard for 
its close relations with Britain, worse in fact, now seen as little more than a 
British proxy.  In the end, Egypt took forward the idea of Arab unity, though it 
was a different vision to that of the British government.   
 
Egypt taking the lead was not viewed negatively by the British who assumed 
they could easily direct the policy of the Wafd government in Egypt.  British 
influence had been bolstered there by the presence of its military, built up 
during the war, and by its embassy’s concerted involvement in Egyptian 
domestic affairs, resulting in British confidence that they could influence inter-
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Arab negotiations.108  With British encouragement, Egyptian Prime Minister 
Nahas Pasha and Nuri el-Said entered negotiations to create a regional Arab 
organisation that would sit somewhere between the general Arab union 
advocated by Egypt, and the Fertile Crescent-led organisation advocated by 
Iraq, with their discussion mediated by diplomat Abdul Rahman Azzam.  Azzam, 
however, proved to have real Pan-Arab vision, convincing King Farouk of Egypt 
both of his views and the need to include Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia in 
negotiations to strengthen the potential union. 
 
Once again British policy makers underestimated the affect existing policy 
would have on the negotiations.  Whilst the British presence in Syria kept the 
French threat at bay, League negotiations concluded with a moderate 
organisation that the British could be pleased with.  Yet British attempts to 
exert influence on discussions served to weaken the Wafd government in Egypt 
and their preferred leader Nahas, providing King Farouk opportunity to dismiss 
his British imposed government109 shortly after the League’s creation while 
sponsoring Azzam as first Secretary-General of the League.  Under Azzam’s 
lead, and with the French threat to Syria over, the organisation began to take a 
new direction.110  Far from being a vehicle through which Britain could maintain 
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its influence in the area, the Arab League was quickly turned into an anti-
imperial, pro-Egypt tool.111   
 
Furthermore, whilst the Palestinian question was initially set low on the 
League’s agenda due to British pressure, this proved only to be a short term 
gain as the situation worsened there heightened its priority.112  Syria was 
particularly concerned and, alongside the delegations from Lebanon and 
Transjordan, used the Arab League to focus on the issue of Palestine,113 its 
interests supported by the Leagues opposition to the creation of a Jewish state 
in Palestine.  Further, the pact underwrote the sovereignty of all the Arab 
member states, a principle to which Syria was committed, Syrian Prime Minister 
Sa’dullah al-Jabiri making the statement “We reject the Great Syria scheme in 
principle and adhere to the Pact”114, in response to Abdullah’s efforts to push 
his plan forward. 
 
Ultimately the inability of the Arab League to cooperate effectively in coming to 
the aid of the Palestinians following Israel’s announcement of independence in 
1948, coupled with the disastrous performance of the Arab armies in the 
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subsequent war, marked its complete failure from Britain’s perspective.  The 
outcomes of the League were the complete opposite of those the British had 
set out to achieve.  Azzam used his leadership of the League to undermine the 
British position in the region and, perhaps worse, it had failed as a vehicle for 
maintaining regional security and stability.  The British had hoped that the 
creation of some kind of Arab federation would lessen inter-Arab rivalries and 
conflict but the emphasis on the sovereignty of each individual member state 
and their rights to freedom of action with regard to foreign policy hinted, at 
least, that this vision would not be achieved.  Certainly they played a hand in 
the Arabs failing so abysmally in the Arab-Israeli war. 
 
The complete failure of the League in overcoming inter-Arab rivalries when 
faced with a common enemy and need for cooperation was demonstrated 
vividly in the failure of the Arab states to coordinate an Arab League policy 
against Israel.  Most significant, clauses enshrining the rights of the Arab people 
in Palestine, and the need to establish an Arab state in Palestine made it an 
impossible vehicle for furthering British interest.  For Britain, the policy of 
supporting Egyptian leadership had failed, leaving the British with less influence 
in the region at a time they were beginning to fear the encroachment of 
another great power, the SU, leaving them looking to the US to help protect 
British interests in the Middle East. 
 
121 
For Syria the resounding defeat of the Arab states in the 1948 Arab – Israeli 
war and associated failure of the Arab League also had far reaching 
consequences.  The League was now seen as an unsuitable vehicle to lead the 
Arab cause; its failure had also engendered some disillusionment in Egypt.  The 
failure in the 1948 war had highlighted the weakness of the Syrian military 
leading to Syria’s first military coup, the short premiership of Za’im, and briefly 
opened up, once again, the possibility of union with Iraq though ultimately 
Syria was convinced to come back into the Arab League fold. 115 
 
Failure to secure a medium for political influence through the Arab League, 
whilst increasingly concerned over Soviet penetration into the region, left Britain 
in search of a different defence pact with partners in the Middle East.  As had 
been the case with the Arab League, Britain needed an Arab state to take the 
lead in the creation of an entity which would stand against the Soviet threat.  
The overthrow of Farouk in Egypt together with ongoing negotiations for British 
withdrawal from the Suez zone left British policy retreating from the position 
that its defence strategy could remain focussed there.  
 
Additionally, there was recognition by many in the British establishment that the 
Suez base was not as strategically important for the protection of current 
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interests.  These might be better secured by an “understanding between 
Turkey, Syria and Iraq”116 both in terms of protecting British oil interests and 
“halting Russian aggression across Persia.”117  By early 1954 many had come to 
the conclusion that British occupation of the Suez base was fast proving to be 
“more a military and political liability”118 than a useful protector of British 
interests, though the Government was still not ready for the complete 
abandonment of Egypt in their plans for the region. 
 
The conclusion of the 1954 Anglo-Egyptian treaty left the British free to regain 
the initiative in the region finding a willing partner in Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri 
el-Said, who believed that the western powers were crucial to Middle East 
security.119  This partnership towards the creation of a regional defence pact 
brought Syria back to the attention of British policy makers.  Just how 
important Syria would be to these plans was considered in the Manchester 
Guardian in 1953 which stated that Syria could wreck any extension of the 
planned Eastern Mediterranean defence plan beyond Turkey just by refusing to 
join as it held an important line of coast and airfields that could be developed, 
plus control of oil pipelines from Iraq and the Persian Gulf through Banias.  At 
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the same time, it notes that no Syrian government could survive cooperation 
with Britain due to its unpopularity as the power held responsible for the 
creation of Israel,120 a fact that policy makers would struggle with for years to 
come. 
 
The strategic importance of Syria was acknowledged by Nuri, as evidenced by 
the time he spent trying to convince Syria to join the pact.  Nuri knew Syrian 
participation would bring in Lebanon and Jordon while, importantly, side-lining 
Egypt.  The union of Syria and Iraq under the Hashemite fertile Crescent 
scheme, had been something Iraq, and Nuri, had been pursuing for some time 
countering Egyptian influence, but up to this point, the British had remained at 
best neutral if not dismissive of this scheme since their interest had been in 
engaging with Egypt.  The rise of Nasser and his pro-Arab policies meant British 
interests now depended on a strong Iraq and bringing Syria into Iraq’s sphere 
of influence (more to the point away from Egypt’s sphere of influence).  This 
put Syria at the centre of the struggle for influence in the Middle East. 
 
On 24th February 1955 Nuri signed a pact of mutual cooperation with Turkey, 
the Baghdad Pact.  Britain viewed the pact as a godsend; it filled what Britain 
saw as a military void in the Middle East, required no British effort to persuade 
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Arab states to join a Western orientated regional pact, and maintained British 
use of Iraqi bases121.  Eden soon viewed the Pact as “key to the security of the 
entire Middle East”, committing to it fully122.  The Pact fulfilled two purposes, 
one, it guarded against the Soviet threat and two, it bolstered the political 
power of Iraq, thus, Britain in the Arab world.123  The decision to accede to the 
Pact on April 4th, 1955, was welcomed by the British Parliament.124   
 
Yet in signing the Pact, British decision makers failed to take account of several 
warning signs, giving far more weight to the military argument emphasising the 
necessity of continued access to Iraqi facilities.125  For Nuri the regional defence 
pact was an instrument to isolate Egypt while promoting Iraq as the real leader 
of Arab nationalism.  Nuri’s machinations were a direct challenge to Egyptian 
supremacy, as such Egypt’s hostility to the pact was assured.  British 
involvement allowed Egyptian premier, Nasser, to label the pact as colonial 
interference, strengthening his calls for Jordon to confine her affairs and 
interests to the Arab bloc and ultimately undermined, again, British plans.126  
The struggle for Syria, a key state for those vying for regional hegemony, and 
so to external powers attempting to exert influence through their allies in the 
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region, was central to the success, or failure, of the British backed Baghdad 
Pact. 
 
The Baghdad Pact was an embodiment of Nuri’s anti-Russian, pro-Western 
stance, in direct opposition to Nasser who was committed to Arab non-
alignment, a policy which required all Arab states to be on board.  The 
perception was that the balance would be tipped for one side and against the 
other by Syria’s decision to join or stay out of the pact.  This was not the first 
time Syria had fallen prey to its neighbours’ manoeuvrings for influence.  Syria 
had suffered previously the scheming of the Hashemite’s on one side trying to 
assert their influence over Syria, and Egypt and Saudi Arabia and the other 
trying to thwart Hashemite ambition.  The fall of the Shishakli regime in Syria, 
which had fought strongly to maintain Syrian independence, came at a moment 
when regional struggles were being fought in the overarching context of the 
Cold War struggle.   
 
A series of weak governments replaced the Shishakli dictatorship.  These were 
divided internally, not least by struggles between pro-Nasserite, leftist forces 
and pro-Western forces, making Syria particularly susceptible to external 
meddling.127  There was danger for these weak governments in being too 
                                                          
127 A Rathmell, Secret War in the Middle East, (London, 2014) p91 
126 
closely associated with even the suggestion of an external alliance.  This was 
almost immediately demonstrated as the government under Premier Faris al-
Khuri collapsed the day after a Cairo conference to which he and other Arab 
leaders had been summoned.  The failure of al-Khuri to condemn Iraq for its 
intention to form a pact with Turkey, nor to rule out making any external 
alliances was enough to see the fall of his administration in Damascus.  A 
politician known to lean to a pro-Western stance, his refusal to condemn Nuri, 
whose proposal to ally with Turkey was now being touted as being akin to an 
alliance with Israel and a betrayal of the Arab people, was unacceptable.  
Worse it went against the stated policy of the Chamber, that of “hostility to 
foreign pacts”. 128 To be pro-Western was tantamount to being against Arab 
interests. 
 
Patrick Seale describes this moment as a turning point where the “neutralist 
‘left’ seized the initiative and the pro-Iraqi ‘right’ faced defeat; when two links 
were made, one, externally between the Ba’th and Egypt, and two, internally 
between the Ba’th and the Syrian Communists – a first concrete step bringing 
Syria into the orbit of Egyptian and Soviet influence and rejecting western 
overtures of alliance.129  These elements would seek to uphold Arab interests by 
countering pro-western influence in Syria, looking for support in countries 
considered fair on the issue of Israel and support the Arab cause.  This, in 
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practice, meant a pro-Russian stance.  Egypt was quick to support the new 
leftist Syrian government and, consequently, the new Syrian premier made a 
statement on 22nd February 1955 “condemning the conclusion of all foreign 
military pacts and wholeheartedly embracing Egypt’s foreign policy themes”.130  
A direct challenge to the British backed Baghdad pact. 
 
When Britain actually entered the Pact it was clear Syria would never join, 
having been persuaded by Nasser’s vision of Arab solidarity, swinging the 
pendulum of power in Arab politics back to Cairo and away from Baghdad.131  
Britain, however, seemed almost blind to the dangers to stability in the region 
that the Baghdad Pact presented.  The spectre of a Hashemite takeover of Syria 
such a pact raised, represented not only a grave challenge to Egypt, but also 
gave King Sa’ud reason to intervene eventually creating an Egyptian-Syria-Saud 
axis against it and British influence in the region.  The Americans, who had their 
own northern tier defence plans for the region and still hoped to work with 
Egypt, were initially hostile to the Pact, further weakening any hopes for its 
effectiveness against the Communist threat.  Israel, too, opposed British 
sponsorship of the Pact, unsurprising given Nuri’s hopes to use it to strengthen 
the Iraqi bid for Arab leadership, with Iraq a country still opposed to Israel’s 
very existence.  Lastly, the French opposed any agreement that strengthened 
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Iraq at the expense of Syria, arguing this outweighed any usefulness it might 
have as a defence against Communism.132   
 
The Soviets capitalised on Western mistakes over the Pact.  Western powers 
had already damaged their credibility by issuing the 1950 Tripartite Declaration.  
This aimed to coordinate the policies of the three big powers, the United Stets, 
Britain and France, maintaining regional stability, access to resources and 
prevent more Arab-Israeli conflict by forestalling an arms race in the region.  
The initial Arab reaction was cautious, especially over the terms that seemed to 
imply acceptance of Israeli borders, but broadly accepted it.  The Syrian Prime 
Minister, Nazim al-Qudsi, statement on it, however, was to prove insightful 
saying Syria “considers itself free to purchase arms wherever it may wish, 
perhaps even from Russia”133.   
 
Under the Treaty arms purchases were only to be considered if they contributed 
to the defence of the state in question, in practice, it meant that arms were 
sold only to those Arab states willing to join a Western sponsored defence 
scheme.  The tripartite agreement was not solely to prevent an arms race in the 
Middle East but also an attempt to foil Soviet incursion into the area and as 
                                                          
132 “French divergence on Baghdad Pact” The Times, 28 January 1956 
133 A Meyer, Quiet diplomacy: From Cairo to Tokyo in the Twilight of imperialism (Lincoln, 2003) 
p21  
129 
such they viewed it with resentment.  Yet as Arab nationalist sentiment grew, 
tied very much to anti-imperialist, and increasing anti-British, anti-French 
activity, Soviet advantage could be gained by simply shifting to a pro-Arab 
policy134.  Soviets exploited the situation simply by making arms available 
without any of the ties being demanded by the Western powers.   
 
The killing blow to the Baghdad Pact, however, was Britain’s ill-judged reaction 
to Nasser’s nationalisation of the Suez Canal.  The decision to collude with the 
French and Israelis against Nasser, then capitulation to American pressure to 
stop operations, combined to fatally weaken British power in the Middle East.  
British alliances and pacts in the region were made worthless by the affair.  An 
Arab regime associating with Britain would seriously damage its credibility and 
legitimacy.  The British failure demonstrated how weak it had become, 
undermining its value as an ally while clearly highlighting the emergence of new 
world superpowers.  Anglo-Syrian relations fell to new lows, the animosity of 
Syria to British action demonstrated both in the destruction of oil pipelines 
running through it, and the refusal for some months following to allow their 
repair, at great cost to the British-owned Iraq Petroleum Company.   
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While the Pact continued to exist, America even joining its military committee 
after the circulation of the Eisenhower Doctrine,135 it marked another failure in 
British policy, projected policy aims being beyond Britain’s means to achieve, in 
material terms and also in its inability to overcome the anti-imperialist 
sentiment now prevalent in the region.  The Pact’s failure and the defeat over 
Suez saw Britain’s time as a major power in the Middle East end but it wasn’t 
the final chapter in the Anglo-Syrian relationship. 
 
The “Syrian Crisis” 
When the French left Syria in 1946, they did so having made no apparent effort 
to meet Mandate requirements to prepare Syria for independence.  Indeed, to 
maintain direct control of Syria they had exploited divisions, countering any 
serious challenge with divide and rule tactics, thus weakening the unity of a 
new Syrian state.  The failure to build an indigenous administrative and civil 
service in the country left it open to the political manipulation of neighbouring 
states, with the regimes of 1940s and 1950s being “chronically unstable” due 
largely to foreign interference.136  The decision by the British Government to 
back the Baghdad Pact meant that Syria became the main battleground 
between rival states for influence in the Middle East, and both Egypt and the SU 
were quick to press forward there.137  Egypt, after securing a pro-Egyptian 
                                                          
135 Ashton, “The Hijacking of a Pact”, p136 
136 Pearson, “The Syrian Crisis of 1957” p45 
137 Seale, The Struggle for Syria, p230 
131 
Syrian government, and having signed a Czech-arms deal late 1955, cemented 
the relationship with a Syrian-Egyptian defence agreement putting the armed 
forces of the two states under single command.138  Egyptian efforts to 
undermine Iraqi attempts at union with Syria were further underpinned by 
Saudi gold, the Saudi’s determined to undermine Hashemite power in the 
region.   
 
The Soviets were also quick to seize the opportunity to gain a foothold in Syrian 
politics, significantly making their first major intervention into Middle Eastern 
affairs with a public guarantee to stand by Syria a month after the Syrian – 
Egyptian defence agreement was concluded.139  This was quickly followed by 
Soviet economic and technical aid, political visits by Syrian leaders to Moscow, 
high level diplomatic exchanges and, importantly, trade and arms deals with 
members of the Soviet bloc.   
 
Britain viewed the expansion of Soviet influence in Syria with increasing 
concern.  Not just over the threat posed by Soviet political influence which they 
had been working to curtail, but also practical concern over the potential threat 
to the Iraqi Petroleum Company’s pipelines running through Syria on which 
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Britain depended for 17% of its oil imports (France 39%, Italy 25%).140  While 
Britain’s antagonistic attitude to Nasser in Egypt was not shared by the 
Americans, over fears a potential Communist takeover of Syria, Britain and the 
US found common ground.  American intervention in Syria had begun even 
before the British Suez debacle when, reacting to increasing Soviet aid flowing 
into Syria, the CIA became involved in planning a coup to oust the current 
regime.  The plot failed, easily penetrated by Syrian intelligence after many of 
the Syrian officers approached by American officials immediately reported back 
to Syrian authorities.  The CIA plot uncovered, Damascus announced its 
discovery publically on November 23rd.  Parallel machinations by Iraq at the 
time, sponsored by Britain in an attempt to secure Syrian participation in the 
Baghdad Pact possibly contributed to the plot’s failure, the Syrians involved 
playing one side off against the other.141  Following the Suez Crisis, Syria’s 
forceful rejection of the Eisenhower doctrine heightened American fears, 
leading to another CIA attempt to reinstall President Adib al-Shishakli, known to 
support the US, in the unsuccessful “Wakeful” plot of 1957, leading to the 
expulsion of key US embassy officials.142   
 
American fears of a Communist takeover in Syria was well known by British 
policy makers, and corresponded with the British view of the Soviet threat. 
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British newspapers throughout the 1950s repeatedly focused on the Syrian-
Soviet relationship, reporting in December 1956, that the Syrian Communist 
party was the best organised in the Middle East and holding key positions in the 
Syrian Army.143  These concerns were reflected in the opinions of the British 
establishment about Soviet gains in the Middle East so, in 1957, the British 
quickly capitalised on American fears.  Prime Minister Harold MacMillan, aware 
of American preoccupation with Soviet influence in Syria from his time as 
Foreign Secretary, was also eager to heal the breach in relations over Suez.  
MacMillan moved quickly to emphasize the seriousness of the situation in Syria 
resulting in the formation of the Anglo-American Working Group and raising the 
prospect of a joint operation to combat it.  Operation “Straggle” was launched, 
its aim: to encourage Syria’s pro-Western neighbours to “take armed action to 
intervene and overthrow the Damascus regime”.144 
 
The Working Group formed in Washington allowed staff from the British 
Embassy to meet senior US officials from the State Department and CIA, to 
exchange information and make recommendations on the situation in Syria.  
Issuing a final report in September 1957, it emphasised the need to plan 
quickly for action in Syria or risk losing the enthusiasm of Syria’s neighbouring 
states, and consolidation of control by the Communists.145  The “preferred plan” 
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was to stage a phony border incident as a pretext for invasion by pro-Western 
neighbouring states and assassinate prominent pro-Communist figures in the 
Syrian regime.146 
 
The plan was never enacted, none of the pro-Western Arab regimes could be 
brought to support it, the public backlash against the Eisenhower Doctrine 
made it too dangerous for them to be seen to be closely identified with 
American policy.  The alternative plan, to use Turkish troops to invade (a plan 
considered by the Americans but discouraged by the British) was foiled by an 
Egyptian manoeuvre putting 2000 Egyptian troops on the Northern border of 
Syria, and Syria taking a complaint against Turkish manoeuvres on its border to 
the UN.147  These efforts were further bolstered by the SU which issued a 
warning to the Turkish troops and indicated their willingness to send a 
matching number of Soviet forces to Turkeys border with Bulgaria.148 
 
Arguably the Syrian Crisis was a success for British foreign policy makers.  
There is no doubt that MacMillan used American fear of the “international 
Communist threat” to re-establish good relations with the US after the Suez 
debacle.  This once again demonstrated British use of Syria as a pawn in its 
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great power game, or at least in its attempt to maintain its great power status.  
Britain seized on the opportunity presented by the limitation of US intelligence 
gathering which had resulted from the expulsion of US embassy staff from 
Syria.  Reports from Britain’s own Middle Eastern embassies downplayed 
communist influence at the time, stating that Syrian Ba’ath leaders in the Army 
and government were firmly in control.  Indeed, officials in the Syrian regime 
reached out to British counterparts repeatedly throughout this period to 
reassure them on this front.  MacMillan was also well aware that the threat of 
Arab nationalism to British interests in the Middle East was far greater than that 
of Communism.149  Yet the gains from pursuing this policy were noteworthy.  
The Working Group provided a model for the type of Anglo-American 
cooperation Macmillan wanted to develop and, even if longer term it proved 
disappointing, it helped heal the rift left by Suez.150   
 
British policy to maintain influence and protect western interests in the Middle 
East in the decades following the end of World War Two were, in many ways, 
unsuccessful.  The legacy of British imperialism and its perceived betrayal of the 
Arabs undermined London’s post-war policy which aimed to maintain British 
influence, particularly policy focused on working through the Hashemites.  
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British policy aimed at maintaining great power influence and prioritising British 
interests in the region instead contributed to its decline.   
 
There were some gains.  Its policy objective, encouraging the US replace the 
British in the Middle East in order to protect Western interests from Soviet 
infiltration, was an overriding preoccupation.  Economically, its accelerated 
withdrawal from the Middle East and strategic replacement by the US was a 
good thing for Britain.  Furthermore, after Suez soured relations between 
Britain and the US, the “Syrian crisis” and resulting Anglo-American working 
group, brought the two nations significantly closer together.  It even reaffirmed 
to the Americans, to some extent, the importance of their British ally.  With the 
mantle for maintaining security and stability in the Middle East removed there 
was potential for a more normalised relationship with the region over time, one 
not distorted by the physical presence of British military forces on Arab 
territory.    
 
However, this policy had a negative impact for Anglo-Syrian relations.  Years of 
encouraging Syria’s pro-Western neighbours, specifically Iraq to interfere in 
Syrian affairs, generally as a challenge to Egyptian hegemony, only pushed 
Syria further into the Egyptian sphere of influence (finally culminating in the 
1958 political union of the two states in the United Arab Republic).  So, Syria 
137 
had been pushed into closer relations with Egypt and the Soviets, precisely the 
opposite of what British policy had set out to achieve.   
 
Dealings between Britain and Syria were from this point onwards a continuation 
of this antagonistic relationship.  Britain’s imperial past and the close 
relationship with the new “imperialist”, the US, dictated the tenor of the Anglo-
Syrian relationship.  British policy tried to force a pro-Western stance on Syria, 
assuming the only other option was being pro-Soviet.  Such an outlook forced 
Syria and other “neutral” Arab states to look elsewhere for their defensive 
requirements, and in the case of Syria forge a strong relationship with Moscow 
– strategic rather than the political – meaning even today the Syrian regime can 
look to Russia for support.  
 
For Britain what was firmly established in this period was the importance 
American involvement in the Middle East, again this thinking continues to 
dominate political elites today.  The general trend of the next few decades for 
Britain would be withdrawal from the Middle East.  Yet Britain’s position as a 
permanent member of the UNSC, and lingering feeling of moral obligation, 
meant a continuing diplomatic presence in the MEPP, notably in the drafting of 
UNSCR 242 following the 1967 June War.  In this, however, once again British 
policy makers failed to address Syrian interests.  The wording of the UNSCR 
was suitably ambiguous but it was clear that it did not call outright for Israel’s 
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withdrawal from all occupied territories.  That this was the position of the 
British government clarified further in 1969, when the British Foreign Secretary 
affirmed that the omission of the word “all” in the resolution was deliberate.151  
For Syria, the implication was that they may have to negotiate with Israel over 
borders which was unacceptable.  As was the fact that the resolution failed to 
protect Palestinian rights,152 actually failing to mention the Palestinians other 
than obliquely referring to a settlement of the refugee problem.  Consequently, 
they rejected it, only adopting the resolution after the 1973 Yom Kippur War 
alongside UNSCR 338. 
 
Conclusion 
Two world wars in the early 20th century had considerable impact on British 
foreign policy in the Middle East and consequently on British Syrian policy.  
Primarily policy was created in an effort to mobilise Arab resources in order to 
win wars that threatened British interests and security across the world.  
Necessarily this meant protecting interests in the Middle East that Britain alone 
did not have the capacity to defend.  Syria, given its position in the Middle East, 
was central to this battle.  With French forces unable to defend its interests 
there, the British effort became central to protecting this county in order to 
secure the region.  Promises made to support Arab nationalism and 
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independence therefore were made primarily in an effort to mobilise the Arabs 
as a resource, though that is not to say there were not some in the 
establishment who also championed their cause. 
 
During both wars, policy making was again led by the need to mobilise as many 
resources as possible, and the real prospect of defeat and loss of territory 
should this not happen.  Decision making was further complicated by the 
different parties involved in negotiating policies and their differing agendas.  
These elements in the First World War led to differing promises being made to 
the Arab population of the region, the European Jews and those great powers 
allied to Britain.  Those closest to the Arab leaders on the ground frequently 
held different views on the best policy path than those in London, so action 
often reflected their desire to support the Arab leaders, thus to allow Faisal to 
enter Damascus with his force first during the first world war, and later Spears’ 
encouragement of free elections for Lebanon and Syria.  A central issue in all 
this was decision makers were more concerned in protecting primary interests 
in the Middle East, and so Syria was approached only in so far as it was 
important to protect these issues, and when resources were stretched, such as 
at the end of the First World War, these primary interests were prioritised. 
 
British concerns for the region were broader than simply protecting the 
territory, they were also concerned to avoid the creation of a power vacuum in 
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the region which could be exploited by, firstly, great power rivals and, latterly, 
the SU.  In both periods immediately after each war there were differences in 
opinion on how this could be achieved.  After World War One some supported 
maintaining British influence over Syria, and felt handing control back to the 
French could potentially threaten primary British interests, some felt that there 
was a moral obligation to fulfil the promise made of a fully independent Arab 
state.  Ultimately, decision makers were unwilling or unable to extend the 
resource this would require.  Similarly, after World War Two, British 
representatives on the ground favoured support for Arab nationalism and while 
on this occasion they were supported by London, Britain was unable to 
capitalise on this as policy toward Syria was eclipsed by the failures in Palestine.  
The result was a series of conflicting promises and short term policies 
weakening the foundations for future British policy in the region.   
 
Emerging from two world wars British power had been seriously stretched, and 
its decline as a great power was to be sharp.  Yet for the British elite a mind-set 
persisted that saw the Arab states welcoming British guidance and influence, 
having a set of interests in common with Britain, despite a legacy of betrayal.  
Furthermore, the British assumed their shared interest with the US in holding 
back Communism intrusion would result in a similar outlook on how to achieve 
this.  As a result of British regional policies based on these faulty foundations, 
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Anglo-Syrian relations foundered pushing Syria in completely the opposite 
direction.  
 
A number of factors were established during this period which set the 
characteristics of Anglo-Syrian relations today.  Syria is in a strategically 
important geo-political position.  In this period this meant that it was drawn into 
British great power manoeuvring, used as little more than a pawn to facilitate 
Britain’s pursuit of its interests.  Confusion in British policy, the result of 
simultaneous policies being pursued be different departments with different 
priorities further exacerbated tensions.  This legacy has been used as a 
propaganda tool to legitimise the Syrian regime as protector of Arab 
nationalism, and to keep alive the idea of “Greater Syria”, to some extent 
explaining its enduring appeal.  This saw Bashar al-Asad, in 2002, giving speech 
in Paris stating he said Syria was prepared to “forget the past,” while no such 
sentiment was expressed for Britain, on a similar visit to London that year.153.  
The British memory, remains more focussed on its support for Syrian 
independence, a memory which continues to dominate for those who still hold 
that Britain has something unique to offer in its relationship with the Middle 
East.  The failure to accept the conflict in these two points of view to some 
extent continues to impact British policy making today.  
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Chapter 2 
British Foreign Policy Toward Syria in the Thatcher Era 
Hafez al-Asad faced a number of crises in the 1980s.  Internally he had faced 
two significant challenges to his regime, the Muslim Brotherhood insurgency, 
then a challenge to his leadership by his uncle Rifaat as he was recovering from 
ill health.  Externally, there was humiliation in Lebanon as he was 
outmanoeuvred by the Israelis, being left to watch as Israel besieged West 
Beirut, bringing the plight of Arafat and the PLO into the international 
spotlight.154  Disappointed with the early Soviet reaction, despite the Treaty of 
Friendship that they had signed with Syria, they remained initially passive 
distracted by threats closer to home and wanting to avoid a superpower 
conflict.155  Worse the Soviet weapons used to counter the Israeli offensive in 
Lebanon had proved ineffectual.  Though a deal was struck for resupply for 
more modern equipment, the cost was increasing Soviet influence on Syrian 
policy endangering Asad’s capacity to pursue an independent foreign policy in 
his struggle against Israel.156  Meanwhile Syria’s other major ally, Iran and their 
Lebanese client, Hizbullah, had begun to pursue their own interests in Lebanon 
at the expense of Syrian influence there.157   
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Having mostly dealt with these challenges by the mid-80s there were several 
signs in 1986 indicating Asad’s grip was again weakening.  Washington’s 
campaign against state sponsored terrorism, which escalated in April with 
decision to bomb Libya in reaction to its alleged involvement in terrorist activity, 
was of particular concern, not least as the group thought to be responsible was 
Abu Nidal which had headquarters in Damascus.  Evidence thought to link the 
Syrian regime to similar acts of terror158 led to the country being listed as a 
“rogue state” by the US.  The ailing Syrian economy was already in crisis having 
been hit by falling oil prices, and was hit further by an EEC decision to suspend 
aid to the country after suspected Syrian involvement in the attempted 
bombing of an El Al aircraft.   
 
Internationally, Hafez was increasingly isolated from the West while, towards 
the end of the decade, his primary ally the SU was weakening, less able to 
supply arms and resources.  As a result, his ultimate aim of achieving strategic 
parity with the State of Israel, believed necessary to bargain effectively for 
recovery of the Golan from Israeli occupation, looked to have failed.  As the 
Soviet economy collapsed, the Russians started to call in debts placing further 
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strain on the Syrian economy.  Assad had to re-evaluate his external policies, 
with the final collapse of the SU leaving Syria internationally isolated. 
 
That decade the Thatcher government in Britain also experienced problems, at 
least in regard to the Middle East.  Despite significant interests in the region 
and a stated commitment to furthering the MEPP, Britain concluded the 1980s 
having cut diplomatic ties with no less than three Middle Eastern states, Iran, 
Libya and Syria; Thatcher faced accusations of pursuing a much too pro-
American policy in the region and also of being seen as being part of the pro-
Israeli camp; finally, and partly as a result of these failings, there were a 
number of British hostages being held in the Lebanon with little resolution in 
sight. 
 
Thatcher was one of the first Prime Ministers to enter office with very little 
foreign policy experience.  Most Prime Ministers of the past century had 
previously held the post of foreign secretary, one of the most senior offices of 
state, it could almost be seen as a prerequisite to becoming British Premier.  
Thatcher, elected at the height of domestic economic troubles, with British 
international prestige at perhaps its lowest point after decades of decline in its 
world role having withdrawn from its colonial assets, campaigned on a domestic 
agenda.  She seemingly had little interest in foreign affairs, content on just 
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letting her Foreign Secretary “get on with it”.  This state of affairs would not 
last long.   
 
The Falklands War demonstrated the power of successful foreign policy in 
increasing the popularity of the government in power.  The lesson was that 
prestige, the appearance of power, was a kind of power on its own.  Victory 
gave Britain a boost externally and internally, contributing to Thatcher’s 1983 
election triumph.159  Though a clear military victory (probably not possible 
without the logistical support provided by the US160) the episode demonstrates 
the difficulty in assessing the success of foreign policy itself.  It went against 
the overarching objective of British foreign policy towards its old colonies – one 
of decolonisation.  Furthermore, it was a failure of longstanding policy that 
favoured by successive governments since the 1960s and by the FCO, that of a 
negotiated settlement.161  The Falklands then became a non-negotiable issue 
for British policy makers, despite the continued harm to British relations with 
other countries in South America.   
 
The favourable impression Thatcher’s handling of this situation left on the 
Americans saw the beginning of a close relationship that for some defined 
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British foreign policy during the era, especially with regard to Middle East policy.  
Whilst British emphasis on Anglo-America relations was long established, in the 
Thatcher era some perceived it as being too close and the costs too high, 
particularly to relations with Arab states in the Middle East.  It also damaged 
British relations with Europe, already strained by Thatcher’s antagonistic style 
of statesmanship when negotiating in Europe.   
 
Another harmful consequence of the Falklands war was that it solidified 
Thatcher’s pre-existing instinctive mistrust of the Whitehall officials at the FCO, 
providing her an opportunity to “move against” it and constitute her own 
foreign policy unit at No 10.162  Lord Carrington’s resignation (the first of two 
Foreign Secretaries to resign under Thatcher) came as the Foreign Secretary 
was blamed by Thatcher for the failures which resulted in the conflict163, and 
strengthened her control on foreign policy.  Thatcher would now rely instead on 
her friends Cecil Parkinson and Lord Hugh Thomas for foreign policy advice.164  
This, combined with Thatcher’s tendency to see things as black and white with 
finite solutions, and her distrust of diplomacy - Sir Nicholas Henderson states 
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she was someone who did not believe in “useful negotiation,”165 - was to have 
a profound impact on her foreign policy.   
 
There were several points during this period in which both British and Syrian 
interests were engaged.  Britain was key in drafting the European Community’s 
Venice Declaration in 1980, and continued during the rest of the decade to 
express its commitment to the peace process.  As settlement of the Palestinian 
issue was a central concern for the Asad regime, any intervention by Britain 
was likely to impact on the Anglo-Syrian relationship.  Commitment to the 
special relationship saw Britain embroiled with American policy both in Lebanon 
after the Israeli invasion in 1982, and in Libya over state sponsored terrorism in 
1986.  Syria regarded Lebanon as part of its sphere of influence thus British 
policy clashed with direct Syrian interest.  Furthermore, increasing concern in 
the British government over international terrorism brought disagreement with 
the Asad regime over its alleged role in sponsoring terror, but also over the 
Syrian decision to “house” terrorist groups, groups which Syria viewed as 
resistance fighters and integral to Syrian leverage in negotiating a Middle East 
peace settlement. 
 
The Middle East Peace Process 
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In her book Britain and the Middle East in the 9/11 era Rosemary Hollis sums 
up how the FCO in the 1980s defined British Middle East interests.  Roughly 
these can be summed up as maintenance of its access to resources and 
markets, preserving stability in the region, countering any Soviet threat, and 
maintaining its alliances, particularly the US and Europe.166 
 
It might be thought from this that there was little implication for Anglo-Syrian 
relations.  Central to achieving these goals, particularly preserving its economic 
interests and promoting stability, however, was advancement of the MEPP.  
Britain would be a key player in the scripting of the Venice Declaration, 1980 a 
significant step in which the EC clearly set out its vision of the process towards 
settlement in the Middle East, and made various attempts to advance the 
process throughout the 1980s including showing support for the Fahd Plan 
(1981), and even inviting delegations to London in the mid-80s to attempt to 
move the process forward.  British policy, however, was a challenge to Syrian 
interests.   
 
Syria, a front line state in the fight against Israel, viewed the peace process as 
a vital concern, having fought against Israel in the 1948, 1967 and 1973 
conflicts, as well as numerous clashes between 1945-67, with considerable 
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losses both material and of human life.  The prevailing perception, that this 
sacrifice could not be wasted, gave Syria a “political and moral” imperative in 
Middle East settlement, above even that of the narrower interests of the 
Palestinian people167.  Any peace process not taking this into account, that 
attempted to cut the Syrians out of a lead role, and especially that was seen to 
be led by external agents and not the Arab people themselves, was 
unacceptable to the Syrians. 
 
The Thatcher government’s initial foray in this area was led by the FCO, with 
Carrington playing a central role.  The EC’s 1980 Venice Declaration aimed to 
“promote Middle East settlement through recognition of Palestinian rights”.168   
In Carrington’s view it was important to have a more cohesive and equal 
working relationship with France and Germany, in turn “crucial because of the 
vulnerability of Western Europe to instabilities of the Middle East and the 
redefinition of the Atlantic relationship that now seems to be taking place”.169   
 
The declaration recognised the right of all states in the region to exist and their 
security, and expressed recognition of the need for justice for all peoples, 
implying the rights of the Palestinians.  It called for a just solution to the 
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Palestinian problem, not just the refugees, but a settlement allowing them a 
right to self-determination.  Significantly it called for the involvement of all 
parties concerned in the peace settlement which included the PLO and any 
unilateral initiative designed to change the status of Jerusalem.  It expressed 
the need for Israel to end territorial occupation, and considered Israeli 
settlements both illegal under international law and a serious obstacle to the 
peace process.  Lastly it called for the renunciation of force or the threat of 
force by all parties.170 
 
Thatcher maintained this was simply a reiteration of what had been the basic 
European position for some time.  There was criticism that this was a major 
departure from traditional British policy, arguing that the European Councils’ 
recognition of the Palestinians right to self-determination, was substantially 
different to its previous commitment to “the rights of the Palestinian people to 
express their national identity and to a homeland”.171  The recognition of the 
PLO was also a noteworthy step, one not in step with American policy at this 
time.  Britain viewed the Declaration partly as a tactic to keep pressure on the 
America, thus the Israel, to keep momentum on the peace process following 
the Camp David process.  Carrington declared “What we have done is to occupy 
ground which had to be occupied, ground in which Europe is seen and should 
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be seen to be proposing something which is demonstrably fair to both sides and 
anybody who says it isn’t really hasn’t read the Venice Declaration”.172   
 
Michael Smith writes that London’s active participation in drafting the 
declaration put Britain between the European and American positions in the 
Middle East.173  Mark Sedgwick expands this, saying that Britain tried to achieve 
a balance, assuming the EC rhetorical stance to leverage EC diplomatic assets 
in support of ensuring consistent engagement from Washington174.  Certainly 
the necessity of American involvement was acknowledged by Carrington, who 
addressing the House of Lords in July 1980, stating, “None of us is labouring 
under the illusion that Europe is capable of producing a settlement on its own. 
Full US involvement is vital to the chances of peace … The initiative by the Nine 
is complementary to that process.”175  Britain maintained the view that the EC 
process should be complementary to the US process, rather than presenting it 
as an alternative. 
 
By the late 1970s, early 1980s, having completed its own physical withdrawal 
from its responsibilities there, Britain found itself between two forces in the 
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Middle East, the strategic security involvement of the US in maintaining order 
and progressing the MEPP, and the growing involvement of the EC in economic 
terms.  Thus at the same time as Britain and the EC set out the principles of the 
Venice Declaration, the British were contributing troops to the multinational 
force (MFO) observing Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai as part of the Camp 
David Accords.176 
 
The British government did not relish the idea of returning even as part of the 
MFO.  Thatcher, in a conversation with Raegan noted her reservations.  British 
history, the legacy of the Balfour Declaration and involvement in the mandate 
of Palestine had left a black mark on Anglo-Arab relations, taking part in the 
MFO would exacerbate this.  Thatcher had even sought advice from Crown 
Prince Fahd, meeting him at No 10, and he had supported her view saying the 
effect of British involvement would be “very adverse indeed, and would do us 
harm in the Arab world.”  Consequently, Thatcher told Raegan she “simply 
could not afford to lose the business.”177.   
 
Carrington, at that time President of the European Community, a revolving post 
each of the member states held on rota, also expressed concern.  At a Council 
of Ministers in Luxemburg he indicated the need to “balance the interests of 
Washington and of the Arab world, and try to find a strategy for the EEC as a 
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whole.”  Carrington was anxious that participation would indicate support for 
the bilateral Camp David agreement about which the Europeans were sceptical 
at best.  As a consequence, he felt, any involvement held potential to 
undermine the European initiative.178 
 
Ultimately pressure on Britain to send troops came not only from the Americans 
but also her European partners.  The Americans understood there would be no 
European involvement without the British179, with the French, Italians and 
Dutch all having expressed a desire to take part in the force, but only in concert 
with Britain, as part of a “European” contribution180.  Thus a decision not to 
take part became potentially damaging to relations both with the American 
administration and partners in Europe.   
 
The final decision to contribute (with troops from Britain, France, Holland and 
Italy) to the Sinai peacekeeping force came with a statement of support from 
the 10 EEC governments.  This statement, at Greek insistence, made no 
reference to the Camp David agreement saying the decision met “the wish 
frequently expressed by members of the Community to facilitate any progress 
in the direction of a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East on the 
basis of mutual acceptance of the right to existence and security of all the 
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States in the area and the need for the Palestinian people to exercise fully its 
right to self-determination.”181   
 
A statement from the four countries contributing troops was more detailed, 
referring to Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai as a step towards realising the 
terms of UNSCR 242, and confirming the commitments in the Venice 
Declaration.  Not participating would contravene the ethos of the Venice 
Declaration,182 but it made “support for the arrangements associated with the 
implementation of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty as quite distinct from and 
independent of the rest of the Camp David process.”183  The four, very aware of 
the antagonism the move would cause in the Arab world, hoped differentiating 
their participation in the peacekeeping force from support for Camp David 
would lessen the effect.   
 
Though holding reservations, and while actively engaging with the European 
process, Britain also took pains to maintain and support American dialogue, 
later taking a positive position on the Reagan Peace Plan despite feeling it fell 
far short of what was needed.  In a communication to embassies Carrington 
emphasised the line that while Britain had issues with American policy at the 
time, believing it would fail, and that British participation in the MFO could 
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damage its ability to propose an alternative to American policy, he continued to 
maintain that only America could bring about comprehensive peace 
negotiations.184 
 
The Venice Declaration, however, became the basis of a common European 
position on the MEPP, but did little to stimulate peace negotiations on the 
ground.  Israel and America both attempted to stop the EC from issuing it with 
Israel loudly and emphatically decrying it."185  Some also saw the as evidence of 
British pro-Arab bias, an accusation repeatedly heard in this early period of the 
Thatcher government with Carrington being assigned blame.  Carrington was 
accused of putting British and American interests directly in conflict with each 
other, and of seeing “the road to influence with Saudi Arabia and Persian Gulf 
states to be appeasement of the Arab desire for a Palestinian state carved out 
of Israel.”186   
 
The Arab reaction was a “grudging welcome,”187 disappointed that it made no 
proposal to change the wording in UNSCR 242 from “refugees” to “Palestinians” 
and that the PLO was not recognised as sole legitimate representative of the 
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Palestinians.188  More to the point they were most angered at the continued 
refusal of EEC governments to move toward explicitly recognising the PLO in 
the declaration at all. 189  The greatest disappointment overall, however, was 
Europe’s failure to build on it, creating no momentum at all. 
 
Britain’s decision to support to the 1981 Fahd plan further underscored, for 
some, both Britain’s desire to appease the Saudis and Gulf states, and her pro-
Arab bias.  The Fahd plan, proposed Saudi Arabia, went further than UNSCR 
242 in a number of ways; in the call for a return of all Arab lands, in the 
dismantling of settlements, in referring to the rights of the Palestinian people 
and creation of a Palestinian state rather than simply a just settlement for the 
refugees,190 and recognised the PLO as legitimate representatives of the 
Palestinians.191  In return, it implicitly accepted Israel’s right to exist.  America 
held this implied recognition with scepticism; the British, reflecting on it in 
continuing discussion with the Saudis, saw it as both credible and necessary, 
referring to the Saudi Foreign Minister’s statement that negotiation between 
Palestine and Israel would not happen without mutual recognition.192 
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Throughout the early 1980s British policy, attempted to bring some balance to 
peace negotiations.  However, this did not bring it closer to Syria over the issue 
actually setting Britain at odds with Syrian policy over settlement of the Arab-
Israeli conflict.  Syria had borne tremendous costs in the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
leading to the belief Syria had an integral role (and right) in any negotiated 
settlement.  Hafez further held the view that the issue of Palestine was an 
integral pan-Arab concern, and as such could not be left to the Palestinians, or 
any other Arab state, alone to resolve as they saw fit.193  The Venice 
Declaration may have brought some balance to negotiations but did not 
mention Syrian (or Jordan) by name, and calls for the PLO to have a role in 
negotiations raised fears of a settlement with the Palestinians that did not 
include Syria.   
 
The decision by the British to participate in the MFO in the Sinai further 
underscored Syrian fears that the Europeans, alongside the US, sought to 
divide the Arabs and pursue individual peace treaties rather than a 
comprehensive peace settlement.  The 1973 war with Israel, for Asad, was a 
tool in achieving an “honourable settlement,”194 Sadat’s decision to conclude an 
individual peace treaty with Israel in 1979 was the ultimate betrayal of Asad’s 
belief in the need of a comprehensive peace treaty.  Asad’s view was that Sadat 
had capitulated to Israel, not made peace.  Asad would work assiduously 
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against any Israeli agreement that opened the door to further bilateral peace 
treaties thus sideline Syria from negotiations195.   
 
Carrington’s support for the Fahd plan similarly found itself at odds with Syrian 
interests.  British hopes that an Arab led plan could provide movement on 
peace negotiations were dashed when the Fez summit rejected it – largely 
owing to the machinations of the Syrian president who thought it was not the 
right time to be negotiating a peace settlement.  Throughout his premiership 
Asad maintained peace negotiations should only be done from a position of 
strength vis-à-vis Israel and only on the grounds that negotiations must cover 
more than just the return of territory.  British policy failed to take into account 
the Syrian outlook on the peace process, particularly the concept that the 
Palestinian issue was a Pan-Arab one, not just one for the Palestinian people.  
Furthermore, they failed to consider the Syria’s strategic positioning, a rivalry 
between two regional powers in which Syria sought to stop Israel encroaching 
not only on Syrian territory, but into her sphere of influence, through separate 
peace deals.196 
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British attempts to move the peace process forward continued through the 
1980s, with a shift of focus to including the PLO in talks.  The Venice 
Declaration, formally recognised the PLO as a key player though informally 
Britain had done so for some time, with some high level official contact.  
Ministerial contact was politically a more difficult proposition.197  British policy 
was constrained by an internal struggle, one faction seeing the necessity of 
including the PLO, while Thatcher struggled to accept the necessity of including 
individuals she regarded as terrorists in peace talks.  An Arab League peace 
mission visit to London in January 1983 was cancelled after it refused to accept 
British insistence on a declaration that “would have committed them to a far 
more explicit rejection of terrorism and readiness to recognise Israel than their 
governments have so far been willing to endorse”.  Many felt that this was 
Thatcher showing solidarity with the US.198  A compromise was reached in 
March replacing the contingent from the PLO with an academic, a move that 
contrasted sharply with the position of several of Britain’s European partners 
who had already met the original delegation before it was due to go to London. 
 
Despite calls in 1984 from Foreign Secretary, George Howe, for the Americans 
to concede that the PLO had a part to play in the peace process, the problem of 
was repeated in 1985.  Thatcher, following a visit to Egypt and Jordan, issued 
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an invitation to a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to come to London for 
discussions on a peace settlement.199  Again the meeting with Howe was 
cancelled last minute, as the two PLO members of the delegation refused to 
make public statements denouncing the use of violence.  Many suspected that 
was a last minute demand from Thatcher under pressure from Israel, Jewish 
actors in Britain and Washington, along with her own reluctance for talks with 
the group.200  Her dislike of terrorists certainly was clear and across the board, 
apparently also negatively affecting her relationship with Menachem Begin and 
Yitzhak Shamir of Israel due to their early involvement in terrorism against the 
British in the Mandate of Palestine.201 
 
Even these moves served only to underlined the tension between British policy 
and Syrian interests.  Again it opened up the possibility of a separate peace 
process being concluded between Israel and the PLO.  The involvement of 
Jordon in the process was also a point of conflict - when the PLO-Jordan 
agreement, to form a joint delegation to any future middle east peace 
conference, was announced in 1985 Syria reacted by accusing Jordan of trying 
control the PLO and of capitulating to the Camp David Accords.  Jordanian 
involvement was a direct challenge to Syria’s own role in championing the 
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rights of the Palestinian people.  Thus British policy put her directly at odds with 
Syrian interests. 
 
Lebanon 
The 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon provoked a crisis overtook any hope of 
the EC countries building on the commitment of the Venice Declaration as 
Lebanon became a proxy fighting ground for the world’s two superpowers over 
the next few years.  British policy toward the conflict was mixed, setting it on 
the path to increasing hostile relations with Syria as the British and American 
policy positions became closer.   
 
Thatcher severely criticised Israeli aggression, telling the Commons that this 
kind of aggression and hostility must be condemned.202  Foreign Secretary 
Francis Pym stated that Britain and its European partners were looking at 
possible measures to take, calling Israel’s actions disproportionate and 
unjustified.203  Britain suspended arms sales to Israel, while attempting to 
persuade her European partners to do likewise204.  Both referred to supporting 
                                                          
202 Engagements, HC Deb 08 June 1982 vol 25 cc14-8, 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1982/jun/08/engagements (Accessed 
10/12/2015) 
203 The Middle East, HC Deb 22 June 1982 vol 26 cc210-71, 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1982/jun/22/the-middle-
east#S6CV0026P0_19820622_HOC_465 (Accessed 10/12/2015) 
204 FCO letter to No.10 ("Israeli Invasion of Lebanon: Arms Sales, 
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/124649 (Accessed 10/12/2015) 
162 
American efforts to negotiate a cessation of violence, clearly deferring to 
American predominance in the area. 
 
Israel’s aggression also caught Asad by surprise, his air force sustaining huge 
losses though his ground forces managed to hold up the Israeli advance, 
stopping them from reaching vital Syrian security interests in Biqa, and from the 
Syrian border.205  Asad twice agreed to ceasefires, with the Israeli’s breaking 
the first, attacking Syrian and Palestinian positions to gain control of West 
Beirut, then negotiating a second ceasefire after the Syrians were driven back 
fifteen kilometres from the capital.  Asad was left “embarrassed and 
humiliated,” forced to sit by and watch Israel assaulting an Arab capital, and 
accused of abandonment by the Palestinians206.  The PLO and Arafat, 
meantime, garnered international sympathy and recognition having gained a 
new platform in Lebanon.   
 
Pym visiting Syria in October 1982 observed Hafez was moving cautiously.  Pym 
noted in a communication to US Secretary of State, George Schulz, that “on 
issues of central importance to them there were few signs of real flexibility, but 
they may be ready to give peace efforts a chance”207.  At the time two peace 
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plans were in circulation.  The Reagan Plan proposed by the Americans, called 
for an immediate freeze on Israeli settlements, proposed Palestinian self-
government in association with Jordan in the West Bank and Gaza and 
reconfirmed the commitment to UNSCR 242.  Regarded by Syria as a 
continuation of the Camp David process it was unacceptable.  Further, it made 
no reference to the Golan Heights, a vital interest to the Syrians, and fatally the 
Reagan plan ruled out full statehood for the Palestinians.208   
 
The second, Fez-2 was the reiteration of the Fahd Plan.  This time the plan was 
endorsed by Syria for two key reasons; 1. it caused a closing of Arab ranks, 
denying Israel a political reward for its aggression; 2. it denied Jordan the 
opportunity to pursue bilateral peace negotiations with Israel under the Regan 
Plan209.  Pym explicitly expressed that between the Fez summit and Reagan 
plan there was an air of expectation in the region, and the advantage would be 
lost if action was not taken quickly, 210 something borne out in the turnaround 
in fortunes in Lebanon.  His attempts to persuade Syria of the merits of the 
Reagan Plan, noted in his communication to Shultz, one that didn’t even 
mention Syria or the Golan Heights, were doomed to fail.  Pym’s statement 
following his visit, referred to Syria’s importance because of its position in the 
region, affirmed that dialogue was essential and there were a number of points 
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of agreement including the condemnation of Israel’s invasion of Lebanon.  He 
outlined Britain’s position but also underlined that British direct influence was 
limited so Britain would work through its European partners "to continue 
putting pressure on even the US to help in bringing about a just peace to the 
region".211  
 
With this lack of direct influence and with discussion limited to old ground, little 
new emerged from the visit.  British support for the Reagan Plan, with no 
provision for the creation of a Palestinian state, and the potential for 
independent Palestinian or Jordanian led negotiations, put Britain at odds with 
the Syrian position.  The discord widened over American policy in the Lebanon. 
 
During the Lebanon conflict, the British position moved demonstrably closer to 
the American position, exemplified by British participation in the multinational 
force (MNF) there.  The decision to participate did not go unchallenged.  Enoch 
Powell summed up the criticisms; Britain had no interests in Lebanon thus no 
moral or legal imperative for activity there, the duties of the force were so 
circumscribed as to be meaningless, he could see no other reason for the 
British being in Lebanon other than “to dance, and to be seen to be dancing to 
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the American tune.”212  With Thatcher seen to be reluctant to send troops, the 
fact she sent even a small force was used as evidence Britain supported the 
American stance.  
 
As a cycle of terrorist and reprisals American forces increasingly engaged in 
military operations in Lebanon, disquiet over the decision to send a British 
contingent to Beirut grew.  This heightened following an American decision to 
bomb Syrian positions outside Beirut, arguably escalating American involvement 
from peace keeper to combatant.  The British government received a late 
warning, through military not diplomatic channels, further enflaming opposition 
in Britain.213  Still Thatcher defended her position in the Commons, declaring 
that British forces would not be withdrawn and backing the American operation, 
saying they took the action on grounds of self-defence, the need to act quickly 
had resulted in the late notice to American allies.214   
 
Asad expressed his concerns to Thatcher in a letter pointing out four worrying 
developments; firstly, the heightened US military intervention into internal 
Lebanon affairs, secondly, escalation from participation in internal fighting to 
attacking Syrian forces rather than establishing peace.  Thirdly, he noted the 
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recently signed strategic agreement linking the interests of Israel with those of 
America, had immediately increased their joint aggression against Syria and her 
forces in Lebanon.  Lastly he pointed out that the actions of America and Israel 
were hampering not aiding national reconciliation.215  Asad perhaps hoped that 
British involvement in the MNF and Thatcher’s close relationship with Reagan, 
would provide Britain with influence on American policy.  Thatcher’s reply to 
Asad was limited to reiterating the purpose of the British presence as part of 
the MNF, her commitment to aiding in the restoration of peaceful conditions in 
Lebanon allowing for the Lebanese people being able to resolve their own 
internal divisions and the withdrawal of all outside forces.216 
 
As American policy in Lebanon progressed the risk of reprisals against the MNF 
heightened.  Increased terrorist attacks against American and Western targets 
enflamed anti-terrorist hysteria in the Reagan administration particularly against 
states seen to sponsor terror such as Libya, Syria and Iran, an attitude reflected 
by Thatcher.  The public support Thatcher gave the US administration was not 
reflective of Whitehall as a whole, with a number of diplomats wary of the 
impact that badly thought out policy was having, though this division was 
largely a matter of method not of objective.   
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Britain and US both supported national reconciliation, stability and withdrawal 
of all outside forces.  This led the Americans to back the 1983 May 17th 
Agreement between Israel and Lebanon which called for an end of the state of 
war between the two countries. It set out conditions for the withdrawal of 
Israeli troops in return for security guarantees, and opened the way for talks on 
normalisation of relations.  Britain, however, saw a need for more flexibility in 
order to overcome Syria’s objections to the agreement, seeing difficulties if 
Syria chose not to cooperate.  Britain put less emphasis on normalisation of 
relations between Beirut and Jerusalem, on post-withdrawal Israeli patrolling 
rights and believed a less threatening, more coaxing approach to the Syrian 
regime would be more effective.217  In this Britain could be seen to implicitly be 
accepting that Syria would perceive the agreement as further Israeli 
encroachment into its sphere of influence, which would not be acceptable. 
 
Increasing violence in Lebanon coupled with domestic pressure for withdrawal 
in the run up to the American elections left America searching for a way to 
extract its troops from Lebanon.  British Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe met 
Asad in Damascus, in his first trip to the region, hoping to find a way forward.  
Asad, though, was in a much better position to continue the struggle, having 
encouraged his local allies in Lebanon to come together as the National 
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Salvation Front to fight an Israeli – Lebanese accord, and having used the time 
America had been facilitating negotiations to rearm218, his Soviet backing had 
also strengthened with the change in Soviet leadership in November 1982.  
Asad was clear, he was “in no rush to help extricate the US from Lebanon 
quagmire.”219  Asad was prepared to wait until his main objective, the 
abrogation of May 17th Israel-Lebanon agreement was met.   
 
Thatcher was known to be frustrated at the lack of progress but certain there 
would be no forward movement without Syrian cooperation in reducing the 
level of violence.  Not under the same pressure as Reagan to withdraw, she 
continued to argue there could be no withdrawal from Lebanon before an 
“alternative arrangement” could be made.220  Howe echoed this sentiment in 
the Commons on January 25th, 1984 stating “precipitate withdrawal would be 
irresponsible”.221  Yet again the British stance would be undermined by the US 
announcement in early February of its unilateral decision to redeploy its 
contingent of Marines to ships off the Lebanese coast.  Thus the US was free to 
launch air and naval strikes at Syrian and Lebanese Muslim forces without 
                                                          
218 Seale, Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East p410 
219 J MacManus, “Syria to set high price on Lebanon peace” The Guardian (13 January 1984) 
220 R W Apple Jr, “US & Britain discuss alternatives for Lebanon” The New York Times, (21 
January 1984( 
221 G Howe “Syria” HC Deb 25 January 1984 vol 52 cc909-10, 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1984/jan/25/syria (Accessed 19/11/2014)  
169 
endangering US troops on the ground however its partners in the MNF, 
including Britain, were left scrambling to extricate their own forces.222 
 
Some in the British establishment certainly viewed policy over Lebanon as 
misguided, or as Ivor Lucas, former UK Ambassador to Syria 1982 – 1984, 
describes it “frankly disgraceful.”223  Yet influenced the British position in the 
broadest context for the British position can be seen in terms of a continuation 
of Cold War politics.  Priority was given to maintaining a close relationship with 
the US, including supporting its continued involvement in the region to ward off 
Soviet influence, with Syria cast as a Soviet ally.  The Reagan administration 
clearly held Syria as the “primary obstacle” to peace in Lebanon and pointing 
out that the Soviets stood firmly behind them.224  This played into Thatcher’s 
own personal inclinations, naturally pro-American and suspicious of anyone 
associated with the SU.  Still, even here Thatcher took pains to caution Reagan, 
advising him to limit use of force against Syrian controlled areas to self-defence 
only for fear of enflaming the situation further225.  Thatcher maintained a 
cautioning voice, well aware American policy created more risk for British 
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personnel on the ground and weakened prospects of political reconciliation in 
Lebanon.   
 
The gradual alignment of British policy with the American position, and so, anti-
Syrian position, can also be explained by reviewing the changes in the British 
foreign policy decision making structure.  Early moves toward closer 
coordination with the EC had largely been led by one man, Carrington.  The 
Falklands episode removed him from office and while there remained a 
significant pro-Arab, pro-Europe element in the FCO, it had also lost influence 
allowing Thatcher seize control of British foreign policy226 which increasingly 
reflected her own pro-American stance. 
 
The solidarity with the Reagan administration was maintained even while many 
in government and the FCO thought American policy was ill judged, (even some 
in the American administration that the Israelis had “misled them at every stage 
of their Lebanese operation”227).  More broadly, they feared that American 
policy over Lebanon undermined America’s position with moderate Arab states, 
thus affecting their faith in America using its leverage with Israel to negotiate a 
fair peace settlement.  Thatcher prioritised Anglo-American relationship, still 
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believing only the Americans could put Israel under the necessary pressure to 
keep them engaged in the peace process, and continued to hope public support 
could lead to influence in private with Washington.  
 
The costs of supporting American policy were high.  In political terms, it caused 
more rifts between Britain and her European partners, already an antagonistic 
relationship.  Thatcher’s perception was however that maintaining a strong 
relationship was essential to counter the Soviet threat.  Her inclination to show 
public support to America, even while privately expressing the need for caution, 
dragged British troops back into the Middle East as part of the MNF in Lebanon, 
putting them into a country in which Syria had a strategic interest, set Britain 
and Syria on opposing sides in a middle east conflict, and locked them into an 
increasingly hostile relationship.  What little influence Thatcher gained from her 
policy of supporting American action seemingly not putting any restraint on US 
reactions to what it saw as Syrian aggression. 
 
Thatcher, the US and the Libya Crisis 
Involvement in Lebanon was not the only time Thatcher’s foreign policy came 
under serious criticism for being too closely linked to that of the US.  In fact, 
writes Eric Evans, Reagan was a natural ally for Thatcher and “'Atlanticism' was 
172 
a key element in British foreign policy during the 1980s”.228  Thatcher’s close 
personal relationship with Reagan did nothing do alleviate these accusations 
from her rivals and opposition.  Support for the American bombing raid on 
Libya, April 14th, 1986, in retaliation for the terrorist bombing of a West Berlin 
nightclub in which two US servicemen were killed earlier that month, is cited as 
a further example of this.   
 
Thatcher agreed to the deployment of US aircraft from UK bases, the only 
Western European leader to support the unilateral action by the US.  The 
decision increased tensions with her EC partners.229  In the Commons, Thatcher 
stated that Britain, too, had suffered from Libyan terrorism, that Libya was 
known to supply direct and continued support to the Provisional IRA and that 
there was evidence that the Libyan government were “directly involved in 
promoting terrorist attacks against the US and Western countries and have 
made plans for further attacks”230 linking British interests to the American 
action.  Reagan credited this evidence to the work being done by GCHQ.231  
Thatcher declared Article 51 of the UN Charter which recognises a state’s right 
to self-defence provided the legal basis for the operation, meaning America did 
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not need to take its case to the UNSC.  Further the UNSC had previously 
condemned state sponsored terrorism but “has not been able to take effective 
action to deter state sponsored terrorism” and that the US response was 
proportionate.232  This despite the fact in early 1986 Thatcher stated “I do not 
believe in retaliatory strikes which are against international law”233 at a news 
conference. 
 
While defending Washington’s decision in the Commons Thatcher and her 
advisers were concerned.  Privately Thatcher expressed reservations that the 
response would set off a “cycle of revenge and counter-revenge”, and 
potentially strengthen Qadhafi rather than weaken him234.  It was thought that 
the US had seriously underestimated the Arab reaction to the bombardment 
and likely repercussions for Americans in the region; at the same time, they 
were aware of potential consequences for Britain in becoming so closely 
associated with American policy.235   In a letter to Dr David Owen MP, Thatcher 
took pains to point out that the decision to allow the use of UK bases was not a 
blank cheque.  Future action would require the US government to seek UK 
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government permission for the bases to be used.236  Thus Thatcher attempted 
to establish that though Britain had supported this US action, it was not blindly 
aligning itself to American policy.  Similar requests would be considered on a 
case by case basis with British interests in mind.   
 
The feared political and human cost was quickly apparent as reports came in of 
the killing of hostages being held in Lebanon.  Two British hostages, John 
Douglas and Philip Padfield, who had worked at the American University of 
Beirut, were killed alongside their American colleague Peter Kilburn in direct 
retaliation for the attack.  Additionally, the Islamic Jihad Organization claimed 
responsibility for the kidnap of British journalist, John McCarthy, three days 
after the bombing raid.  The former residence of the British Ambassador in west 
Beirut was also attacked though no one was hurt.237  
 
These were costs Thatcher was prepared to incur.  Thatcher’s decision was 
calculated; the raids would go ahead regardless so it was better for the British 
interest to stand with the US on this issue.  Following the raids Minister of State 
Timothy Renton made it clear that in taking the decision “Britain had taken 
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account of the position of the hostages”238  The decision was made on the basis 
of “the importance for this country’s security of our Alliance with the US and the 
American role in the defence of Europe.”239  No doubt frustration over the 
inability of the UNSC to tackle the terrorist situation also played some part.  
Moreover, there was also a feeling that after the support from the US over the 
Falklands, Britain was not in a position to refuse the use of British military bases 
to attack Libya.240  Britain also gained “kudos”, helping influence the passing of 
US legislation which aimed to make it harder for IRA fugitives to claim asylum 
in the US241.   
 
For some this was not enough in repayment.  UK support provided US action 
with an air of legitimacy which was not equalled by British influence over 
American Middle East policy.  Yet two of Thatcher’s main policy aims were met; 
a strong relationship with America and her determination that states that 
sponsor terror needed to be dealt with aggressively.   
 
It should be noted Libya also a good example of an occasion where Thatcher 
was prepared to stand against it, that is, in her refusal to apply sanctions to 
                                                          
238 A Travis, “Hostage position was considered before strike” The Guardian, (18 April 1986) 
239 M Thatcher, “US Bombing of Libya” House of Commons Speech, Hansard HC [95/875-81], 
16 April 1986 
240 M Smith, “Britain and the US: Beyond the Special Relationship” p23 
241 P Sharp, “British Foreign Policy under Margaret Thatcher” in Otte (Ed) The Makers of British 
Foreign Policy: From Pitt to Thatcher, p280 
176 
Libya. Increasingly exasperated with Libya’s behaviour particularly its 
involvement in sponsoring terrorist attacks against western targets, the US 
announced a series of economic sanctions against Libya in January 1986.  They 
sought the support of other western countries in applying sanctions designed to 
isolate Qadhafi.  Britain had broken relations with Libya two years previously in 
following the shooting of WPC Yvonne Fletcher outside the Libyan People's 
Bureau in central London in April 1984.  Thus it could have been expected that 
Thatcher would have agreed to the sanctions regime suggested by the 
Americans. 
 
Britain, however, stood with Europe in refusing to impose sanctions,242 
Thatcher proclaiming loudly that “sanctions don’t work”.243  For once, happy to 
side with her European allies, Thatcher stood firm in the belief that sanctions 
only work “if every country applies them” and “Alas, that was not going to 
happen with Libya.”244  The demands of American policy here conflicted with 
another major priority for Britain, that of protecting British economic interests.  
These interests won out, a consistent pattern for the Thatcher government; the 
same reasoning was behind Thatcher’s refusal to impose sanctions against 
South Africa where Britain also had considerable economic interests.  Thatcher’s 
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personal prejudice that nothing should get in the way of free trade central to 
the decision.   
 
Once again, however, British support for America over the raids set it against 
the interests of the Syrian regime.  Once more Asad watched as an external 
power aggression against an Arab state, an allied state.  Reacting predictably, 
the regime warned prior to the attack that “the US would be “the biggest loser” 
if it attacked”245 and pledged to support Libya against US aggression.  Syrian 
concerns went further than simply condemning the bombing of an Arab state.  
The Reagan administration was preoccupied with the issue or terrorism from 
the start, with some in the administration seeing a “Soviet hand behind every 
manifestation of anti-Western statement.”246  Syria, seen as a Soviet client, was 
particularly concerned that they could be next, US statements in the wake of 
the raid heightening this concern as Reagan warned that if other states such as 
Syria were found to be involved in international terrorism they would “receive 
the same treatment.”247  
 
Syrian support of “terrorist” groups was a tool in Asad’s fight against Israel 
encroachment into Arab territory but Asad also viewed these groups as national 
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resistance fighters, legitimately fighting against oppression of Palestinian rights.  
He contested their being labelled terrorist saying:   
“Since the beginning of the Palestinian question, Syrian territory 
has been open to all Palestinian organizations, but they have been 
allowed to engage only in the struggle against Israel for the 
restoration of their usurped rights; they have never been allowed 
to engage in any other activities. As far as I know and remember, 
no terrorist act in any other part of the world emanated from 
Syria”. 
While there is no doubt that Syria used its connections with various groups to 
further its interests, through Hizbullah in Lebanon for example, this was 
generally a direct reaction to Israel’s manoeuvres.  It can be argued this was 
done out of self-interest, a proxy was against Israel that protected Syria’s 
borders and security, yet it was also a strong part of Syria’s identity as a 
frontline state in the fight against Israel, and part of their Pan-Arab role in 
fighting for the rights of the Palestinian people, and against the wrongs that 
had been done to the Arab people as a whole248.  The tendency to treat all 
activity perceived as terrorism the same way limited policy options for the West 
and severely impacted on constructive Middle East policy, resulting in a more 
hostile relationship with Syria.  
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Asad was further aggravated by the apparent hypocrisy in the Western 
approach, pointing out in an interview he gave on May 17th to a delegation of 
journalists, that there was no similar condemnation of terrorist acts committed 
by Israel in Lebanon, such as the bombing of villages, towns and refugee 
camps.249  American policy demonstrated an inability to take a more nuanced 
approach to Syria, and tendency to disregard Syrian concerns.  British support 
for that policy left it with little room for manoeuvre even had policy makers 
wanted to.  As terrorism struck closer to home, however, Anglo-Syrian relations 
would only continue to deteriorate.   
 
Thatcher, terrorism and Anglo-Syrian relations 
By the time of the 1986 Libya raid the world had seen a “growing trend of 
state-sponsored terrorism with Libya, Syria and Iran as prime culprits”.250  As 
western policy in the Middle East resulted in increased terrorist activity, 
Thatcher’s stance on state sponsored terrorism hardened.  British foreign 
policy, led from No 10, increasingly backed American anti-terror activity.  
Thatcher was strident in her denunciation of terrorist activity, influenced, 
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perhaps, by her own experience of IRA terrorism.  This set the groundwork for 
the break with Syria when terrorism interrupted Anglo-Syrian relations in 1986.   
 
The Hindawi Affair 
On April 17th 1986 an Irishwoman, Ann Murphy was stopped by an Israeli 
security guard at Heathrow airport as she boarded at El-AL airliner.  Unknown 
to her she carried 1.5kg of Semtex in her suitcase, given to her by her 
boyfriend, a Jordanian named Nizar Hindawi.  A day later he turned himself 
over to the authorities, and on 18th April he was arrested and taken into 
custody for questioning.  Details of the plot would emerge at his trial in early 
October but from early days of the enquiry many believed the plot was linked to 
senior levels of the Syrian government. 
 
Prior to Hindawi’s trial the British government showed a relatively measured 
response with no rush to precipitate action.  Internationally, the Tokyo G7 
economic summit in May provided an opportunity to reach agreement and issue 
a statement on a number of measures to be used against states that sponsor 
terror, with Thatcher very much masterminding the statement.  Still, the British 
181 
seemed to take a different view from the US on whether or not the new 
agreement allowed for the use of military power.251   
 
On May 7th Howe, answering questions in the Commons was asked if he shared 
the view of the American administration who “thought Syria would be a suitable 
candidate for possible unilateral American action.”  He stated that Britain was 
committed to the measures set out in the Tokyo communique, and any action 
would depend on whether “there is plain proof of state involvement in 
terrorism, suitable to deserve the response suggested.”252  This message was 
repeated by Timothy Renton, asked for a clear statement the government 
would not support retaliatory action by Israel against Syria in a Parliamentary 
discussion on 12th May.  He replied similarly stating that each case would be 
judged on its own merit with a proportionate response.253  Hafez condemned 
the Tokyo measures as ‘acts of intimidation’, feeling this was a “worldwide 
campaign against Syria which he saw as a prelude to physical attack wither by 
Israel alone or in conjunction with the US... He believed Europe, and Britain in 
particular, had joined the hostile US-Israeli front”.254  
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Meantime, there was the normal tit-for-tat summons to Syrian diplomatic staff, 
expulsions alongside assertions from the Syrian regime was that it was not 
involved and accusations that Israel was behind it all.  The Syrian Ambassador 
was informed that the British Government required the withdrawal of the three 
attaches from Britain within seven days, after they failed to cooperate with the 
police.  The Syrians in turn expelled three British diplomats – a decision 
denounced by the British as retaliation that “was regrettable and totally 
unjustified”255 but not unexpected.   
 
Elements in the British establishment were actively advocating restraint.  One 
reason for caution was concern for British hostages in the region.  The 
attempted bombing of the EL Al Aircraft occurred only two days after the 
American bombing of Libya.  Taking too militant a stance at this point would 
further heighten the risk to British ex-patriots in the area.  Furthermore, Syria 
was not Libya, being “tougher, more influential, more discreet... Syria was, 
however vulnerable to diplomatic pressures because it aspired to function as a 
conventional and respectable Middle East state”256  Thus caution at this stage 
left the door open to persuading Syria to adopt a friendlier position more in line 
with Western interests.  Ultimately however, until the trial itself, British judicial 
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procedure dictated details be kept confidential, the added involvement of the 
FCO and intelligence services makes this level of secrecy unsurprising.   
 
On the Syrian front, Asad denounced the accusations levelled at his regime.  He 
suggested that the focus on combating terrorism obscured the real issue, 
treating the symptom but not the underlying problem.  Not denying the acts of 
terrorism perpetrated in Western Europe, he accused these countries of failing 
to talk about terrorism in Lebanon and Palestine “they are levelling accusations 
against the real strugglers who have faith in their nation and their homeland, 
and who are offering their blood for the cause in which they believe”, making 
the differentiation between “terrorism” and the fight for national liberation.257  
Prior to the Hindawi trial, Asad also gave an interview in which he challenged 
Western intelligence services “to prove that Syria was behind a single terrorist 
operation anywhere” and giving his version of events in which blame for the 
plot was laid firmly at Israeli feet as a means to weaken his government.258 
 
The evidence revealed at the trial appeared to comprehensively lay the blame 
for the plot on the Syrian regime.  Anti-terrorist detectives revealed Hindawi’s 
group had all the “hallmarks of a group of misfits, freelance terrorists looking 
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for a sponsor”.  After a number of abortive meetings in Libya, they left for Syria 
and were taken to a military camp in the Bekka Valley and trained by Syrian Air 
force intelligence officers.  There Hindawi met with Brigadier-General 
Mohammed Kholi, head of Syrian Air Force Intelligence, and three officials, 
Lieutenant-Colonels Haitham Said, Mufid A’Kour and Samer Kokash.  In 
February 1985 Said provided him with false credentials and paperwork allowing 
him entry to Britain, along with money and told him of a plot to bomb an El Al 
aircraft.  He made a dry run to London following which he returned to 
Damascus to be taught to arm the bomb’s detonator and provided with a cover 
story should he be caught.   
 
On his return to London, he was supplied with Semtex.  He then resumed 
contact with his girlfriend, and on 16th April, took her to the airport leaving her 
with the bomb.  He returned to his hotel only to find the plot already foiled, 
Israeli security staff having found the bomb just after 9am, and publically 
announcing the discovery.  He then went to the Syrian embassy where he 
reportedly asked for and received help from the Syrian Ambassador.  The next 
day he gave himself up to the British authorities. 259  On 24 October the trial 
concluded with Hindawi convicted of “attempting to place on an El Al aircraft at 
London (Heathrow) Airport a device likely to destroy or damage the aircraft 
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contrary to Section 1(1) of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981.”  Hindawi was 
sentenced to forty-five years’ imprisonment. 
 
This terrorist attack was just one of several that western authorities suspected 
of having Syrian connections.  There was a suspected “own goal” in which two 
Syrians were killed after a bomb destroyed their car parked in London’s West 
End on New Year’s Eve 1978.  The 1982 assassination attempt on the Israeli 
Ambassador in London was thought to have Syrian connections, clear links 
were found to the Abu Nidal organisation, a Palestinian terrorist group at the 
time based in Syria.  In 1985, Britain expelled four Syrians after British 
detectives apparently thwarted a planned attack on two leading PLO figures in 
London.260  October 1986 saw two men holding Iraq passports deported to 
Syria after they were intercepted by police at the start of what was thought to 
be another Abu Nidal plot.  Asad rejected the accusations, the regime insisting 
that the Abu Nidal offices in Damascus dealt only with information and publicity 
and the attacks did not serve Syrian interests.  In fact, even Western 
intelligence agencies came to the conclusion that Abu Nidal himself was now 
actually in Libya.261  The Hindawi trial was on another level however. The 
compelling nature of the evidence and the strong link, not just to terrorist 
organisations based in Syria, but to senior members of the Syrian regime and to 
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high level Syrian embassy staff, considered a major development.  The 
consequences of this for the Anglo-Syrian relations were serious.  
 
Providing a statement to the Commons on Anglo-Syrian relations on October 
24th Howe confirmed “conclusive evidence of Syrian official involvement with 
Hindawi.”  The Syrian claim, that their contact with Hindawi throughout had 
been as a “bona fide journalist” was “frankly ridiculous” given his paperwork 
could not have been obtained without collusion with Syrian officials, and the 
contacts he’d made with Syrian officials since arriving in London.  “Independent 
evidence” established that the Syrian ambassador was personally involved in 
securing Hindawi sponsorship by the Syrian intelligence authorities.  “Equally 
compelling evidence”, according to Howe, showed that Hindawi sought to 
secretly contact Syrian intelligence officials in Damascus to request assistance 
in securing his release.  Toward the end of his statement Howe announced the 
decision to break diplomatic ties with Syrian. 262    
 
The statement revealed the now inherent conflict in British policy, choosing to 
cut ties with Syria as part of a hard-line stance against terrorism directly 
contradicted the policy of “playing our full part” to find peaceful settlement in 
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the Middle East.  A statement from the British Ambassador to Syria at the time, 
though, is illuminating; while admitting the break in relations to be a 
“disadvantage” the ambassador added “It has got to be said that in recent 
years we have not been able to exercise very much influence over Syrian 
policy”.263 
 
The decision to break diplomatic relations came within hours of the verdict.  
The breakdown in relations with such a strategically important state in the 
Middle East can only be seen as a failure for British policy.  In some senses the 
government had no option, Thatcher’s aggressive stance against state 
sponsored terrorism meant her credibility was involved; anything reaction seen 
as weak risked criticism in Parliament and the press, potentially from her 
international partners.  In fact, she made the decision three days prior to the 
verdict and saw Asad, now, as an obstacle to an accord being reached between 
Israel and Jordon264.  Thatcher was, reportedly, the driving force in the decision 
to end diplomatic relations, a decision not discussed at full Cabinet, but taken 
by Thatcher and a small group of senior Cabinet ministers.265 
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Percy Cradock, writes that there was a choice for Britain; one, to expel the 
Syrian ambassador or two, cut off ties entirely.  He argues he would have opted 
for the first since full confrontation equalled a greater risk to British citizens, 
sacrificed intelligence information, and also risked losing Britain’s overflight 
rights which would have a financial implication.266  Prior to the trial the FCO and 
Foreign Secretary had urged caution for similar reasons.  These reasons 
remained but in addition if Britain failed to convince her allies to follow her lead 
in cutting ties with Syria, then the British action would have little effect on 
Syria.  The cost potentially - British lives in Lebanon and British interests in the 
Middle East generally.  
 
Clearly the decision was not straight forward, one diplomatic source explaining 
that there was much at stake, including the risk to British diplomats abroad and 
that “Syria could make sure that Britain play no further role in the Middle East 
peace process.  That would be a blow to the Foreign Office… [Syria] is the 
cornerstone of the Middle East.” 267  Thus Syria was acknowledged as a key 
state in the Middle East, under the direct protection of the SU and its influence 
in the region recognised as extensive.  The breach in relations would 
necessarily have a number of consequences.   
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British property and citizens across the Middle East were at heightened risk of 
becoming priority targets for Abu Nidal and other terrorists, and there was 
further risk for western hostages already being held.  Though Britain had little 
economic interest in Syria the British move put its wider economic interests at 
risk since Syria was considered a frontline state in the war against Israel.  
Consequently, British relations and trade with other Arab states could have 
cooled, even with those states Britain viewed as more moderate such as Saudi 
Arabia.  Lastly, there were implications for British airlines since many flights to 
the Middle and Far East were routed over Syria and the closure of Syrian 
airspace would have a financial cost.  The FCO was not unaware of these risks.  
On the announcement of the break in diplomatic relations one FCO source 
called it an “accident of history” that the Hindawi case had led to Britain 
accusing Syria of involvement in terrorism, saying “We are reacting to a 
situation.  Any country around the world could find themselves in the same 
situation”.268  Attempts to mitigate the situation were evident in the statement 
by FCO officials saying Britain was not attempting to provide a “blueprint” for its 
partners in the EC or other members of the G7.   
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Officials noted a number of ways Britain’s allies could show support of its 
stance.  One, suspension or reduction of high-level contacts; two, tighter 
security checks on Syrian Arab Airlines; three, the recall of ambassadors for 
consultations.  They also noted the pledges made by the G7 at the Tokyo 
summit in May for concerted action where cases of state sponsored terrorism 
were proven.269  By this, the FCO was attempting two things.  Firstly, to 
moderate the impact should Britain’s allies fail to act as stringently as the 
Government would like, perhaps in part hoping to balance the anticipated 
strong voice of the Prime Minister.  Secondly, by reminding Britain’s allies of 
their commitment to concerted action they tried to elicit a joint approach to 
Syria that might mitigate effects of the break on British interests. 
 
Syrian reaction to the break in relations was immediate and fierce.  British 
diplomats were given just one week to leave the country.  Overflight rights for 
British aircraft were revoked.  The British Council in Damascus was closed, a 
considerable blow to cultural relations between the two countries.  Syrian ports 
and territorial waters were barred to British shipping.  Syrian Arab Airlines were 
stopped from flying to London.  The reaction, though not unanticipated, dashed 
any hopes that Syria would maintain the principle of reciprocity, which was the 
norm in such cases.270  Asad furiously denied any Syrian involvement, pointing 
the finger at Israel and enemies of the regime who wanted to weaken his hold 
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on power.  There was evidence linking the Hindawi family to Mossad, 
uncovered by coordinated Syrian and Jordanian investigation, which established 
the family had a history of involvement with the agency.  Another theory is that 
Israel had prior knowledge of the plot, allowing it to go so far for maximum 
political benefit.  Others suggest that the plot was too clumsy for Asad to have 
been involved, the evidence so obvious that it was more likely to have been a 
frame up, not by the CIA or Mossad, but an Arab enemy such as PLO chairman 
Arafat or Qadhafi. 
 
Patrick Seale argues that probably at least one Syrian agency was involved, but 
equally it is likely neither Asad nor his Prime Minister Dr Kasm and possibly the 
rest of his government knew anything of it until the story broke on the news.  
Asad deliberately set up his various security services and military agencies in 
order to prevent any one agency gathering too much power and thus the ability 
to challenge him, so it is possible one of these may have acted independently.  
Equally these agencies could be encouraged to partake in this kind of plot 
independently, offering Asad plausible deniability.  Yet, that it was Khouli, with 
close personal ties to Asad, who was apparently central to the whole affair 
creates even more uncertainty as to the level of Asad’s own knowledge and 
involvement.   
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For the British government, the evidence left little doubt of some Syrian 
involvement, likely, the Syrian Air Force Intelligence agency.  Asad, though, 
viewed the plot in terms of regional intrigue, seeing it as an attempt to 
undermine his regime.  Certainly he had reason to be worried about the 
allegations of involvement in terrorism being brought against his regime.  His 
regime was being subjected to the same barrage of accusations that had 
resulted in the US air force launching bombing raids against Libya, making his 
sense of vulnerability all the more pertinent. As would be repeated both in 
2003, after Iraq, and the 2011 after Libya, there was mounting speculation 
throughout 1986 that Syria was next on the list for US military intervention.  
Both Vice-President George Bush and President Reagan accusing Syria of 
“godfathering terrorism” and “running the risks that entailed”.271  Thatcher 
made no statement backing a military strike against Syria, but neither did she 
categorically rule it out.  Her decision to “break new ground” becoming the first 
British Prime Minister to visit Israel in late May had further cemented the 
perception of British drift into an US-Israeli axis.272  For Asad this demonstrated 
British support for plans by Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres to pursue 
settlement of the Palestinian problem through a separate deal with King Husayn 
of Jordan,273 a move bound to raise Syrian ire. 
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Thatcher’s response was also predictably strong.  Her natural inclination to 
distrust this Soviet backed socialist state; direct experience of terrorism through 
the IRA, and her personal friendships with King Husayn of Jordan and Prime 
Minister Peres of Israel may also strengthened her thinking.274  In the official 
British view, the nature of the Syrian regime was to blame for creating the 
conditions for the plot to occur.  If it was the case that Asad was not the person 
who authorised the attack then the worth of a diplomatic relationship with a 
leader of a regime not able to control, or answerable for, its activities was 
questionable.  If he did know about the attack the decision to cut ties was even 
more justifiable.  
 
The Hindawi affair stands as an exemplar of the murky world of Middle East 
intrigue and demonstrates the difficulties British foreign policy faced.  There 
were clear differences in opinion between the PM and the FCO in how to handle 
the affair.  While Thatcher’s voice reigned supreme it was key in preventing the 
resumption of ties with Syria.  Thatcher insisted in tying the resumption of 
relations with Syria, to Asad’s willingness to renounce terrorism, unwilling or 
unable to accept the Syrian argument that these were resistance fighters, or 
that the groups are integral to Syrian interests in its regional struggle with 
Israel.   According to the British government the evidence tying Syria to the EL 
Al plot was conclusive but several other investigations into terrorism in Europe 
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failed to build similar strong cases, making choosing an appropriate response 
problematic.  Thus a coordinated and effective policy against international 
terrorism remained elusive.   
 
The case highlighted the difficulties Britain applying pressure on Syria with few 
economic ties and military retaliation not an option. Political and economic 
pressure had to come from acting in concert with allies and partners.  With the 
Tokyo agreement in place, and the joint experiences of terrorist attacks 
suffered by other Western allies, the conditions appeared favourable for a 
collective stance against Syria.  Yet conversely, there was a considerably less 
than robust response given the circumstances highlighting the difficulty for 
Britain’s partners and allies to stand united on Middle East policy, and for 
Britain, it highlighted some intrinsic difficulties in its foreign policy. 
 
Taking a stand, Thatcher and her allies 
The task of negotiating a coordinated response from the EC was arduous, with 
each member state having a different view on what measures the EC might 
take toward Syria reflecting their different interests in, bi-lateral ties with, and 
proximity to, the Syrian regime as well as the Middle East region as a whole.  
Whilst most of the twelve governments condemned the plot, a number, led by 
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France, expressed doubt as to the extent of Asad’s involvement with a marked 
reluctance to break economic and diplomatic ties. 
 
A meeting of European Foreign Ministers on October 27th, 1986 in Luxemburg 
failed to reach a collective decision despite Howe’s detailed summery of the 
Hindawi trial including the evidence collected of official Syrian involvement in 
the plot.  Howe appealed for the Community to adopt a nine-point package of 
measures against Syria, including a tough statement condemning Syria, a halt 
to EEC aid, ceasing official visits, an arms embargo, limits on the size of Syrian 
embassies, mutual non-acceptance of expelled Syrian diplomats, tighter visa 
controls, temporary recall of EEC ambassadors from Damascus and more 
security checks on Syrian airline flights.  Delegates were unwilling to go much 
further at this stage than a “vaguely worded condemnation of terrorism.” 275   
Even this wasn’t unanimous as Greece refused to endorse it, not accepting 
either that Syria was sponsoring terrorism or that the Damascus government be 
singled out.  A French representative said of the evidence that Britain 
“presented to us, what can be described as irrefutable proof of the involvement 
of Syrian intelligence services... However, is it the same of the Syrian 
government?  We were not convinced”.276  It was a stance echoed by several 
other partners. 
                                                          
275 D Brown, “Europe refuses to back Howe on Syria” The Guardian (28 October 1986) 
276 T Lalevee, “Thatcher takes lead against Syrian terrorism” EIR, Vol 13, No 44, Nov 1986, p46 
196 
 
This reaction was instantly condemned by the British government, Howe 
complaining that terrorist attacks in one European country appear not to make 
much impact on others.  Thatcher was the loudest and most critical of her 
partners, stating that their lack of action did not “live up to their bold 
statements against terrorism”277.  This played well in the press, but the reaction 
of the other EC states was likely expected.  It was unreasonable to expect any 
more from a multinational organisation only three days after the end of the 
Hindawi trial.  Britain’s own decision to cut ties with Syria had been taken with 
no prior notice to any of these partners whom it now asked for support.  Each 
member had their own interests to consider, France had her own hostage 
concerns, as did Germany, and also had troops on the ground in Lebanon.  Any 
decision with regard to Syria would have implications for both.   
 
Additionally, this meeting of EC foreign ministers was arranged prior to the 
verdict and key ministers were missing, the French, German and Italian foreign 
ministers all with prior engagements.278  It was hardly an auspicious setting to 
discuss united action against Syria.  Thatcher had not endeared Britain to her 
European partners consequently they were resentful of British attempts to 
pressure them over Syria for measures “designed to boost Mrs Thatcher’s 
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political popularity at home rather than as a genuine international contribution 
to defeating terrorism”.279  Dennis Healy, shadow foreign secretary, noted that 
“the British case might have been stronger if it itself had taken stronger action 
over South Africa.”280  Here both Britain and Germany had opposed sanctions 
with similar interests at stake, but while Chancellor Kohl quietly lobbied behind 
the scenes Thatcher had approached negotiations in her usual manner leaving 
a stain of resentment among her EC partners, while Kohl came away clean.281   
 
Howe sought to mitigate British reaction, reporting to the Commons on his 
return from the EEC Foreign Affairs Council, that partners had been “impressed 
and disturbed”282 with the evidence he’d brought to the meeting and stressing 
to the House that all ministers were prepared to take further measures given 
time to digest the evidence, with the exception of Greece.  This was backed by 
the French President in his statement that “no compromise was possible with 
terrorism or states which indulged in terrorism.”283   Both viewed the meeting 
the upcoming 10th November as a chance to review the potential measures that 
could be taken.  At that meeting Britain finally got an agreement on joint EEC 
action.  The attending foreign ministers decided on four sanctions against Syria, 
including an arms embargo, suspension of high-level visits, a review of the 
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activities of Syrian diplomats and consular missions in EC countries, and that 
each would review and tighten security precautions surrounding the operations 
of Syrian Arab Airlines.284 
 
These were moderate anti-terrorist measures falling far short of Howe’s 
suggested nine-point package, but the varying national interests meant that 
this could be expected.  The ban on high level exchanges with Syria was 
maintained for nine months, and the EEC Commission did not recommence its 
funding of two major aid projects in Syria until September 8th, 1987.  The 
Commission stated that these had stopped over technical and not political 
problems while British government continued to insist it would not support any 
proposal for new aid to Syria at that time.285  The suggestion that European 
partners should follow Britain into a full diplomatic rift with Damascus was flatly 
refused.  Howe presented the meeting as an example of EEC resolve.286   
 
Perhaps in contrast the support from the US seemed more immediate; Reagan 
endorsed the British stand, withdrew the American ambassador from Syria and 
intimated that there could be further action after discussion with Britain.287  
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While indicating that the US might consider further diplomatic and economic 
steps with regard to Syria, the Reagan administration also clearly stated there 
would not be a diplomatic break.  This was consistent with its recent position 
vis-à-vis Syria which was to keep “President Asad’s Syria on its list of proscribed 
terrorist nations while at the same time maintaining diplomatic links at the 
highest levels”.288  Perhaps after her high profile support of US action in Libya 
Thatcher might have expected more from the US.  Following the Tokyo Summit 
agreement, it had been the US that had been most vocal in supporting the 
possibility of military intervention in Syria.  Taken together with the hawkish 
rhetoric coming from President Reagan and Vice President Bush earlier in the 
year and the weight of evidence against Syria, the US reaction could be viewed 
as somewhat weak. 
 
The Americans, though, had their own interests to look out for in the region.  
The fate of the six American hostages held in Lebanon, and the public reaction 
should they be killed as a result of American aggression toward Syria, restricted 
its options.  The Syrian role that had emerged in helping to organise safe 
passage for American hostages in that period was also important.289  Any action 
against Syria also risked further destabilising the general situation in Lebanon, 
which potentially could destabilise the whole region.  The issues that worried 
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the British FCO over taking a tough stance with Syria, overridden by Thatcher, 
were of as much a concern, if not more so, to the US which had more interests 
invested in the region that would be put at risk.  Lastly there was infighting 
within the administration as to where the blame for the incident really lay, some 
believing that Qadhafi not Asad was behind the plot.   
 
Despite earlier sabre rattling following the Libyan strikes, any action against the 
Syrian regime was an entirely different and more dangerous prospect for 
America.  It risked a confrontation with the SU, Syria being their principle client 
in the Middle East, “As a pariah Colonel Qadhafi was the soft option; as the 
Soviet Union’s closest ally in the Middle East, President Asad is untouchable”.290  
It should also be noted that the Syrian military was not seen as a “pushover” 
making the risks of staging a military intervention higher.291  Even in Britain 
there was no particular support for military intervention so it would have been 
hard to justify by the US, particularly as the Article 51 argument on self-defence 
provided to legitimise the Libya action was already considered weak in that 
scenario.  Lastly, there was the added complication that tensions between 
Israel and Syria were already high so any action by the US had to be 
considered in terms of igniting this situation further. 
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Both the Thatcher government and Reagan administration agreed that Syria 
“tolerated, encourages or actively sponsors operations which... would pass as 
terrorism”, yet Asad was not considered in the same light as Qadhafi and never 
gave the same kind of “rhetorical support for most flagrant terrorist exploits”292 
as Qadhafi did.  In other words, Qadhafi, much like Saddam Hussein in 2001, 
was a state leader who overtly stood in the way of peace and stability in the 
region, posed a threat to American interests and most importantly, was 
someone with whom the diplomatic option was no longer thought viable.  Asad 
was still considered as someone who had authority and influence, and most 
importantly a rational actor with whom to engage in diplomatic negotiations.    
 
Less than a month following the Hindawi verdict Thatcher suffered another 
blow as details of the Iran-Contra affair emerged.  Senior officials in the 
American administration had been secretly facilitating the sales of arms to Iran, 
then under an arms embargo, hoping to secure the release of US hostages and 
to fund the Contras in Nicaragua.  The emergence of details of the arms for 
hostages deal was damaging to the US administration.  As if to underline the 
importance of his regime in the region, it was Asad who revealed the affair, 
deliberately leaking details to the pro-Syrian Beirut paper Al-Shiraa.  For Asad 
this served a number of purposes, reminding the Americans and others in the 
region of the important part Syria played there.  It was also a shot at Iran 
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which, in Lebanon, was vying for influence with Syria.  Neither was it 
coincidental that Asad chose to reveal these details just as the Americans were 
praising Iran for aiding in the release of hostages while dismissing any 
suggestion of positive Syrian involvement in these releases. 
 
Thatcher, in her drive to “punish Syria for its role in the Hindawi affair,” was left 
high and dry.293  In Washington as the story broke, however, Thatcher 
maintained her policy of publically supporting Reagan.  Within weeks of 
breaking relations with Syria, Thatcher “defended the President’s secret 
dealings with Iran on the grounds that it was always necessary to maintain 
contact with people… she offered not a word of admonition for the most blatant 
appeasement of terrorists a western government has undertaken”.294  
Thatcher’s staunch defence of Reagan was more than what he received from 
some members of his own government. 
 
Thatcher held a genuine desire to make a stand against terrorism, and Syria 
was a soft target, military action was ruled out as there could be no risk of 
direct military confrontation with the SU, and there was no real loss to be had 
in economic terms.  Additionally, the amount of evidence in this case was 
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unusually persuasive.  Speaking to the Commons, Thatcher stated that “There 
is a very clear declaration on terrorism, to which all summit countries are 
committed. We shall obviously be monitoring its application”.295  This was 
Thatcher’s opportunity to put the agreement to the test.  Unfortunately, as with 
many such statements, in order to get agreement on the statement the 
language was suitably ambiguous and as such not all Thatcher’s allies were 
compelled to act.     
 
In her insistence on cutting ties with Syria and refusing to consider 
reengagement until President Asad denounced all “support for terrorism” 
without any preconditions, Thatcher cut ties with a key state in the region.  A 
dialogue with Syria could potentially have aided in bringing British hostages 
kidnapped in Lebanon home safely.  In some senses it isolated Thatcher, not 
Asad, locked in a path significantly different from both her European and 
American allies, who despite denials, all negotiated with both the Syrians and 
Iranians to free their own nationals.  Domestically it caused friction within her 
own government.  Furthermore, cutting ties with a state thought to be central 
to the achievement of peace, security and stability in the region ran contrary to 
British interests in pursuing an active role in peace efforts. 
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Resumption of Diplomatic Relations 
The major condition Thatcher put on re-establishing relations with Syria was 
that Syria must show itself to no longer sponsor terrorists.  On this there would 
be no movement, but ultimatums such as this are not useful tools in diplomacy.  
Thatcher’s efforts to isolate Syria and thus potentially forcing the regime to give 
way on this issue, rested on Britain's ability to persuade her partners to follow 
suit.  Britain essentially encountered the same problem that America had run 
into over Libya when it had sought partners to join the Americans in sanctions 
against the Qadhafi regime.  Moreover, the Syrian regime was being told it 
must renounce state sponsored terrorism and cut all links with so-called 
terrorist groups, simultaneously, the British government was insisting that Syria 
should show her readiness to be a responsible member of the international 
community by using her influence with such groups to press for the release of 
the western hostages in Lebanon. This must be regarded as a somewhat 
ambiguous at least, if not contradictory stance on the issue.   
 
Finally, Thatcher’s stance against state sponsored terrorism, and in particular 
against Syria, became closely attached to her own personal prestige as Prime 
Minister.  It became almost impossible for the British government to back down 
on the issue without any significant move by Syria to give ground while 
Thatcher held the premiership.   While other countries made deals to secure the 
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release of their citizens in Lebanon, no movement was achieved by Britain in 
this respect until after relations with Syria were restored and this did not, 
perhaps could not, happen until the resignation of Thatcher in 1990.   
 
The FCO and the British Embassy in Damascus had felt British reaction to 
events should never have gone as far as severing ties completely.296  Almost 
immediately after they were cut there were calls for the government to restore 
ties and questions over what would precipitate this restoration.  By February 
1987 the FCO had upgraded its diplomatic presence in Damascus with 
speculation that the timing was linked to the disappearance of Terry Waite in 
Lebanon, and the hope that Syria would use its influence to negotiate his 
release and the release of other hostages.297 This was denied by the Foreign 
Secretary and relations remained the same.298  Simultaneously, the UK 
government also came under pressure to reinstate diplomatic relations with 
Syria from her European partners who hoped for an international Middle East 
peace conference in which Syria was seen to play a crucial role.299  In both 
cases Britain maintained that no restoration of relations could be considered 
until the Syrian regime cut its support for terrorist groups, and refused to 
support restoration of EEC ministerial visits to Damascus.   
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By July 1987 Britain had removed its opposition to dropping the sanctions the 
EEC had adopted in the wake of the Hindawi affair “in order to facilitate 
renewed diplomatic attempts for a conference on peace in the Middle East”.300  
The Thatcher government by then had already expressed support for American 
moves to reengage with Syria, a decision they had made in hopes of Syrian 
cooperation in the hostage situation, and also in an attempt to encourage Syria 
to distance itself from Iran at a time where the two countries are seen to be 
increasingly in dispute over Hizbullah in Lebanon.301  Despite both these issues 
having clear links to the stated British priorities, plus some positive signs from 
Syria in terms of the regime distancing itself from terrorism with the closure of 
the Abu Nidal group office in Damascus, the British government maintained 
Syria had not done enough to begin moves to restore relations. 
 
America and Britain’s European partners moved to reengage with Syria 
prioritising their individual interests or goals in the region while pressure on 
Thatcher’s government to do the same increased as hostages from other states 
were returned safely.  As a number of signatories to the Tokyo anti-terror 
statement of 1986 were seen to breach anti-terrorist declarations, Thatcher 
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held the line in Britain.  In May 1988 Thatcher told the Commons that Britain 
would not pay ransom to terrorists, reiterating that there would be no 
resumption of relations with Syria until it disassociated itself from terrorism, and 
denying concern over loss of influence in Middle East diplomacy.302  Syria’s 
position, not Britain’s, appeared stronger as a result.  Asad’s regime, now 
experiencing warmer relations with the US and other EEC partners, could 
withhold cooperation on the hostage issue as an incentive to full diplomatic 
relations. 
 
It is easy to consider British policy here simply as clumsy but, as one article of 
the time put it, “It was Syria's London embassy that was the base for one of 
the most flagrant abuses of diplomatic privilege of modern times.”303  While 
there may have been other motivators in Thatcher’s decision to cut ties, the 
severity of the crime plus the weight of evidence were important factors.  It 
was the conditions placed on resuming them that was problematic.  For one 
thing, it was unclear what the Syrian regime would have to do to demonstrate 
compliance.  The immediate measures Asad took to tighten his control of the 
intelligence services and later the expulsion of Abu Nidal from Syria304 did little 
to sway the British government.  Thus relations were broken without any clear 
route to their resumption. 
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By early 1990 the Thatcher government’s stance toward Syria was becoming 
untenable.  Voices in both Parliament and the media were arguing loudly for 
the resumption of relations.  Circumstances had also changed.  A similar break 
in relations with Iraq over the hanging of a London based journalist, or even 
over the smuggling of nuclear trigger devices, had not followed those events.  
The estimated cost to BA was now being estimated to be up to £50 million a 
year, and Britain only had two junior diplomats and a Secretary in Damascus 
with no access to senior figures in the Syrian regime, so no influence over 
hostage negotiations.305  The call for a different approach was echoed in the 
FCO and led by Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd, appointed in October 1989, 
who also defended the decision to maintain Anglo-Iraqi ties saying Britain must 
not lose its last embassy “between the Khyber Pass and the Mediterranean”.306  
By this time, it was clear there was no advantage to this policy against Syria.  
Furthermore, Thatcher’s own position in Government was weakened, 
particularly over the unpopularity of her government’s poll tax policy, plus 
suffering from Howe’s damning resignation speech which severely condemned 
her attitude to Europe.   
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Signs of disagreement between No. 10 and the FCO were again apparent in 
disagreement over speaking with Iran over the hostage issue.  Thatcher spoke 
in the Commons restating her position, equating negotiating as akin to 
blackmail.307  Yet Britain’s established policy had neither gained the release of 
the hostages already in captivity nor made any Western citizens in Lebanon 
safer.  On resuming relations with Syria, Tory MP Peter Temple-Morris, who sat 
on the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, said "Pressure is now moving 
strongly in this direction... From my contacts with the Foreign Office over the 
years I know that an element can see the advantage of a restoration of 
diplomatic relations with Syria".308  Hurd in the Commons too, reiterated his 
opinion that holding discussions, not striking bargains or making concessions, 
with the hostage takers was perfectly right.309 
 
For Syria the outlook had also changed.  Along with internal issues including a 
poor economy with a bloated public sector, and blatant corruption and loss of 
financial aid from other Arab countries Asad had by now lost his major ally the 
SU.  From the mid-1980s onwards Gorbachev, facing his own economic 
problems, stopped supplying Syria with large amounts of military equipment 
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ruling out any hopes of achieving strategic parity with Israel.310  Asad’s 
pragmatic policy making saw him move to improve relations with the West, and 
regionally with Egypt, Morocco and Jordan and demonstrating his regime was 
instrumental in securing negotiations for release of Western hostages, along 
with Iran.311 
 
The 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait offered Asad an opportunity to cement this 
change in direction as the US sought to recruit Syria in order to isolate Saddam; 
Asad’s strong nationalist credentials, strong army, and intelligence assets made 
him potentially the strongest Arab rival to Saddam in Iraq.312  There were 
indications, too, that Britain recognised the changing situation.  FCO Minister 
William Waldergrave stated that new circumstances in the Middle East might 
raise the prospects of hostages being released and noted engagement with 
Syria and Iran might figure in that.313  The issues over Syria’s links to 
international terrorist groups with the continued opposition to renewal of ties 
with Syria meant Britain restored relations with Iran, not Syria, on 27th 
September 1990.  Still a softening on the British stance could be seen in the 
government lifting its block on EC aid to Syria for the first time since 1986, 
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freeing the path for European Commission discussion on grants and loans to 
the value of £105 million at least.314  
 
By October 1990 Syrian troops were on the ground in Saudi Arabia, alongside 
American and British forces, adding another layer of complexity to Anglo-Syrian 
relations.  Hurd stated ''On our side there is complete readiness to re-establish 
diplomatic relations.''315  The resignation of Thatcher finally opened the doors to 
a reconciliation.  On 28th November 1990, the same day John Major became 
British Prime Minister, the government restored relations with Syria.  A change 
in both the international arena, with the downfall of the SU and in the regional 
situation with the invasion of Kuwait, combined with the ongoing hostage 
situation with the key role of Syria in both Lebanon and the MEPP, plus 
American reengagement with Syria added weight to those arguing for a 
restoration of ties.  Yet timing suggests that Thatcher played a large part in 
delaying that rapprochement, even to the point of seemingly obstructing 
national interests.  While others in her government may have backed her 
opinion, Thatcher’s fall from grace handed power to those opposing it. 
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Conclusion 
The Thatcher government did not enter office intending to be dragged back 
into the quagmire of the Middle East, to be side-lined in diplomatic terms to 
some of the biggest issues in the Middle East and would have lost diplomatic 
relations with three Middle East states including Syria.  British foreign policy 
toward Syria during the 1980s was directly influenced by its reaction to broader 
Middle East issues during this period, and despite Anglo-Syrian relations not 
being high priority for the incoming Thatcher government, they were certainly 
high profile by the time Thatcher resigned as Prime Minister of Great Britain on 
22 November 1990. 
 
A key point for British foreign policy in the region was, in fact, an event totally 
unrelated to Middle East politics.  The Falklands War can be seen to be key for 
a number of reasons considerably impacted on British foreign policy making and 
this had consequences for the policies it pursued in the Middle East from that 
point on.  It heightened Britain’s sense of identity and confidence in the world.  
and strengthened Thatcher’s hold over government policy.  Simultaneously, 
some strong voices in government lost influence in the fall out, not least 
Carrington.  Thus it decreased the strength of those voices calling for a closer 
relationship with the Europe and strengthened Britain’s relationship with the US, 
not least in underlining the importance of the relationship to Britain in the 
strategic support it received from them.  Further, the victory impressed the 
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Reagan administration, highlighting Britain as a useful partner on the world 
stage and cementing a strong personal relationship between the two leaders, 
Thatcher and Reagan. 
 
There was nothing to indicate these developments would necessarily lead to the 
deterioration of Anglo-Syrian relations.  However, combined with events which 
saw British troops on the ground in Lebanon, British support for American 
bombing in Libya, a growing perception that British foreign policy was far too 
closely linked to American and a hard-line stance by the British government 
against international terrorism the path toward increasing Anglo-Syrian tensions 
was clear.  Keeping British on this path, were Thatcher and her supporters.  
Thatcher’s legacy was a poor one for British policy in the Middle East.  
Thatcher’s antagonistic relationship with Europe meant she was not naturally 
inclined to support European initiatives, her overwhelming belief in the 
necessity of a close relationship with the US, fundamental to the security of 
Europe, disinclined her to support a distinctly European approach in the Middle 
East.  The subservience to American policy in the region side-lined any hopes of 
a significantly different approach, and left the Arab states without a stronger 
voice to balance American backing of Israel.  This position was detrimental to 
Britain’s hopes for peace and security in the region. 
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Thatcher led Britain's policy toward international terrorism, her black and white 
stance leaving little room for manoeuvre after the conclusion of the Hindawi 
trial.  Thatcher’s Syrian policy eventually set her staunchly apart from her allies 
who maintained some kind of diplomatic relationship, but not in a way that 
significantly aided British priorities in the region.  While the British reaction was 
understandable, the removal of a British presence in Syria resulted in the loss of 
a valuable source of intelligence and means for discussion and negotiation.  The 
position essentially weakened British capacity to pursue its goals in terms of 
protecting its own citizens in the region. 
 
The resignation of Thatcher cleared the obstacle standing in the way of 
resuming with Syria.  By1990 Syria too was looking to the west for some 
support, having lost its primary sponsor, the SU.  As events played in Kuwait, in 
many ways it could be argued that Asad had made the more astute foreign 
policy decisions having, despite various setbacks, kept his regime relevant to 
the resolution of major regional issues; the resolution of civil war in Lebanon, 
key to ending the hostage crisis, still a major player in bringing about a 
comprehensive peace in the Middle East and, in showing support to the allied 
action against Saddam’s aggression in Kuwait, helping to legitimise the 
coalition’s counter offensive while gaining various boons from the Gulf states 
and Egypt.  Thatcher’s policies on the other hand, had seen British policy in the 
Middle East severely undermined and had done little to live up to the early 
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promise of the Venice Declaration.  Only in the resignation of Thatcher was 
there some hope for the normalisation of British relations with Syria but it was 
some time before Anglo-Syrian relations once again rose in prominence. 
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Chapter Three 
New Labour’s Foreign Policy and Syria before Bashar 
Tony Blair’s New Labour government came into power almost a decade after 
the end of the Cold War, and was the first to be completely free of the shadow 
of that conflict.  The collapse of the SU had left the West optimistic.  The 
Western style liberal democracy had “won”, and was the model which could 
secure peace and stability internationally, therefore priority was given in the 
promotion of good government, democracy and human rights.  The violence 
seen in Eastern Europe, especially in Bosnia, however, had highlighted that 
threats to peace and security remained and needed an international response 
that could be shaped in a very different way now the threat posed by sparking 
Cold War dispute was removed. 
 
The international system was dominated by the remaining superpower and 
Britain’s ally, the US.  There was opportunity to reframe British foreign policy, 
and the Blair government expressed its aim of establishing a new role for 
Britain, one that would establish Britain as a force for good in the world.  British 
priorities laid in strengthening ties with Europe, and maintaining a “special 
relationship” with the world’s remaining superpower, ensuring some of the key 
security arrangements of the Cold War years, such as NATO, remained relevant 
and remained a priority for the US.  Security was no longer seen in terms of 
protecting against an existential threat, but in terms of a number of diverse 
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issues including security of resources, environment, against international crime 
and arms trafficking.  This meant the establishment of a new kind of foreign 
policy, a move away from foreign policy based on narrow national interest and 
realpolitik. 
 
The 1997 election, as is generally the case in Britain, was fought and won 
primarily over domestic policy issues; Blair had only given one speech on 
foreign policy on the run up to the election.  This was neither surprising nor 
unprecedented but even so Blair was particularly ill-versed in foreign policy, 
according to Clare Short he had shown little or no interest in foreign policy 
before becoming Labour leader in 1994.316  He was also one of the most 
inexperienced Prime Ministers in foreign policy matters since World War Two.317  
It was, then, in complete contrast to this, that his premiership would in many 
ways be defined by matters of foreign policy. 
 
Blair was quick to set out his plans for a new confident Britain.  The notion of 
“Cool Britannia” was born giving an indication of how important the idea of 
image and prestige, thus the role of the media, would be for this government.  
Blair had the strong support of the Labour party behind him, having remodelled 
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it significantly since becoming labour leader, removing many barriers previous 
leaders had faced when attempting to negotiate key policies particularly with 
the unions.  He was also strengthened in that many in the Labour party 
credited Blair, personally, as a major factor in the Labour victory.   
 
The perception of a strong and dynamic new government was heightened by its 
contrast with the preceding government of John Major.  The outgoing 
Conservatives had been riven with internal wrangling, had poor relations with 
the US Clinton administration, and such a bad relationship with Europe that its 
European partners delayed final negotiations on the Treaty of Amsterdam until 
after the British election.318  Blair quickly established good relations with the US 
and his positive outlook on Europe was viewed with favour by other European 
leaders319.  His very engaged and personal style of politics meant he “rose 
rapidly to the status of key world leader”,320 his increasing presence on the 
global arena having implications not just for foreign policy direction in Britain, 
but also for the decision making process itself, over which actors in government 
could influence policy decisions.   
 
                                                          
318 Speech by Lord Wallace of Saltaire “The Collapse of British Foreign Policy” Chatham House, 
(September2004) 
319 D Kavanagh, “The Blair Premiership” in A Seldon (ed) Blair’s Britain 1997 – 2001, 
(Cambridge, 2007) p3 
320 M Clarke “Foreign Policy” in A Seldon (ed) Blair’s Britain 1997 – 2001, p593 
219 
While not immediately apparent, this held implications for British policy towards 
Syria, as British policy in the Middle East region took centre stage for Blair’s 
premiership, firstly in attempts to rejuvenate the MEPP, and latterly as the War 
on Terror focussed international attention on the region once again.  Echoing 
the experiences of the past, Anglo-Syrian relations would be impacted more by 
wider British priorities and interests, than they would be direct bilateral 
interaction and concerns.  This chapter looks at the early years of the New 
Labour government, considering its style, decision making processes and 
priorities and how this affected its foreign policy, demonstrating any impact this 
had on the Anglo-Syria relationship.  Further it looks at how the government 
became increasingly pro-interventionist in its foreign policy, demonstrating the 
lessons it learned from these experiences, the impact that had of its policy 
making which would eventually bring British interests into conflict with those of 
Syria. 
 
New Labour & the making of British Foreign Policy 
New Labour’s foreign policy making process, under Blair, came under intense 
scrutiny from the media, academics and MPs both in the Labour party and in 
the opposing parties, all of whom to varying degrees, queried policy decisions 
not just in their own right but also on the basis of who was leading foreign 
policy making and how decisions were made.  Further they queried the 
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assertion that foreign policy making under New Labour would be something 
new, and involve a new role in the world. 
 
Blair was determined to overhaul “old fashioned institutions”321 of Whitehall.  
The intent to reform the FCO was clear from the outset, driven by a concern 
within elements of both new and old labour that it was a last bastion of 
privilege which needed to be overhauled to reflect “modern” Britain322.  All 
Whitehall departments were subject to the drive to import management styles 
from the private sector, aiming to increase accountability and improve working 
practice, in practice this introducing a management style based around targets 
increasing workloads and leaving less time for policy discussions.  John Dickie, 
in The New Mandarins, describes how this new approach to foreign policy was 
felt in a practical sense, including changing the recruitment and selection 
process in the FCO to ensure quality and diversity in intake, improving training 
for new recruits, and launching a review into how the FCO operated, all to 
challenge the prevailing institutional perceptions, to modernise and think 
differently on world issues and its approaches to them.  The intension clearly to 
change the way in which the FCO operated and challenge underlying perception 
and assumptions of that department.  
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The primacy of the FCO over foreign policy had been under challenge for some 
time but this was compounded under Blair with the creation of a new 
department, the DfID, led by Claire Short.  Short interpreted the remit for this 
new department widely, leading to a number of turf wars with the MoD, DTI, 
FCO and No 10.323  Whilst the creation of the DfID had been announced prior to 
the election, it now seemed to be in direct contradiction to Blair’s commitment 
to “joint up” and “open government.”324  The rivalry between this new 
department and the FCO did nothing to add to the ideal of transparency and 
clarity in policy decision making.  Once established, the DfID’s influence grew 
rapidly, with Chancellor, later PM, Gordon Brown directing significant budget 
resources into this department.  The DfID quickly outstripped the FCO, by 2009 
– 10, having a resource budget two times the size of that of the FCO.325   
 
Even in providing advice on foreign policy to ministers the FCO has increasingly 
seen competition.  New Labour also brought in expertise and knowledge from 
other governments and non-governmental organisations including academics, 
businessmen and increasing the number of think tanks, most notably The 
Foreign Policy Centre set up by New Labour in 1998.  The intent was to reform 
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the way policy was made by expanding the knowledge base and expertise, and 
diversifying the sources of policy advice.  As well as tapping into a broader 
spectrum of data and experience, the intention was also to further erode the 
traditional narrow elitist base for foreign policy decision making, to diversify its 
input and tap into relevant and up to date information held by agencies outside 
of government.  It should be noted, though, in doing so the Blair government 
exposed the decision making process to the invested interests and concerns 
that these outside agencies hold, as they would advocate in the interests of 
their own particular area of interest.   
 
Conversely, while the process was opened up in this way, funding for research 
within the FCO itself has seen cuts throughout the 1990s326.  Foreign policy 
decision making cannot, then, be fully explained simply by studying the advice 
from and implementation through the FCO and its officials.  This in itself adds a 
layer of difficulty as Paul Williams writes, that even with the rising number of 
agencies that may be consulted on policy, the “process itself remains one of the 
most secretive in government”.  It is difficult to attribute decisions making in 
the face of this highly complex policy making process. 
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Despite the commitment to “doing things differently”, traditional characteristics 
in British foreign policy were present in Blair’s government.  New Labour had 
committed to steps which could have tackled some of the underlying criticisms 
of British foreign policy, such as the secrecy that often surrounded policy 
making, and criticisms of its pragmatic, realpolitik approach to foreign affairs.  
These included measures to be taken to “open up” government and to increase 
transparency in government decision making.  One set was fulfilling a 1997 
manifesto promise in the passing of the Freedom of Information Act.  The FCO 
also took further action, using mediums such as its website to make various 
documents and reports easily available to the public, helping to generate a 
sense that the government was opening up in the arena of foreign policy 
making.  Robin Cook committed to publishing a new annual Human Rights 
report, 327 highlighting the work of the FCO in promoting Human Rights abroad.  
Still, while consultation may have been broadened, and while official 
publications may be easier to access, the decision making process was more 
complex and arguably still opaque in its nature.   
 
The British political system, at least with regard to foreign policy, is structured 
in such a way that a significant amount of power lies with the executive.  
Calling Blair’s stewardship a presidential style premiership is not an accurate 
reflection of the position of the British Prime Minister.  Indeed, it has been 
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argued that, in fact, Blair was not subject to the same checks and balances that 
a US president must face in the realm of foreign policy.328  Once voted in, the 
British first past the post system hands the Prime Minister a tremendous 
amount of power, especially in the realm of foreign policy, where the domestic 
audience is generally less informed thus providing less constraint on 
government behaviour.   
 
The means that the role of the Prime Minister is likely to be a significant factor 
in foreign policy making, often creating a tension between that office and that 
of the Foreign Secretary.  A growing trend over the past half century had seen 
the transfer of power over foreign policy to the Prime Minister simply owing to 
the way that foreign affairs are conducted at the international level.  
Commitment to a multilateral approach to international affairs and membership 
of numerous international organisations, the UN, the EU, NATO, the G8, the 
Commonwealth, not only allowed Blair to argue Britain’s “unique” position in the 
world, but required him to take the lead at the numerous summit meetings that 
accompany membership of such groups.  Thus even in the mind of the general 
public the face of the Prime Minister was more connected with foreign affairs, 
as numerous pictures of Blair at various international summits and meetings 
were beamed into living rooms and spread across newspaper front pages. 
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By his second term Blair had replaced Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, a potential 
rival to Blair’s vision, with Jack Straw.  From this point, the role of the FCO was 
more about the implementation of policy rather than making it, and the Foreign 
Secretary “became more of a trouble shooter and messenger than policy 
architect or innovator”.329  This added weight to accusations that Blair was 
deliberately by-passing the traditional process altogether, favouring his 
“cabal”330 of advisors, his inner circle which included Alistair Campbell, Jonathan 
Powell, Sally Morgan and David Manning, in what was dubbed his “denocracy”.  
He was criticised for rarely consulting the FCO to the point senior officials would 
by-pass it and talk either directly to Blair or his foreign policy aide, Sir David 
Manning instead.331   
 
Blair’s use of special advisors has been harshly criticised by many on a number 
of grounds.  These advisors are unaccountable to the electorate as they are 
political appointees rather than elected officials.  Additionally, unlike civil 
servants who are also unelected, there is no sense of loyalty or being a 
representative of an institution of state, only to the person employing their 
services.  Yet Blair was not the first Prime Minister to use special advisers, for 
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example, John Major had eight special advisors, but by Blair’s time this had 
risen to twenty-seven332 adding to concerns that these advisors were replacing 
the role of the “impartial” civil services in providing policy advice.333  It could 
equally be argued that the number of special advisors reflected the increasing 
complexity of international affairs, and introduced flexibility into the process not 
possible working through the formal processes of the FCO.  Still the impression 
that Blair personally involved himself in foreign policy at a high level and 
preferred working with his coterie of “favourite” advisers and officials, as 
reflected by the Butler report, making it difficult for his foreign secretaries, Jack 
Straw for example, to exert their own authority over policy making334 was 
damaging.   
 
Describing this small group simply as a group of close Blair allies bypassing 
appropriate channels is however, an over-simplification.  In fact, Blair’s key 
advisers on foreign policy, particularly policy in the Middle East, were actually 
seconded from the FCO,335 notably David Manning.  These ad-hoc groups were 
not static, Blair would gather together the relevant ministers and relevant 
defence and intelligence officials depending on the issue at hand.  Thus while 
many decisions were taken by small groups of ministers or by the Prime 
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Minister with one or two ministers, these were officials who had a major 
interest in, and knowledge of, the issue at hand.336  
 
In fact, the most damaging aspect of Blair’s preference for working in this way 
was the accusation that in doing so he by-passed his Cabinet in the decision 
making process.  This refrain came not only from observers outside Whitehall, 
but also from within the Government itself.  Cook and Short were both 
particularly critical on this issue.  In this “sofa style” government it was not just 
the FCO that had been supplanted from its traditional role, but the Cabinet’s 
role was likewise diminished.  This is a particular allegation of those who accuse 
Blair of running a “presidential style” of leadership.  Instead of consulting and 
discussing international affairs with his Cabinet, Blair favoured ad-hoc meetings 
with a select group of advisors not accountable to the electorate.  Clearly Blair 
did prefer these informal arrangements but again he was not unique, nor was 
he acting without precedent.   
 
Whereas the scope of foreign policy has grown over time, the capacity of the 
Cabinet remained the same.  It is, and in fact it has long been, a body that 
“registered decisions taken elsewhere, most often at No 10 or one of its 
subordinate committees.”337  For example, the first military intervention the 
New Labour government embarked on, Operation Desert Fox, was agreed at a 
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meeting of the cabinet Defence and Overseas Committee rather than by full 
Cabinet.338  Most ministers sitting at the Cabinet, are too overburdened with the 
priorities of their own departments and in keeping their own position339 to 
adequately discuss matters of foreign policy in weekly Cabinet meetings.  The 
Foreign Secretary gives weekly reports on EU matters and Foreign Affairs 
generally and, if any decisions are to be made, the Cabinet is “usually left just 
to rubber stamp the conclusions of the three grandees of Downing Street – the 
Prime Minister, Chancellor and Foreign Secretary.”340 
 
For Geoffrey Howe the 2004 Butler Report clearly underlines that the Blair 
government, in operating this way, failed to make use of the knowledge and 
intelligence available by neglecting to consult with the “resources of wisdom, 
experience and expertise available in the independent civil service, not least in 
the FCO, and not to mention the Cabinet Ministers themselves”.341  The 
criticism certainly was upheld in the Butler Report.  It stated: 
“we are concerned that the informality and circumscribed character 
of the Government’s procedures which we saw in the context of 
policy-making towards Iraq risks reducing the scope for informed 
collective political judgement.  Such risks are particularly significant 
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in a field … where hard facts are inherently difficult to come by and 
the quality of judgement is accordingly all the more important”342  
 
The criticism was not simply about lack of note taking, or transparency in 
decision making, where Blair had overstepped the mark was in that these small 
groups were seen to act outwith the Cabinet structure and processes.  Blair’s 
reaction to the criticism was not to end the ad-hoc meetings but to organise 
them to “operate formally as an ad-hoc Cabinet committee”343 from that point 
onwards.  This may not have made the decision making process any more 
transparent to outsiders, but it did produce a review of procedures and more 
“systematic record keeping” at No 10.344  Blair, not bound by any constitutional 
requirements setting out the role of the Cabinet, ensured that he was one of 
the few who had oversight of the whole process; he was responsible for 
deciding how the system would work, setting the agenda, the timescales, and 
the memberships for cabinet committees.  After the 2005 election, he further 
enhanced this position as he “dramatically reworked the Cabinet committee 
structure, establishing new committees charged with pursuing his policy 
priorities... usually chaired by himself”.345 
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While restraints on policy making – the electorate, Parliament, the Cabinet for 
example – exist for both domestic and foreign policy, in the case of the latter 
they are weaker.  The maxim that British governments are not voted out over 
foreign policy would seem to hold given that Labour managed to win the 2005 
election despite the Blair government despite the situation over Iraq, Labour 
losing in 2010 largely due to the economic crisis and Gordon Brown’s 
unpopularity.  The “presidential” argument may be credible when it comes to 
foreign policy, it would be a much harder argument to win over domestic policy 
where No 10 was often at battle with the formidable Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, and the Treasury, even managing to stymie Blair’s desire to join the 
Euro, one of many policy issues that bridge domestic and foreign affairs issues. 
 
Foreign policy making in Blair’s government was influenced by two separate but 
related factors that led to an increasing centralisation of foreign policy making.  
Firstly, the overall trend of foreign policy making over the last few decades had 
been to centralise the decision making in the executive and specifically in the 
post of prime minister.  A pre-existing deficiency in the system, that is, the lack 
of an adequate system of checks and balances on foreign policy making once a 
party is installed in government has exacerbated this factor.  The result has 
been that the Prime Minister is able to take a strong lead in foreign affairs, and 
is much less constrained in that arena than in domestic policy making.   
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A second factor was Blair’s own personal style which saw him predisposed 
toward controlling the foreign policy agenda.  This was owing to his belief in his 
own leadership in foreign policy making and his determination to take an active 
role in international affairs.  To these a third element would be added, with the 
international context changing after the events of 9/11 and the perceived need 
for dynamic leadership straight from the top only strengthening the trend 
towards centralisation.  All of these elements affected the shaping of policy and 
its implementation, impacting on Britain’s relationship with the Middle East 
generally and thus relations with Syria, as the increasing centralisation of 
decision making limited dissenting voices to Blair’s preferred policies.  
 
 
New Labour: New priorities? 
Blair is described by several authors as having neither a particularly strong 
political background nor convictions, and in particular little experience in foreign 
policy.  His overriding concern was making New Labour distinctive from old, and 
with respect to foreign policy, distinctive from what had gone before.  Above all 
Blair championed the idea of making Britain a “strong force for good” in the 
world– this would later be apparent in his willingness, among other things, to 
commit to British forces to military intervention.  The rebranding of Britain 
would herald new confident participation on the international level.  Britain 
would be strong in Europe and strong in America, Blair seeing no contradiction 
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in the position, saying that to be strong in one relationship would strengthen 
Britain’s position in the other.  However, while Blair would come to dominate 
British foreign policy making, initially Robin Cook as Blair’s first Foreign 
Secretary, was given the freedom to formulate and express New Labour’s 
international priorities for the FCO.  For some, Cook’s appointment, given his 
strong personality, is evidence that at least at first, Blair did not intend to take a 
leading role in foreign policy.   
 
Peter Ford (former Ambassador to Syria 2003 – 2006) describes Cook’s tenure 
as a “brief flourish of independence” before British foreign policy was totally 
subordinated to the American policy agenda.346  On his appointment, Cook set 
out to forge a new vision for Britain.  His mission statement for the FCO on 12th 
May 1997, had four foreign policy goals: security, prosperity, quality of life, and 
mutual respect.  Despite New Labour’s eagerness to show it was taking a new 
direction in foreign policy these goals were not particularly novel.  However, it 
was one phrase in this speech, speaking of an “ethical dimension” for British 
foreign policy, that caught the media’s attention, causing unwanted scrutiny of 
British international dealings, not to mention of Cook’s personal life, and also 
creating tension between Cook and Blair, as Cook’s ethical statement went 
much further than those at No 10 had anticipated347   
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Cook’s mission statement bore little resemblance to the kind of realpolitik 
traditionally associated with British foreign policy.  Alluding to the growing 
interdependence of nation states, for Cook it was essential that the values and 
interests that underwrote Britain’s domestic policy must be supported in foreign 
policy.  The belief in human rights that was present in domestic policy, should 
not be ignored in foreign policy simply for pragmatic reasons of national 
interest, in an interdependent world this kind of hypocritical behaviour could 
undermine Britain’s influence, and ultimately this would be damaging to the 
country.  From this he derived that there must be an ethical dimension to 
policy.  This notion that Britain should be a “force for good” to enhance its 
influence in international affairs was also reflected in Secretary of State for 
Defence, George Robertson’s, 1998 Strategic Defence Review which first coined 
the phrase and suggested reforming Britain’s defence strategy with a view to be 
ready to intervene in world crises.  A joint exercise by the FCO and the MoD, 
the review aimed to incorporate New Labour manifesto priorities to be “strong 
in defence; resolute in standing up for our own interests and an advocate of 
human rights and democracy the world over; a reliable and powerful ally; and a 
leader in Europe and the international community” 348.   
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The review appeared to reflect a change in attitude that had begun to seep 
through into government, that the public wanted to see Britain taking an “active 
role in foreign troubles – “the desire for the government to do something"349.  
However, it failed to adequately address the rationale for the new focus, or 
reveal which partners would be involved, or where such interventions might be 
carried out.350  For states suspicious of the very same legacy or imperial history 
that Blair argued meant Britain had a natural role in the world, a special stake 
in the Middle East for example, the new emphasis on promoting values, ethics 
and democracy not simply pursuing national interests was just another mask for 
the traditional western style imperialism with which they associated British 
governments. 
 
In his mission statement Cook said that  
“Our foreign policy must have an ethical dimension and must support 
the demands of other peoples for the democratic rights on which we 
insist for ourselves.  The Labour Government will put human rights at 
the heart of our foreign policy and will publish an annual report on our 
work promoting human rights abroad”  
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Cook’s concept of an “ethical dimension” to foreign policy came under 
immediate attack by critics.  Arguably, by trying to make New Labour foreign 
policy distinct in this way he unnecessarily drew criticism to it.  His public 
commitment to an ethical dimension presented opponents and critics of New 
Labour with an easy target, any hint of unethical dealings immediately made 
the press. 
 
Ethical Foreign Policy and the British Arms Industry 
A major priority for the new Foreign Secretary was to tighten up on arms export 
controls and he moved quickly to do so, introducing guidelines which stressed 
the importance of human rights, the need to consider whether exports “would 
be likely to lead to increased tension" and that exports would not be granted 
where “the arguments for doing so are outweighed... by concern that the goods 
might be used for internal oppression or international aggression, or by the 
risks to regional stability, or other considerations".351  Cook was then actively 
involved in the passing of a EU level agreement, the 1998 EU Code of Conduct 
on Arms Exports, again aimed at preventing the sale of arms “which might be 
used for internal repression of international aggression or contribute to regional 
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instability”352, preventing the sale of arms to regimes where they might be used 
to violate “human or democratic rights”353.   
 
Cook further committed the FCO to producing an annual report on arms 
exports, and under the EU code all members were under obligation to share 
information on their arms exports (conventional arms, ammunition and military 
equipment), share details of export licenses and produce public reports. 354  
Arms manufacturers, at least publically, welcomed these moves as it put them 
on an equal footing with their competitors across Europe.355  Still, it was 
inevitable the government’s role in the arms trade would come under attack, 
the very concept of a British arms trade being at odds with what the media 
chose to report as Cook’s ideal of an ethical foreign policy.   
 
Britain is the world’s second largest arms exporter356 and is thought to have the 
most lucrative defence industry on the continent357.  According to the MoD, 
over 400 000 jobs depend on the arms industry, with around 30,000 dependent 
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on exports.358  In its first full calendar year the New Labour government 
approved more than 10,300 arms export licences, a figure larger than the 
previous year despite the new policy.359  2181 of the licences granted were to 
“countries of concern”, among these, Syria, which was granted licences for 
small arms, machine guns and accessories.  Indeed, only 24 licenses were 
refused, with licences granted for arms exports to a further 15 states that 
would seem to contravene both UK and EU guidelines.360  
 
The commitment to these new guidelines was again brought into question 
when Britain’s largest arms fair was held in Surrey in September 1999.  Whilst 
the expo was organised by the company Defence Systems & Equipment 
International, it was sponsored by the MoD.  The list of invited countries, 
complied by DSEI and the Government, of which, according to Amnesty 
International, at least “thirty classed as having repressive regimes and/or states 
involved in torture” including representatives from Syria where the regime, as 
described in the Independent newspaper, “had been involved in brutally 
repressing opponents” whilst it also hosted the headquarters of a number of 
Palestinian terrorist groups”.361   
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Writing in the Times, Michael Binyon reported Amnesty International’s claim 
that Cook’s attempts to “put human rights at the heart of foreign policy” was 
undermined by the failure of other Government departments to follow his lead.  
Moves by the FCO to set up the international war crimes tribunal, limit arms 
exports and speak out with regard to human rights abuses were not supported 
by the MoD, the DTI or the Home Office” 362  In fact, he writes, the DTI 
approved 10 licenses for exports to Algeria, 10 to Colombia, 59 to Saudi, 64 to 
Indonesia, and 146 to Turkey. A further report in the Observer, April 2003, 
drew attention to official reports from the DTI, which showed that between 
1999 and 2001, export licenses exceeding £1.5 million were approved for 
equipment that had dual use.  The 2001 report listed exports including “toxic 
chemical precursors, equipment for the use of military infrared/thermal imaging 
equipment and military flying helmets.”  In the case of the chemical precursors, 
the DTI had nothing more than the assurances of the Syrian government as to 
its end use.363  Even in the case of Syria, with no special ties to Britain, having 
a long history of hostile relations, and in which the economic interest was 
negligible in terms of the actual sales, the priority given to arms sales by the 
DTI seemingly overrode the commitment of the FCO to bringing an ethical 
dimension to arms sales. 
                                                          
362 M Binyon “Ethical Foreign Policy eroded by Whitehall” The Times (23 September 1998) 
363 “Ministers face probe on UK arms for Syria”, The Observer, (06 April 2003) 
239 
 
Cook’s efforts were further undermined by Blair who was said to have watered 
them down.  Blair is said to have insisted on a statement underlining the Labour 
government’s commitment to a strong defence industry after coming under 
pressure from Britain’s main arms manufacturers (one of his main advisers, was 
a former director of British Aerospace).364  In fact, Short writes that arms sales 
were a “blind spot” for Blair and he would later be joined in this by Straw who 
saw it as a “duty to promote British arms sales”.365  
 
While arguably Cook might have been more genuine in his commitment to an 
ethical foreign policy than Blair, it certainly was Cook who faced the most 
criticism when the reality of Labour foreign policy decisions failed to live up to 
the rhetoric.  Cook’s commitment was demonstrated, for example, in his 
establishment under the Foreign Secretary’s office of a large department 
dealing with Human Rights, which had a staff of twenty diplomats.  It is also 
evident in his appointment of an Amnesty International activist as a political 
adviser.  He seemingly failed to get his colleagues on board with the direction 
of his policy, however, and his work was undermined in a country where such 
priority was given to the arms trade.366  Cooks handling of two cases of note, 
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the sale of Hawk jets to Indonesia and the Arms to Africa Affair, were heavily 
criticised on this basis.   
 
The sale of £300 million Hawk jets to Indonesia was approved despite reports 
of these aircraft being used against the population in East Timor.  When faced 
with actual evidence in 1999, the government still refused to revoke the 
licenses citing legal reasons and insisting Indonesia had promised not to use 
them this way again.367  Derek Fatchett, Minister of State at the Foreign Office, 
made a statement at the time saying, "I would say we are ethical in terms of 
the fact that we have very clear criteria for the sale of defence equipment.  
Those criteria are very different from the previous governments,"368 feeding 
criticism that it was business as usual for the British arms industry. 
 
More damaging was the Arms to Africa scandal, in which FCO officials and the 
British High Commissioner in Sierra Leone were accused of sending arms and 
ammunition in support of the beleaguered President Kabbah, through a private 
military company, Sandline International.  This was in contravention of a UN 
arms embargo, one which had been drafted in large part by Britain.  A report 
by the Foreign Affairs Select committee was highly critical of the FCO’s role in 
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this affair, criticising officials in failing their duty to Ministers, and both the FCO 
and the Foreign Secretary for prioritising a government inquiry369 over that of 
the Select Committee.  The affair was damaging itself but the criticism of Cook 
and the FCO was substantial, not only opening the FCO to criticism over its 
commitment to ethical foreign policy it also brought into question the 
commitment, more generally, to open and transparent foreign policy decision 
making370.   
 
Perhaps more importantly, Blair was impatient with Cook’s seeming inability to 
deal with the negative publicity.  For Blair, Britain did the right thing in 
supporting Kabbah in Sierra Leone, regardless of any mistakes made, and he 
was furious at Cook’s mishandling of the situation, and inability to refute the 
criticism he was receiving from opposition and in the press.371  The whole affair 
cast a shadow over Cook and the FCO, as “by a combination of incompetence 
and cover-up, the Foreign Office managed to turn a minor if flawed effort to do 
the right thing…into a crisis which further ‘took its toll’ on the Foreign 
Secretary’s standing”372 
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Ilisu Dam Project 
Blair’s instinct to override ethical principles in favour of economic interests was 
apparent in his support of Turkey’s Ilisu dam project.  This also brought British 
policy into direct conflict with Syrian interests.  The purpose of the Ilisu dam 
project is hydroelectric power production, flood control and water storage.  It is 
situated on the Tigris river 40 miles upstream of the Syrian-Iraqi border and in 
a mainly Kurdish region of Turkey.  To create the reservoir for the dam, fifty-
two villages, and fifteen towns had to be flooded.  This included the town of 
Hasankeyf, a Kurdish town of 5500 people, and of historical significance as the 
only town in the region of Anatolia that had survived since the Middle Ages.373  
The full human impact of the project would be the displacement of about 16000 
Kurds with no compensation, with another 20000 having their lives 
“disrupted”.374   
 
British interest came from the involvement of British firm Balfour Beattie in the 
development of the dam.  They were being supported by the DTI in their bid to 
build the dam, with the project to be underwritten by the British government to 
the tune of £200 million from the export credit guarantee department.  Turkey 
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had looked for funding from other governments after the World bank had 
already decided against funding the project on the grounds that it violated the 
UN convention preventing border disputes, and wars between states that share 
water resources, consequently private banks were unwilling to back the 
project.375   
 
Both Syria and the Arab League lodged complaints against the dam (Turkey 
having failed to consult her neighbours) on the grounds that the downstream 
flow of water, a resource already stretched, could potentially be limited by the 
Turks.  The impact of the project was debated in February 2000 in the House of 
Commons where it was heavily criticised, it would affect three countries –
Turkey, Iraq and Syria— with a consequent impact on the water politics of the 
entire area, something with the potential to create further instability in an 
already unstable area. 376  
 
This criticism was echoed in a report from the Select Committee on Trade and 
Industry which stated, that there were suggestions that Turkish officials had 
threatened to cut supplies to states thought to support Kurdish insurgency, and 
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that the dam was in breach of a number of treaties and agreements.  Further, 
the Syrian Embassy had forwarded a paper arguing the “failure of Turkey to 
consult the downstream states on the Ilisu dam is in breach of international 
law.”377  
 
The government faced censure over its capability to exert any control over 
Turkey’s future use of the dam.  The Select Committee recommended that a 
number of conditions would have to be put in place before the Government 
agreed to grant export credit for the project, which included conditions on 
Turkey consulting affected parties, that the issue of resettlement was resolved 
including adequate consultation, compensation and monitoring of the 
programme, and the maintenance of downstream flows was assured.  It also 
recorded a concern “if DTI took their own responsibilities for promotion of the 
Government's commitment to human rights and sustainable development the 
less seriously because of a perception that other departments would take up 
those issues, leading in practice to DTI invariably granting priority to 
commercial considerations”.   
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This latter observation highlighted a major issue with the project - it was in 
direct contradiction with both the FCO’s ethical foreign policy, and also its 
environmental policy.  Perhaps even more significantly, it was another 
indication that not all Whitehall departments were on board with the FCO’s 
objectives.  It also signalled a failure of the government’s “joint up working” 
agenda since reportedly the FCO was not consulted over the project and 
apparently only found out about the issue when it was reported in the 
Guardian.378  In this case, the priorities of the individual departments involved 
were in conflict with each other, and the DTI pursued its own interests above 
the priorities set out by the FCO for British foreign policy. 
 
In the prioritisation of British economic interests abroad, the DTI had an 
important backer.  As controversy over the dam raged on, one of its main 
proponents was Blair despite the objections of Cook, the deputy Prime Minister 
and the Trade Secretary.  Blair prioritised just the direct commercial interests 
involved in the dam but his support was also linked to Turkey’s bid for 
accession to the EU, and to British arms exports, Turkey, being a NATO ally, 
was a key market for the British arms market.379   
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Critics pointed out that, in fact, Turkey’s membership of NATO meant the 
construction of the dam conflicted with British long term interests.  The project 
had the potential to exacerbate tensions over access to water, risking regional 
stability, bad for British long term interests.  More specifically, Turkey is a NATO 
ally, if fighting did break out then Britain could be dragged into the conflict 
under NATO’s Article 5, meaning there could be a direct impact on Britain’s 
security.  On the EU side of the argument, a further report from the Trade and 
Industry Select Committee pointed out that they were “not confident of the 
capacity of the Turkish authorities to meet conditions that would satisfy 
European Union standards”.380  Again this did not fit in with Blair’s policy to be a 
strong and full member of the EU. 
 
While Blair remained in favour of the project he was persuaded to add 
conditions to the financing of the project.  Firstly, a resettlement programme 
for the Kurdish people, secondly, provisions to ensure water quality in the Tigris 
reservoir, thirdly, adequate downstream water flows to Iraq and Syria and 
lastly, the production of a detailed plan to preserve the archaeological heritage 
of Hasankeyf.381  It was not until 2001 that the government dropped its support 
for the dam project but only after it had been severely criticised on four 
separate occasions by House of Commons Select Committees, and following the 
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withdrawal of Balfour Beatty from the project.  The four conditions imposed by 
the government had still, at that point, not been met. 
 
By 2001 Cook had suffered criticism both on the personal and political front for 
which Blair had little patience.  Under attack over how British arms sale fit into 
his new ethical framework, and hitting barriers over economic policies, Cook’s 
ethical foreign policy, particularly its emphasis on human rights, also ran into 
difficulties over the  concurrent policy of constructive engagement.382  This 
policy required a relationship with repressive regimes and represented “a new 
faith that trade with questionable regimes will make them reform and 
behave”.383  The trick was finding a balance between pursuing an ethical 
foreign policy with a commitment to human rights which might preclude the 
very kind of interaction need by constructive engagement.  Evidence of this 
problem could be seen in the criticism of Cooks’ visit to China when he was 
censured for putting economic interests ahead of human rights.  For many 
however, this is just another example of business as usual, with British 
economic interests put ahead of human rights considerations. 
 
Meantime Blair had come into his own as a leader in international relations, 
while losing patience with Cook’s model for an ethical foreign policy.  Blair had 
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found a role on the international scene and framed his own version of ethical 
foreign policy in the form of humanitarian intervention.  In a speech in January 
1999 he said “when the international community agrees certain objectives and 
then fails to implement them, those that can act, must.”384  The problem with 
this policy, one of “doing the right thing”, was that it had little legal basis.  FCO 
lawyers had previously advised that “humanitarian motives were insufficient to 
justify the use of force under international law”385 yet Blair was not dissuaded.  
 
The Blair Doctrine 
In his time as British Prime Minister, Blair led Britain into an unprecedented 
number of military engagements including interventions in Iraq (1998), East 
Timor (1999), Kosovo (1999), Sierra Leone (2000), Afghanistan (2001), Iraq 
(2003) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2003).  The earlier 
interventions served to strengthened Blair’s position in terms of leading the 
foreign policy agenda, in increasing his profile, and strengthening his standing 
with other governments and leaders.   
 
It was his preference in deciding on these interventions, as several British 
leaders before him, to work through small ad-hoc groups.  During Operation 
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Desert Fox in 1998, Blair worked through the DOP committee.  By the second, 
more extensive, Iraq campaign this group had become even smaller comprising 
of a very select inner advisors.386  Not running the war though the main Cabinet 
was not a major change, past engagements had been run through a war 
cabinet, a formal subcommittee and responsible to the full cabinet.  Where Blair 
strayed, was his “war meeting” which included three Secretaries’ of State 
(Foreign Affairs, Defence, International Development), his Chief of Staff, his 
Directors of Communications and of Political Relations and his Foreign Policy 
adviser was that it was not formally responsible to the Cabinet, so was a prime 
ministerial committee.387  Arguably, then, Blair did consult with the relevant 
people, rather than just meet with his “cronies” as was the perception of many 
observers.  However, the lack of formality, the small grouping and the crisis 
situation made decision making susceptible to “group think”, making it difficult 
for any member to go against a general consensus, particularly with a leader 
with such a dynamic personality leading it.   
 
Blair emerged from the Kosovo intervention much more confident in his 
international role.  Blair soon observed that, even if the allies only used air 
strikes, 85% of the assets used would be American.388  His experience also led 
him to conclude that his European partners could not be trusted, either in terms 
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of willingness to act and capacity to deliver, to provide the necessary resources 
for military intervention.  Blair noted in his autobiography, the European’s 
“brilliant statements of intent...evaporated when consequences of seeing them 
through became apparent”.389  The episode underlined his key belief in the 
need to maintain American engagement in international affairs, since without 
US military support the Europeans would have been unable to act; thus in order 
to pursue a policy of humanitarian intervention it was necessary to keep the 
Americans on board. 
 
Justifying the action in Kosovo and giving thought to the problems in getting 
Britain’s partners and allies to act in times of humanitarian intervention, Blair 
gave his Chicago Speech in April 1999 in what became known as the Blair 
doctrine.  The speech laid out five considerations when deciding to intervene: 
1. Is the case for actions clear? 
2. Have the diplomatic options been exhausted? 
3. Are there military options that can be sensibly or prudently undertaken? 
4. Are we prepared for the long haul? 
5. Are national interests at stake?390 
Notably despite New Labour’s commitment to multilateralism there was no 
mention of partners in the considerations.  Critics even argue that not even the 
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Kosovo intervention fit these criteria.  While Blair increasingly favoured greater 
intervention, viewing it as the responsibility of being a member of the 
international community to promote “universal” rights and freedoms, the 
perception in many states was that he was promoting intervention to impose 
“Western” notions of justice and freedom. 
 
Blair’s proactive foreign policy approach had a tendency to fail to consult with 
the FCO.391  His “Doctrine of International Community” was further example of 
this behaviour, devised without any prior consultation with the FCO.392  Yet this 
was the department which had to try to turn this speech into a viable strategy 
document, a task that prove impossible and which they gave up after “a few 
weeks of effort”. 393  Lawrence Freedman, a major contributor to the Chicago 
speech, suggested in this case there could be two reasons for this reluctance 
regarding FCO “interference”.  In the first instance, he suggests, if the FCO had 
seen the speech first they would have insisted on including a UN test, which 
Blair saw as a potential roadblock to intervention.  Secondly, the speech came 
at a time where the Prime Minister wanted “something dramatic” which would 
appeal on both the domestic and international level, something that the often 
too pragmatic FCO could not produce.394   
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The former point would seem to be fair.  In July 2000 Cook attempted to clarify 
the Doctrine setting a further 6 principles to consider when it is clear there are 
ongoing human rights violations and crimes against humanity on a large scale, 
saying the international community should, these included the criteria, “Ensure 
force is collective and where possible has the authority of UNSC.”395  The need 
for UNSC authorisation was something Blair had purposely left out as he had 
been frustrated by the inability of the UN to act on Kosovo since the Russians 
would have vetoed any attempt at a resolution authorising the use of force.   
 
Blair’s language on the right to intervene on humanitarian grounds was 
criticised in 2001 by the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty.  The commission was set up by the Canadian government in 
response to Kofi Anan’s question of when the international community should 
intervene for humanitarian purposes and produced the report “Responsibility To 
Protect”.   It criticised Blair’s doctrine, firstly, in that his language prioritised the 
rights of the intervening parties rather than the rights of the people who would 
be affected by any intervention and, secondly, in that the doctrine deals mainly 
with the intervention itself rather than dealing with the steps prior to, or the 
commitment of resources following, an intervention.  A final criticism was that 
Blair framed the discussion in terms such that anyone disagreeing with the 
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need to intervene can be dismissed as “anti-humanitarian,”396 prejudicing the 
discussion from the start.   
 
Nelson Mandela was another opponent of Blair’s doctrine, criticising the action 
in Kosovo, and NATO for ignoring the vetoes in the UNSC, saying that 
diplomacy should have been better used, “I am resentful about the type of 
thing that America and Britain are doing.  They want to be the policemen of the 
world and I’m sorry that Britain has joined the US in this regard”.397  A final 
failure of the doctrine was that it neglected to clarify who should apply the 
criteria when considering undertaking an intervention, if not an organisation 
such as the UN.  Still, in both the Kosovo and Iraq cases Britain has been 
criticised for failing to fulfil its even its own weak criteria and of not letting the 
diplomatic option run its course. 
 
Despite framing the Kosovo intervention in moral terms, pressing the 
international community to engage in a military operation based on “values,” 
there were important interests at stake.  These included the credibility of NATO, 
the special relationship, and the need to lead in European defence.398  To these 
reasons author Mark Curtis adds two more, that the bombing campaign was 
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necessary to enable NATO to continue its expansion eastward, and also, that it 
aided in reorganising eastern economies to the benefit of Western businesses.  
If so these are very much traditional interests for British foreign policy. 
 
Britain a “pivotal power”? 
A professed objective of Blair’s foreign policy was for Britain to be a pivotal 
power, a bridge between the US and the EU.  British governments had 
persistently struggled with balancing the “special relationship” with the US and 
the ever closer political relationship with the EU.  Blair insisted that the two 
relationships complimented each other, certainly if Britain were to be a “bridge” 
then it needed to be seen as a committed and strong member of the EU. 
 
Most observers consider Blair’s first term to have been quite successful in terms 
of the British relationship with Europe.  Though the Chancellor, Gordon Brown, 
prevented Britain joining the single currency, in other areas Blair was 
successful.  Blair’s government was recognised as having a more positive 
outlook on the European project, an “enthusiasm for enlargement, a whole 
hearted support for a common foreign and security policy, in favour of new 
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initiatives in European defence, and behind a renewed push for greater trade 
liberalisation”.399  
 
Yet, again, in a number of ways Blair’s European policy reflected a simple 
continuation of traditional British interests.  The Saint Malo declaration signed in 
1998 established the European Security and Defence Policy400, the creation of 
the European Rapid Reaction force in December 1999 allowed Britain to take a 
lead on European defence, but under British insistence “NATO remained the 
basis of the EUs collective defence.”401  Blair insisted that European measures 
were integrated with the NATO framework, thus not threatening the role of 
NATO.402  Ensuring the primacy of NATO was designed to demonstrate the 
Europeans were pulling their weight in defence terms (especially after events in 
the Balkans) rather than providing an alternative security and defence strategy, 
and was an attempt to keep the Americans engaged in European defence and 
security.  In doing so, it limited the capacity of any European defence arm 
acting independently of NATO or the US. 
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To some extent Blair’s concept of Britain as a “bridge” was simply a reframing 
of Churchill’s three circles policy.  The idea that Britain was needed to be a 
“bridge” between the US and EU left other European somewhat bemused by 
the idea that they needed Britain’s intervention to be able to work the US.  Still, 
for a time, Blair was able to maintain some balance between the two central 
relationships in British foreign affairs.  However, when the international context 
changed after the events of 9/11 the difficulties in balancing these two 
relationships were laid bare despite Blair’s assumptions that the common 
interests and values shared by Europe and the Americans would bring them 
closer together. 
 
During the first term of New Labour government there were a number of 
developments which came to define the Blair government.  While Cook made 
some attempts to reprioritise British foreign policy to incorporate an ethical 
dimension, he failed to get backing from other Whitehall departments who had 
their own priorities, eventually this lack of cooperation greatly undermined his 
efforts.  Blair’s increasing tendency to centralise information, knowledge and 
decision making in No 10 marginalised the Foreign Secretary to an extent with 
many decisions on foreign policy instigated in No 10, not the FCO.  Eventually, 
Cook was removed from the FCO as Blair lost patience with his ethical project.   
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The appointment of Jack Straw as Foreign Secretary strengthened Blair’s 
position.  Straw’s role became more of a “trouble shooter and messenger than 
policy architect or innovator”.403  Here, even Straw eventually stepped out of 
line when he stood with Germany and France in their efforts to come to a 
diplomatic solution with Tehran over the its quest for nuclear power.  To many 
this demonstrated “that the British no longer had an independent foreign policy 
and to prove that they could on occasion disagree with the Americans when 
their judgement differed”.404  Some reports at the time had it that this stance 
cost Straw his post, though Lord Levy writes that it was actually Straw “cosying 
up to Gordon Brown around the cabinet table”405.  Peter Ford, however, says 
that the Americans were behind Straw’s removal and from that point there was 
no one in the FCO willing to go against the American line.406 
 
The centralisation of decision making at No 10, and an executive that revolved 
round a select inner circle has led authors to criticising the Blair government on 
the grounds that these ad-hoc groupings were “susceptible to group think” 
limiting policy discussion and dissent.  This was combined with Blair’s personal 
willingness to embark on military intervention on humanitarian grounds, 
although after 9/11 this became more associated with intervention on behalf of 
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security and counter-terrorism.407  This would have impact across all British 
foreign policy decisions, limiting the input into decision making and creating a 
context where the scope for manoeuvre was also limited. 
 
Impact on Anglo-Syrian relations 
The 1990s had seen the international system change with the ending of the 
Cold War and the outlook for Syria had also changed.  Without Syrian’s primary 
ally of the SU and given the moribund state of the Syrian economy, Hafez’s 
decades long goal of strategic parity with Israel was out of reach.  This brought 
with it a need to review Syria’s foreign policy options, regionally and 
internationally.  No longer able to pursue his previous strategy with regard to 
Israel, Hafez opted to pursue engagement in the peace process.   
 
Hafez’s struggle to prevent Saddam’s ambition to promote Iraq as the natural 
Arab hegemon in the region was coupled with a need to reduce Syria’s 
isolation, a result both of losing the SU as an ally and of his alliance with Iran in 
the Iran-Iraq war leaving him at odds with other Arab leaders in the region.  
This had led to his joining the Allied Coalition in 1990 after the invasion of 
Kuwait, a rational decision that had resulted in several positive consequences.  
It removed of Saddam as a possible rival leader of Arab nationalism and 
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secured more positive relations with the West and the Gulf states (in turn was 
financially beneficial as he received aid from both the Gulf states and EU).  Most 
importantly, Asad entered the anti-Iraq coalition in the anticipation that the US 
would in return (and as promised) broker an acceptable peace settlement with 
Israel once the Gulf war was over.  
 
The decade, then, had seen an overlap develop in the interests of the Syrian 
regime and those of Britain and the West generally.  The British policy for 
containment of Saddam’s Iraq, the need for movement on the hostage issue, 
the belief that Syria was key to achieving peace in the Middle East, a general 
view that Asad was someone they could do with business with and the long 
term British priority of promoting stability in the region concluded in the policy 
of engagement with Syria.  Relations further warmed as Hafez saw the EU as a 
power that could potentially act as balance to the influence of America in the 
MEPP, seeing Britain, along with France, as necessary to establishing this.  Even 
in the 1980s, Syria’s principle interest in Britain was owing to its role in the 
European Union.408  Generally, however, while the British came to the 
conclusion that it was necessary to deal with Syria, there was no sense that 
there would be any modernisation of the regime itself whilst Hafez Asad was in 
power.  
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Blair’s determination to enhance Britain’s position in the world was evident in 
his efforts to get the MEPP moving again.  This coincided with Hafez’s own 
interests who had, by then been calling for a greater European role for some 
time.  Hafez recognised that, while there was need to strengthen his relations 
with the US to bring Israel to the table, it was also necessary to have a balance 
to the US, and he looked to the EU to provide this.  Whilst France was a more 
natural ally, Hafez perceived a need for warmer relations with Britain as London 
was a potential veto to EU involvement because of its closeness to Washington.  
Perhaps this was behind the fact that Hafez was reported to be the first Arab 
ruler to have congratulated Blair on his election victory in May 1997. 409  Blair’s 
eagerness to be involved in the process was also almost immediately apparent, 
dispatching Derek Fatchett, FCO Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Middle East, 
including a visit to Syria, within weeks of the elections to hold talks with Syrian 
officials on the stalled negotiations.410   
 
While Blair evidently saw a role for Britain in pushing for movement within the 
EU, this was within the traditional British position that the EU role should be in 
compliment to any US-led negotiations.  There were early hopes that Blair could 
use his time in the EU Presidency (January – June 1998) to push the peace 
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process forward.  Traditional thinking had it while the EU had significant 
economic ties in the region, it had little military clout and was perceived as too 
pro-Arab for the Israelis to take seriously, leaving only the US as the serious 
broker for peace.  There hope Blair could cash in on the important EU economic 
ties and his own close relationship with US President Clinton to reinvigorate the 
process.411  However, Britain failed in this.  The failure was understandable, 
since the EU has struggled to create a Common Foreign and Security Policy, 
and in areas where there are numerous individual national interests at stake 
such as the Middle East, finding a common position on issues and events has 
been rare.  Thus, the British view that the US takes the lead on the MEPP can 
be understood yet simultaneously this position undermines the EU efforts by 
limiting its options to those that compliment American efforts, and consequently 
limiting pressure on Israel.   
 
Blair gained office at a time when Netanyahu’s premiership of Israel meant 
even the US had given up on making any progress on the Syrian track of the 
peace process, it meant, all the more, that no progress could be made on the 
EU track.  The Ehud Barak premiership in 1999 reopened the door on the Syrian 
track, with it becoming the preferred option and seen as the most likely path 
for success (dealing with Arafat considered a more impossible option).  With the 
full weight of a Clinton administration behind it and both Barak and Asad 
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seemingly open to some kind of deal, this negotiation was given support by the 
British who were glad to see America pushing talks forward again.  Whilst 
ultimately the talks collapsed and stalled in 2000, negotiations had got much 
further than previously thought possible.   
 
Clearly the British did not have a lead role in these negotiations, yet some 
American officials pointed to a level of British intervention.  A conscious decision 
to take a more pro-Israeli stance was apparent which had led to a 
strengthening of relations between Britain and Israel.  Blair had strengthened 
links with the Israeli Labour party while appearing hard on Netanyahu’s Likud 
government412 when it was in power, having sent one of his own aides to 
consult for the Barak campaign.  One gesture of payback for this was Barak’s 
resumption of talks with Syria with a role for Britain, filled by Blair’s special 
confidant, Michael Levy who was sent to handle British diplomacy.413   
 
In truth, the extent of British influence here is questionable.  Without America 
taking the lead, and if the two negotiating parties had not their own individual 
reasons for the resumption of talks, there would not have been much British 
intervention could have done to kick start negotiations.  The pro-Israeli stance 
and the use of a personal envoy, particularly Lord Levy known as “The Cash 
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point” in Israeli political circles,414 have been criticised as typically Blair, short 
sighted if he indeed wanted a role in the wider Middle East, and with regard to 
Lord Levy, making traditionally pro-Arab the FCO deeply unhappy, and 
uncertain as to Levy’s role and remit. 
 
However, according to some accounts this may be an overly negative criticism 
of events.  Levy’s reception at the FCO may be open to debate but he does 
seem to have enjoyed a close relationship with Robin Cook, Blair even asking 
for his help in persuading Cook to accept the position of Leader of the House.415  
Levy himself states that while his relationship with Jack Straw was not as close, 
they got along416 though Straw is less kind, saying “If you wanted to be Tony’s 
Foreign Secretary, Michael was part of the package....I was consistently 
bemused as to what Tony seriously thought Michael added to the peace of the 
Middle East”.  He further noted that “When Michael Levy was appointed as 
envoy… Israel must have thought they had won the lottery... his unpredictable 
manner led to many difficult moments – one senior official describe him as ‘self-
launching, semi-guided missile’.”417 
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It is clear that Levy did have some impact on restarting the Syrian- Israeli 
peace talks, making an initial series of visits to the Middle East in 
spring/summer 1999.  On his first trip to Syria he met with Farouq al-Sharaa to 
be given the frank Syrian view that they were sceptical of Israeli willingness to 
meet their minimum requirement for peace - withdrawal from the occupied 
lands to the 1967 lines.  A second visit to meet Hafez followed in June, which 
Levy describes as “warm but formal”.418  Basil Eastwood, Ambassador to Syria 
at the time, thought that Hafez used the meeting to conclude “that Levy was a 
valid interlocutor about the relationship between Israeli internal politics and the 
peace process”.419  Asad appeared to have appreciated Levy’s insights into how 
the Israelis were thinking, capitalising on his contacts there.  Far from being 
outside the official process, Eastwood explains, Levy was accompanied on his 
first visit by Robin Cook’s political advisor, and subsequently by the FCO desk 
officer for the Arab/Israeli negotiations. 
 
As described above, at the time of Levy’s first visit to Damascus, the political 
context in the region was more positive.  Barak was Israeli Prime Minister and 
there were indications that the Americans were looking at the revival of the 
Syrian track, although not really expecting much progress.  Levy’s first meeting 
in Damascus was with Basil Eastwood and the American Ambassador Ryan 
Crocker, no one really expected much progress.  For the meeting that followed 
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with Hafez, Levy was accompanied by Eastwood and an FO specialist, and the 
discussion was “business-like and friendly” but with little “substance”, 
confirming the earlier conversation.  Over the next 24 hours, Levy would be 
taken to meet with Bashar al-Asad, then be called back to see Hafez who, 
contrary to all expectation, expressed a readiness for “open early, face-to-face 
talks with Israel with the aim of a peace deal and an eventual summit”. 420  
Hafez saw Levy as a conduit to the Americans to pass on the message that he 
was ready for direct negotiations.  On receipt of that message a few days later, 
Madeleine Albright quickly arranged peace talks in Shepherds town.  In fact, 
according to Eastwood: 
“There was no British presence at Shepherdstown. In my view the 
Israelis tried to be too clever; they pocketed (and then leaked) all the 
Syrian concessions (on security arrangements, water and peaceful 
relations) but avoided any serious discussion about withdrawal (and 
the key Syrian demand – the line of 4 June 1967). It might have been 
better if there had been a British presence to encourage the Israelis to 
be more serious.”421  
This reflects a view that the British could potentially have impact in facilitating 
talks on the Syrian-Israeli track of the MEPP, but also the view that, by insisting 
on the primacy of the Americans in the process, Blair set limitations on the 
impact.  There was no balancing power to bring pressure to bear on the 
                                                          
420 Levy, A Question of Honour, Location 2017-2051 
421 B Eastwood, Correspondence, 19 June 2014 
266 
Israelis, which might have been a deciding factor in these talks.  Levy, 
however, suggests that the real problem of the peace talks which ended at a 
summit in Geneva, March 2000 may have been the desire on Asad’s side for an 
early deal due to his poor state of health.  On arrival at the summit he must 
have realised that any deal was some time away and he no longer had the time 
to make it.422   
 
Within months of the failure of the Geneva summit Hafez died.  Many now saw 
these talks as having been a missed opportunity.  On the British side while 
there must have been disappointment that these talks failed, they now looked 
at the new Syrian President, someone who’d spent time in Britain, had a British 
wife and appeared to be a modern Arab leader.  Blair viewed Bashar as a 
reform minded leader, as did many in the West, and saw an opportunity to 
create a new Anglo-Syrian relationship.  As things stood, there was potential for 
a new relationship to be forged by the two states. 
 
Conclusion 
The early years of Blair’s government were marked by the commitment to a 
new kind or foreign policy, a break from realpolitik that traditionally marked 
British foreign affairs.  Britain was going to forge a new role in the world, be a 
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force for good, be strong in Europe and strengthen the special relationship with 
the US.  The international system, redefined since the end of the Cold War, and 
now unipolar with the US the remaining superpower, meant that there was the 
opportunity to redefine the role Britain played in international affairs.   
 
In practice, however, the changes New Labour made in UK foreign policy were 
not so substantial.  While these years were definitive, it was more in the sense 
of a new government settling into office, and therefore determining who and 
how foreign policy was made.  These formative years saw power in foreign 
policy making move from the FCO to No 10, and influenced by the very 
personal leadership style of the Prime Minister.  The period also saw the normal 
interdepartmental conflicts of priorities which resulted in foreign policy activity 
that did not always fit the narrative.  None of this was particularly precedent 
setting. 
 
In terms of what this meant for Anglo-Syrian relations, British emphasis on 
good governance and democracy could have set these on a rocky path.  Yet, 
the interest Blair had in proactively working towards settlement of the MEPP, 
and being a more integrated member of the EU held opportunity to strengthen 
these relations as they also fit the interests of Hafez Asad who was looking to 
the EU to balance the influence the US gave to Israel in peace negotiations.   
There were opportunities here for Britain to play a more constructive role. 
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Whilst there were moments in which the interests of Britain and Syria 
overlapped, such as some minor arms sales, the Ilisu dam project, and the 
interjection of Lord Levy into the peace process perhaps helping to give 
confidence to the US that these talks would be worthwhile, there was little 
indication of any new initiative that would significantly change relations.  Where 
these interests overlapped they were dealt with on a case by case basis rather 
than being considered, seemingly, in terms of the wider foreign policy priorities, 
in part, perhaps, because of the involvement of department other than the 
FCO.   
 
In many ways, then, the censure of some observers of the time that it was 
“business as usual” at the FCO, was accurate at least in terms of the Anglo-
Syrian relationship.  Even Blair’s increasing role in foreign policy decision 
making and strengthening of support for humanitarian intervention would seem 
to have had little direct implication for British relations with Syria.  While British 
policy was to promote economic liberalism and good governance, and while it 
viewed the EU as a vehicle to aid it in doing so, the door was open to a warmer 
relationship between the new Asad regime in Syria and the Blair government.   
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Chapter Four 
Blair and Basher – A new relationship? 
As Bashar al-Asad ascended to the Syrian Presidency, Blair’s government had 
been in power for three years.  During this time, British foreign policy priorities 
and strategies had been made, and structures around who made it and how it 
was made had been settled.  The reality for Anglo-Syrian relations was that 
there was little direct impact.  Where interests had overlapped on a few 
occasions in this period, policy seemed to be made on a more or less traditional 
basis, case by case.  
 
Yet, barely a year into his presidency events outwith Bashar’s control created a 
whole new international context.  The terrorist attacks of September 2001 
rocked the international system.  Whilst still living in the same unipolar world, 
the sense of American invincibility had been delivered a severe blow, and 
threats to international security were viewed under a different lens.  With 
particular significance for Syria and the Middle East, regions that were viewed 
as creating instability in the international system, and states who were seen to 
encourage terrorism, were now viewed as a more serious threat to international 
peace.  For Britain, this highlighted the need to tackle the MEPP, and to work 
with the autocratic regimes of the region, such as Syria, to normalise their 
relations, promoting reform and modernisation and exporting British values and 
ideals.   
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In Hafez’s final years, there had been signs of that the Anglo-Syrian relationship 
warming up in contrast to the relationship typical of the previous few decades.  
As Bashar entered the presidency, Blair’s belief in his personal leadership style 
was established, demonstrated in his confidence in his own ability to work with 
this new generation of autocratic leaders.  Kampfner observed that, “whenever 
he saw a leader that was new and different, he tried – on a very personal level 
– to befriend him.  It could be Putin, it could be Jordan’s new King Abdullah, 
Syria’s new President Basher al-Asad or even China’s premier Zhu Rongji”423.  
This view was fed, in part, by the idea that the end of the Cold War had 
discredited this kind of regime while it validated the Western economic liberal 
democratic model.  It combined with the view Syria’s “westernised” Bashar was 
already inclined, indeed needed to, make reforms in his country.  The feeling in 
No 10 was that the time was ripe for change in Syria.   
 
Just as Hafez had been the first Arab leader reported to have sent his 
congratulations to Blair after his 1997 election win, Blair was quick to welcome 
Bashar to his Presidency.  This despite the fact that not only was he unelected 
but the presidency in Syria is traditionally a non-hereditary position, meaning 
the Syrian constitution had had to be amended to allow his assumption of 
power.  The idea that Bashar was set to introduce reform, and that this should 
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be encouraged, fit conveniently with one of New Labour’s primary foreign policy 
priorities, that of achieving regional and international stability through 
democracy promotion and promoting good governance. 
 
A number of signs in the initial weeks following Bashar’s inauguration seemed 
hopeful for the future.  As Hafez spent the last decade of his life preparing the 
way for Bashar to succeed him, part of this strategy had been a conscious 
effort to limit his exposure to the public eye.424  Despite this, Bashar was 
commonly understood by many London to be a young modern leader with a 
Westernised outlook due to his time in in Britain, and a willingness to reform his 
regime.  These reformist credentials seemed to be borne out in the period 
known as the Damascus Spring following his accession during which a number 
of civil societies were allowed to form in Damascus.  Political discussion was 
more open, with calls for the State of Emergency in Syria to be ended (the 
Statement of 99, September 2000), and a more democratic multiparty political 
system established.  It was argued that the need for economic reform had to 
be accompanied by political reform (the Statement of 1000, January 2001).  
These statements were not welcomed by the regime but elicited only minimal 
reaction and discussion was not immediately closed down.   
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This new era of Syrian life saw the emergence of a new set of apparently 
reform minded individuals recruited into the regime.  Alongside the creation of 
the new civil societies, it saw the release of hundreds of political prisoners 
(unique in the admittance that these prisoners had been detained for purely on 
political grounds according to Amnesty International)425 and new freedoms for 
the press in the form of licensing of private newspapers, and allowing parties 
affiliated to the Baath party to publish and distribute their own journals.  A 
further sign of change was the creation of the Human Rights Association of 
Syria in July 2001426.   
 
The general hope was that these were signs that Bashar heralded a fresh new 
start yet it was quickly demonstrated that there were limits to how far the 
regime would tolerate criticism, the Damascus Spring soon followed by the 
Damascus Winter.  Most authors writing of this period blame the “old guard” for 
the sudden crack down on the growth of civil societies, regime stalwarts fearing 
the pace at which the demand for change was growing.  Many of those 
prisoners released soon after Basher’s inauguration were quickly be 
incarcerated again.  The fact remains, however, that the expectation that 
Bashar would immediately act on political reform, or even that he ever really 
intended to (at least to the extent some activists and the West clearly wanted), 
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was too high, and even the “evidence” that Bashar was set on complete reform 
exaggerated.   
 
Bashar, in reality had spent only two years in London, more significantly he had 
received a traditional Syrian education.  Therefore, it is highly unlikely that his 
western experience would drastically shape his overall outlook.  In fact, 
Raymond Hinnebusch writes: 
“Bashar’s exposure to the West does not compare with that of most 
other Middle Eastern leaders. Moreover, the father-son relation, a 
presumably powerful socialization mechanism, would have 
committed him to the preservation of his father’s Arab nationalist 
legacy while the apprenticeship he served under his father, 
including time within the military, would have socialized him into the 
code of operation of the establishment. And the legitimacy of the 
Bashar’s presidency was contingent on faithfulness to the standard 
of national honor defended by his father, namely the full recovery of 
the Golan from Israel without being seen to abandon the demand 
for Palestinian national rights.”427 
Flynt Leverett, in his 2005 work Inheriting Syria explores this theme further.  
He examines not only the political legacy Bashar inherited on his father’s death, 
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but the weakness of his own position, in terms of the limitations and constraints 
he was left with, challenges from other members of the Asad family, from 
within the regimes inner circle, and owing to the unresolved issues in the Syrian 
economy and political and civil society.   
 
On foreign policy, Bashar inherited Hafez’s grand strategy, aimed at containing 
Israel,428 at a time when Syria’s regional and international standing was 
considerably weakened.  Lebanon in 2000 had seen a resurgence of anti- Syrian 
sentiment and Rafik al-Hariri was about to return as Prime Minister, posing a 
serious threat to Syria’s dominance in the neighbouring state. Israel had 
unilaterally withdrawn from the South, weakening Syria’s justification for its role 
in Lebanon429.  Hopes that Bashar’s presidency would revive peace talks with 
Israel were soon dashed as it became clear that talks could not be revisited 
until Bashar strengthened his internal position in the regime.  The weakness of 
Bashar’s position meant that there would be no immediate progress on the 
hoped for reforms or peace negotiations.    
 
The extent to which Bashar was committed to reform may have been 
overestimated.  While his inauguration speech spoke of reform the main 
concern was with economic reform.  When speaking of democracy Bashar said, 
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“We cannot apply the democracy of others onto ourselves.  Western 
democracy, for example, is the outcome of a long history that resulted in 
customs and tradition that distinguishes the current culture of Western 
societies”.430  Many thought this opened the way for debate on democratic 
reform in Syria, equally it could have signalled Bashar’s belief that the Western 
state model was not necessary the right for Syria.  Many of the new “reformers” 
were better described as technocrats not democratic thinkers, making it more 
likely that Bashar was concerned with reform of the administrative system 
rather than the political one, something that would sit comfortably alongside 
attempts at economic reform.   
 
In the economic sphere the need for reform was acute which was reflected in 
Bashar’s attempts to court western governments.  The Syrian economy had 
suffered substantial blows during the 1980s from the abrupt decline of the oil 
price, the loss of soft loans from the Gulf states as a result of supporting of Iran 
in the Iran-Iraq war, and the collapse of the SU.  Hafez in the 1990s made 
some attempt to open up the Syrian economy aiming to encourage private 
investment.  Economic growth appeared to signal some success but the failure 
of the reform was masked by the effects of Syrian participation in the 1991 Gulf 
War – the monies Syria received from the Gulf states in return for its support, 
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the rise in oil prices as a result of the war and latterly the illegal sale of Iraqi oil 
against UN sanctions. 
 
The economic predicament Bashar faced was acute thus attempts to liberalise 
the economy were an obvious priority.  The end of the Cold War was a “win” 
for the western model of neoliberal capitalism and the associated Western 
dominated institutions, the IMF, World Bank, OECD and WTO that support it.431 
Syria’s economic reforms had to be aimed at “integrations into and conformity 
with the standards of the global market and accompanying West centric foreign 
policy”.  This meant shifting the emphasis from the moribund public sector, and 
encourage investment in the private sector.432  Several measures aimed at 
enabling this were passed.  The problem was that for a number of these 
measures this was as far as it went, with the pace of implementation very slow.  
For example, while Bashar persuaded the Baath Party Regional Command to 
ratify a decision to promote opening of commercial private banks in Syria in 
December 2000, by 2003 not a single one had opened.433  Bashar fought on, 
making overtures for help, for example, inviting representatives from the Bank 
of England to Damascus to discuss setting up a regulatory system.434  Private 
banking was eventually established in the late 2000s.   
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Bashar encountered many of problems that had plagued his father’s attempts 
to liberalise the economy.  To take the measures required to encourage 
economic growth and reform the inefficient public sector, tackling corruption 
within the elites of the regime would be necessary, and Asad initially lacked the 
power or support to do this.  Some argue this is another reason Asad looked to 
the West for support.  He acted quickly to revive EU Association Agreement 
talks, seeing this as a tool which could be used to increase the pace of change 
in Syria.  Following the Iraq war, he argued the agreement would strengthen 
ties with Europe, telling this old guard this was a necessity in the face of the 
hostile US relations.435 
 
Blair has been criticised for seeing a potential partner in Bashar.  Certainly he 
was not alone in seeing Bashar’s presidency as a positive development, many 
Western leaders and academics thought likewise, and initially there were the 
signs in Syria reflecting this point of view.  Similarly, there were also signs that 
perhaps should have served warning, certainly they advocated a cautious 
approach in pursuing a dialogue with the regime.  Barry Rubin points out that 
this optimistic outlook was in total contrast to the disgust of many Arab 
intellectuals.  They saw Bashar’s inauguration as a final humiliation turning the 
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Syrian republic into a family fiefdom436.  Taken in light of the events in Syria 
since the beginning of the Arab Spring 2010 it would be easy to accept Rubin’s 
arguments pointing to the Asad regime manipulating the West’s desire to see 
reform without any real commitment to change.  Yet, at the time there was 
certainly a struggle going on inside Syria between reformers and the Old Guard, 
and many Syrians were hopeful for the future, reflected somewhat in Bashar’s 
personal popularity with many Syrians.  This being so there did seem some 
hopes for Britain, and the West, to forge a better relationship with Syria.  
Certainly the assumption that the Baath regime was there to stay and thus had 
to be dealt was one that was widely shared.  
 
Regardless of the true nature of the Syrian regime and its intent at this 
juncture, consideration needs to be given as to how far British foreign policy 
generally, regionally and specifically toward Syria, could be seen to have 
facilitated the desired changes in the regime.   The British stance as taken by 
Blair, was that Asad was someone with whom Britain could work.  Given that 
this was the position taken, the question must be how far British policies 
augmented this dialogue.   
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Blair seemed to take the lead role in engaging Bashar but the decision to 
engage Syria was not at odds with FCO policy.  This was “generally supportive 
of the idea of engaging with Syria”437, viewing Bashar as a “new player worth 
giving the benefit of the doubt.”438  The Syrian regime was authoritarian but 
Bashar showed signs of wanting to open up, and unlike Saddam in Iraq and 
Qadhafi in Libya, the Syrian regime seemed to have more of a collective 
leadership, rather than just one man at the helm, which could be dealt with.439  
For the Syrians, better relations with Britain were advantageous for reasons of 
legitimacy for the regime, held potential for improvement of trade and in terms 
of having British support within the EU.  For the British, there was interest in 
opening dialogue with regard to human rights and offering support with regard 
to stability in Lebanon.440  Both sides had potential gains to make.  Still many in 
Whitehall and the media queried whether Blair was justified in believing his own 
personal brand of leadership could affect change, as he took charge of building 
relations with Bashar, arranging a visit in October 2001 which took place post 
9/11, and the beginnings of US intervention in the Middle East and Afghanistan. 
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The War on Terror 
The events of September 11th, 2001 were a defining moment for British foreign 
policy as Blair immediately recognised that immense implications for 
international relations as he writes in his memoir, “It was war... this was not a 
battle for territory, not a battle between states; it was a battle for and about 
the ideas and values that would shape the twenty-first century.”441  Blair saw 
the event itself as world changing, an “intrinsic challenge to the democratic free 
market and global order”.442  This the reasoning behind his immediate decision 
that the US could not be left to fight alone, this was a fight for principles and 
values, not narrow national interests.  Jack Straw, purports to have had no such 
immediate epiphany.  However, he acknowledges in his autobiography that day 
did change everything, defining British foreign policy for several years following 
the attacks and probably longer.  Certainly, for all that came before, Blair’s 
response to these events came to define not only his foreign policy, but his 
entire premiership. 
 
In the statement given by Blair responding to the terror attacks on the US, he 
said Britain stood shoulder to shoulder with American, saying "This is not a 
battle between the United States of America and terrorism but between the free 
and democratic world and terrorism… [we] will not rest until this evil is driven 
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from our world."443  Straw also argued for standing with the Americans and 
advised the best way of doing so was to publically support Washington and try 
to use what influence Britain had privately.444  Most importantly, for Blair, was 
that Britain’s close alignment to the US be “pursued more vigorously than 
ever”445.  It was essential that the US should not be driven to act unilaterally, 
harming international relationships and potentially undermining international 
institutions.  To avoid this, the British needed to be part of the conversation, to 
encourage the US to work through the UN, and to address the moribund Arab-
Israeli peace process. 
 
Additionally, Blair argued, the commitment to stand with the US was clearly in 
the national interest, since he viewed the terrorist attacks as attacks on the 
“free world” not just America.  They thus attacked the values and beliefs that 
Britain, American and the West held in common.  Promoting this message, in 
the eight weeks following 9/11, Blair would travel 40000 miles, take 31 flights 
and speak with 56 foreign leaders,446 adding to the perception that he was 
acting like an American diplomat not a British Prime minister.  In his 
autobiography Blair writes “I was writing regular notes to him [Bush], raising 
issues, prompting his system and mine: humanitarian aid; political alliances, 
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including in particular how we co-opted the Northern Alliance (the anti-Taliban 
coalition) without giving leadership of the country over to them… Above all, I 
was globetrotting – to the Middle East, Pakistan, Russia – trying to ensure that 
we kept the support we had.”447  
 
Rather than showing true leadership, this unprecedented level of support 
earned Blair the reputation of being an America lackey among leaders in Europe 
and the Middle East.  Further, John Dickie writes, “His whirlwind tours of far 
flung capitals to garner support for the campaign … led to an impetuous 
promise of 6000 troops to ‘stabilise Afghanistan’ when calmer heads at the FCO 
were advocating caution.  Heeding this advice would have spared him 
embarrassment of standing down the British force weeks later as US command 
clear they running campaign and did not want them.”448  His early years in 
government had strengthened Blair’s belief that only he could handle this kind 
of foreign crisis effectively.  It had also left no one strong enough in 
government to counter his belief that this was an attack on Western values and 
restrict his reaction accordingly.  This lack of formal consultation was also 
evident in that at this time, between 11th September and the end of the month, 
Blair convened his cabinet just once, and even Cobra, the Governments crisis 
response committee, had only three meetings.449    
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Blair’s statement also underlined the instinctive leaning he had in defining 
international events as “good” and “evil”, foreign policy in the light of “doing 
the right thing” in a moral sense, rather than the more considered ethical 
foreign policy aspirations of Cook’s time in the FCO or traditional pragmatism in 
defence of the country’s interests.  Anyone who could not see events in this 
light was met with impatience: other states that could not see the value of 
Blair’s argument were on the wrong side.  Blair’s foreign policy agenda would 
not be one of narrow national interests but Britain would be acting to protect 
“ideals of greater good in places where our interests were not visibly involved 
at all”, a contentious policy at best.450 
 
Targeting the Taliban  
Blair was the first foreign leader President George Bush called following the 
September 11th terrorist attacks.  Bush ended his call saying “we will make no 
distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who 
harbour terrorists”.451  This was the prism through which US foreign policy was 
made in the decade which followed, one with which Blair would quickly align.  
In the days following the attack Blair spent much of his time calling on other 
leaders to rally behind the US, and visited both New York and Washington in 
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the week that followed.  The first to feel the impact was the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan.   
 
Sympathy was clearly with the Bush administration.  UNSCR 1368 which 
condemned the attacks was passed on 12th September with little fuss quickly, 
two weeks later a further resolution passed authorising military action.452  After 
the Taliban failed to acquiesce to demands to give up the leadership of al-
Qaeda and move to dismantle its network, US and UK forces moved in 
beginning Operation Enduring Freedom on Sunday 7th October 2001 with the 
aim of removing the Taliban from power and confronting al-Qaeda. 
 
The international community was largely supportive over the operation in 
Afghanistan.  The links to the training of Al-Qaeda operatives there were 
known, as was the fact that the Taliban housed and supported its leadership.  
Still, the operation was criticised by some, particularly over the fact that no 
explicit UN authorisation for the war was sought, instead it was justified under 
the UN Charter’s Article 51, as an act of collective self-defence.  There were 
further accusations that, while the events of 9/11 led NATO to invoke Article 5 
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of the charter, NATO was not represented in Afghanistan (neither was the 
EU).453  
 
The invasion of Afghanistan might have served to introduce a cautionary 
approach to solidarity with the US.  Several states, alongside Britain, declared 
their support for the Bush administration in the operation against the Taliban.  
A total of 80 countries offered support but “only Britain participated in the first 
wave of strikes”.454  The US campaign to remove the Taliban from Kabul was 
fast and unilateral, NATO’s offer to aid in the invasion brushed aside.455  Having 
learned the lessons of Kosovo, the Afghan campaign was fought through a 
coalition of the willing but whilst the US used the military, logistical and 
diplomatic support of their allies, they refused to share leadership of the 
operation.456  The reasoning behind Blair’s support for the US was that 
influence a war you have to be in it,457 but an effective way to have done this 
would have been in advocating a role for NATO, both to protect the credibility 
of such multinational organisations, and in legitimising the operation which 
lacked explicit UN authorisation; however, instead Blair prioritised the need to 
stand with the Americans above such considerations.   
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In the US led invasion, Britain lacked influence over operational matters, even 
though UK troops were involved.  This was clearly evident when the Bush 
administration decided to move their focus from Afghanistan to Iraq without 
consultation, leaving UK troops to take up the slack in Afghanistan.  Blair could 
not persuade Bush that reconstruction in Afghanistan was vital and a 
responsibility of the allies; every attempt he made being met with resistance in 
Washington.458  These lessons should have served warning as Britain 
considered supporting a similar intervention in Iraq, foreshadowing similar 
problems.   
 
One state leader who did condemn the Afghanistan invasion was Bashar al-
Asad.  It was as part of his 9000 mile, month long trip following 9/11 Blair 
embarked on his ill-advised October 2001 visit to Damascus.  Both leaders 
professed to having an open and candid discussion but in the public press 
conference Asad roundly condemned the Afghanistan campaign.  Asad said that 
whilst he condemned the terrorist attacks on America, “We didn't say we 
support the international coalition for launching war. We are always against 
war… We cannot accept what we see on television, the killing of innocent 
civilians, hundreds now dying every day. I don't think anyone in the West 
agrees to that”.  Drawing a distinction between terrorists and resistance 
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fighters, with regard to the Palestinian groups whose headquarters were in 
Damascus, he said “Resistance to occupation is an international right....Acts of 
resistance are very different from acts of terrorism. In the West you have 
examples. In France one of the most prestigious is President de Gaulle, who 
fought for the liberation of France.”459 
 
Asad was in a difficult situation after 9/11 and trying to occupy a middle 
ground.  Whilst he condemned the terrorist attacks and cooperated in sharing 
intelligence on al-Qaeda, he roundly condemned the military action in 
Afghanistan.  Given Bush’s proclamation that states were “either with us or 
against us” this position was dangerous.  Asad’s outburst was explained by 
referencing his need to play to his home audience yet it highlighted the 
difficulties the British faced in attempts to engage with Syria.  Asad also had 
reason to be concerned, with the US considering Syria a “rogue state.”   
America’s new crusade against terrorism and the states that played host to 
what it considered terrorist groups, notably militant Palestinian factions hosted 
by Damascus made for a challenging environment.  Rather than write this off 
simply as playing to a home audience Blair could have used the opportunity to 
address some of these concerns, but he seemed completely unaware of Syria’s 
views or interests. 
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This was the backdrop to Blair’s visit to Syria.  He had two objectives, “to look 
for a way of weaning Syria away from its support of Hizbullah and other 
groups, and the other was to try to get Syria to re-enter talks with Israel on the 
return of the Golan Heights”460.  What he achieved was a PR disaster.  In 
Alistair Campbell’s words, Blair received “a total banjaxing from Pres Asad, 
which was a bit of a problem” and it was played out in the British media to the 
extent that, “there was no point trying to make out Asad had been anything but 
unhelpful, though TB was still of the view it was as much a clash of political and 
media cultures as a deliberate act of hostility”.461.. 
 
The reasons behind Blair’s decision to court Syria, in some ways, were only 
strengthened after the terrorist September 2001.  For Blair, 9/11 had inalterably 
changed international relations, and the need to tackle areas of instability was 
heightened.  That that meant reengaging in Middle East peace negotiations, 
and tackling leaders who were seen as likely to ferment instability, which meant 
getting the key players on board.  Syria’s was one of those key players.  Asad’s 
regime was no friend of Bin Laden, was militantly secular and “had no love of 
action based on fundamentalism”.462  It had also already shown willingness to 
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share intelligence.  Still, most observers were uncertain what Blair hoped to 
achieve with his visit (the Canadian foreign minister had visited less than 48 
hours before and discussed the same issues much more privately463) and 
unclear what “unique leverage”464 Blair brought to the table.   
 
The visit went against the advice of the FCO, not in that they were against the 
attempt to engage Bashar, but in the high profile of the visit and press 
conference.  Blair was either poorly briefed or not briefed at all, since “he spoke 
constantly of the Palestinians, of the Mitchell Plan and the Tenet Proposals” 
giving the impression his concern was only with the Israeli – Palestinian peace 
process465, and that Syria’s own peace negotiations and demands were 
unimportant.  This impression was compounded by his demands that Asad stop 
supporting “terrorist” groups demonstrating little understanding of Syria’s 
legitimate claims with regard to the Golan Heights.  This served as a further 
demonstration of a British government failing to understand and give weight to 
Syrian interests, whilst insisting Syria met British demands over its priorities. 
 
The perception was that in this display of international showmanship Blair was, 
once again, ignoring the knowledge and expertise of his own FCO, and relying 
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too closely on a very small group of policy advisors.  His rhetoric appeared to 
echo American demands that Syria gave up support for Palestinian militants, its 
major leverage for Syria in the peace process, before Syria’s concerns could 
even come to the negotiating table.  Blair’s European partners were reportedly 
perplexed at his visit.466  Without clear British investment or interests in Syria, 
which could be used to exert leverage, British influence in Syria was dependent 
on what it could deliver through Europe, and what kind of influence Blair held 
with the Bush administration.  The image of Blair as an Ambassador for the US, 
then, did little to assure the Syrians he could deliver what they needed on 
either front.  By appearing to simply reiterate the American message it brought 
into question whether he had either the will or the power to influence them, 
and being too closely linked to American policy put him at odds with his 
European partners, meaning it was unlikely Britain could use Europe to pressure 
Syria on this issue. 
 
Blair could have chosen to send a representative, either from the FCO or a 
special envoy.  Blair himself pushed for the press conference, adding fodder to 
critics who argued that, for New Labour, presentation, not substance, was very 
much part of policy.  Unfortunately, again it showed naivety on Blair’s part: 
Asad had to play for a home audience and given Blair’s mishandling of the 
issues Asad’s firm rebuttal could easily have been predicted.  Even Charles 
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Powell, himself sent by Blair to establish a dialogue with Asad in September 
2001 expressed surprise that a press conference was held when there were no 
detailed agreements or joint actions to announce467.  Lastly, the visit was not 
one that would ingratiate Blair with Jerusalem, thereby conflicting with another 
of his priorities in the region.   
 
Iraq  
Clearly showing support for the US factored into the decision to go to war in 
Iraq yet for Blair Saddam was a problem long before September 11th, 2001.  
Blair’s point of view had been formulated from his own experiences of the 
events that led to Operation Desert Fox.  The failure of the sanctions regime, 
the continuing flouting of UN resolutions by the Iraqi regime, simply the 
behaviour of Hussein to date was evidence enough that he would not change, 
and consequently would remain a danger to peace and stability as long as he 
was in power.    In 1997, Paddy Ashdown, noted Blair’s comments that, “’the 
state of the intelligence was ‘pretty scary’, and that Saddam Hussein was ‘very 
close to some appalling weapons of mass destruction’.  ‘we cannot’, he warned, 
‘Let him get away with it.  The world thinks this is just gamesmanship but it is 
deadly serious’”468.  In February 1998 Blair made a statement to the Commons, 
saying: “The Saddam Hussein we face today is the same Saddam Hussein we 
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faced yesterday.  He has not changed.  He remains an evil, brutal dictator.... it 
is now clearer than ever that his games have to stop once and for all.  If they 
do not, the consequences should be clear to all”.469  Reportedly Blair was much 
more keen to see military action over Saddam’s continued defiance of the US 
and UK.   
 
Britain’s relationship with Iraq was similar to that of the US since the 1991 Gulf 
war.  Maintaining the no fly zone and upholding UN resolutions since the 1991 
war was a constant and costly commitment.  Sanctions imposed by the UN, 
supported by Britain, were failing, bringing not only the effectiveness of 
Britain’s policy, but the credibility of the UN, into question.  Britain’s preferred 
solution - “smart” sanctions - was not supported by France or Russia.  Some 
suggested this was because both had negotiated lucrative trade deals to 
commence after the lifting of sanctions, but another argument is that the 
French priority was that the Russians were not left as Iraq’s “only friend.”  The 
French further insisted that inspections could not become “perfectionist” and 
thus unrealistic.  They argued, that once 95% of Iraq’s WMD were destroyed it 
would be difficult to find the last 5%, meaning it was essential that a diplomatic 
relationship was maintained to allow continued access for inspectors.470 
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Blair’s frustration over Hussein’s intransigence, and willingness to choose the 
military solution, was demonstrated in the run up to Operation Desert Fox, a 
major bombing campaign carried out by Britain and US from December 16th – 
December 19th 1998, justified by the allies on grounds that Iraq was in violation 
of UNSC resolutions and was refusing to cooperate fully with inspectors.  As 
military action was due to start, in fact some aircraft were already in the air, on 
15th November he received a call notifying him that the American’s were turning 
back after Hussein had contacted them agreeing to greater compliance.  Blair 
argued this should be ignored as Saddam would not follow through on promises 
but it was too late, the air strike being called off.  Ultimately Operation Desert 
Fox commenced on December 16th, 1998, with Blair being proven correct, and 
with Britain the only ally to join the US in military action.471  Clearly Blair was 
already convinced that something had to be done about Saddam well before 
the 2003 operation. 
 
The opinion of both the British and US governments after 9/11 was that the 
world could no longer tolerate the kind of behaviour exhibited by Saddam.  The 
persistent undermining of the UN resolutions, in particular, Saddam’s cat and 
mouse game with UN weapons inspectors could no longer be borne.  
Furthermore, there was the possibility that WMDs still remained in the hands of 
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this “evil dictator” and the potential that these WMD could end up in the of the 
hands of terrorist groups was unacceptable.   
 
For Blair, the experience of Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan had proved 
the viability of military force, and clarified the justifications for it as he had 
conceptualised in his April 1999 Chicago speech.  In Kosovo, particularly, Blair 
had considered the “dysfunction between international law and plain morality” 
and reconciled for himself the legitimacy of action taken by NATO without a UN 
resolution.472  Finally, the events of 9/11 had clarified in his mind what could 
and could not be tolerated.  British intelligence reports had for many years 
detailed the data on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, the likelihood of what 
still remained, of whether he would use them, and of what might happen once 
sanctions were lifted.  The perception of the potential threat these posed was 
now much higher, as terrorism and WMDs could potentially come together, and 
obligated a response.  While Blair made the decision early on that is was 
essential that the US not be left to act unilaterally in response to the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11, he was also clear that, in his opinion, this was in also Britain’s 
national interest.   
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America had moved to a policy supporting regime change by either covert 
means or through assistance to opposition groups in 1998, Britain also 
generally supported this position, while France and Russia remained opposed, 
instead advocating a gradual lifting of non-military sanctions, and normalisation 
of relations with the current regime.473  Endless rounds of negotiation had 
become almost farcical.  Carne Ross, offers a number of explanations for this.  
One, the traditional analysis that the interests of those concerned were 
diametrically opposed; the US interest being to maintain sanctions which had 
been highly effective in preventing the Iraqi’s from any significant rearmament: 
Britain interest was to find a way to soften the impact of the sanctions on the 
Iraqi people thereby countering international criticism whilst maintaining a 
sanction regime; the French and Russian interest being to make sure any new 
sanctions regime would not make the situation worse for the population, 
though both also had substantial economic interests at stake.  Another analysis 
is simply one of “bad group dynamics” that is, the negotiators were a group of 
“young to middle aged males (mostly), who spend the time arguing but not 
listening, with “petty rivalries and animosities” dictating the debate.  Finally, he 
offers another, complementary analysis; that each side believed that their 
argument dealt with “real facts and real people”, in other words their 
information was good and unbiased, whilst the other side’s was not. This he 
says is common to all foreign policy and is aggravated, not helped, by the ever 
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growing information now accessible though the explosion in communications 
and the internet. 474 
 
Arguing that Blair’s support for the invasion of Iraq was solely due to his 
dedication to the US does not present the full picture.  What can be said is that 
he was unable to adequately set out the British case for intervention as 
separate from that of the US.  The Bush administration had clearly stated 
regime change as an objective, alongside the WMD issue, whereas the British 
government was restricted from citing the same.  Though clearly viewing 
Hussein as a central risk to stability in the region, Blair was advised that regime 
change had “no basis in international law” as a justification for invasion.475  The 
Attorney General advised further that the current situation with regard to Iraq 
meant intervention on humanitarian grounds was not applicable.476  This left 
Blair a narrow case to put to the public based on compliance on UNSCRs.   
 
Britain’s support over Iraq, with Britain being another permanent member of 
the UNSC, lent the US-led coalition a more significant degree of legitimacy.  
Blair’s proactive support for the war in the US, where he was considerably more 
popular than Bush,477 made the case more credible to the American public.  A 
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criticism made since, by members of the US government, is that Blair failed to 
exert the same level of influence over Bush as he did over the US public.  Still 
the nature of government in Washington is such that different groups are 
always vying for power, making politics there difficult to navigate at the best of 
times, and even President Bush has since admitted that his administration was 
“heroically dysfunctional”.478  This makes it difficult to judge just what level of 
influence Blair could have brought to bear on this matter. 
 
The support Blair offered was neither unconditional nor blind.  While it may be 
true that, for Blair, the idea of not supporting the US position on Iraq was 
unimaginable there was more reason behind the decision.  Britain was inclined 
to support the invasion of Iraq as a solution to what was a long standing and 
intractable issue.  It further supported the war due to the British perception of 
security changing after 9/11.  In real, practical, terms however British support 
came with two requests (though never absolute conditions).  One was that the 
Bush administration attempt to go the UN route to get support for the action; 
the second was a US reengagement in the MEPP which Blair saw to be at the 
heart of problems in the region.    
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The argument is that Blair failed to achieve either of these objectives, that 
despite showing public support to the US, the British government had very little 
influence over US foreign policy aims and that this was a failure for British 
foreign policy.  Here again, it must be stated that these were desirable 
outcomes for Blair not absolutes.  From the British government’s point of view 
Blair did succeed in getting the Bush administration to try the UN route and did 
come away with UNSCR 1441, which Straw and his team were instrumental in 
drafting.  Furthermore, he never stopped pressing for the Americans to 
reengage with the MEPP resulting in the November 2002 commitment to the 
Road Map; though in reality this did not become a priority.  In the end Blair 
could have backed out of the Iraq conflict, being given the option to do so by 
Bush just before the vote was put to the British parliament, but he opted not to 
do so. 
 
Blair has also been criticised for not meeting his own stated criteria for 
intervention as defined in his Doctrine of International Community speech (set 
out in the previous chapter) before setting out on his Iraq adventure.  The case 
for action was not clear.  The precipitator to action in Iraq was the terrorist 
attacks in America.  Without these, it is unlikely that any action against Iraq 
would have taken place.  There was no evidence linking Saddam to the 
terrorists involved in the 9/11 attacks (though plenty linking them to Saudi 
Arabia, a major UK and US ally in the region), and no real links with the al 
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Qaeda organisation.  The case for war on Iraq was built around its possession 
of WMD in defiance of UNSC regulations.  Certainly, in a document produced 
later that year UK “International Priorities: a strategy for the FCO,” making the 
world safer from global terrorism and WMD was one of the top priorities for 
Britain.  Since the end of the war and subsequent failure to find WMD, criticism 
has focused on the British intelligence case behind this and how far the British 
government misled parliament and the public over the WMD issue.   
 
Whilst it seems clear now that there were no WMD to be found in Iraq, the 
intelligence presented was consistent both with the intelligence from other 
states and the intelligence reports and FCO briefings on Iraq since 1991 
according to the Butler report.  Yet both the September dossier and the 
“dodgy” February dossier detailing this intelligence data to Parliament have 
come under much criticism as deliberate attempts to mislead.  There have now 
been four inquiries into aspects of the Iraq war, one by the FAC, one by the 
ISC, the Hutton Inquiry and the Butler Report, all cleared the government of 
any attempt at deliberate subterfuge.  All, aside from the Hutton Inquiry (which 
had a much narrower remit) have been critical of the way intelligence 
information was presented, while finding no evidence that the information was 
manipulated to mislead.479  It should also be noted that the scope of these 
inquiries was dictated by the government and depended on its cooperation. 
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Straw reflects in his memoirs that bowing to pressure to make a case for war 
was the mistake made here, all the rationale for the war was clearly available in 
open source documents in the form of UNSCRs.480  In releasing the dossiers the 
government had not anticipated that parliamentarians and the general public 
would treat the intelligence as fact, rather than intelligence.  What criticism 
there has been of the dossiers has revolved around failing to include the normal 
kind of caveats that would be more usually found in intelligences briefings and 
dossiers created for the government.    
 
Criticism, particularly that considering the legality of the war, has focussed also 
on Blair’s failure to get a second UNSC resolution and/or his failure to get the 
US to push harder for a second resolution.  Again, it should be noted that these 
arguments were not over the accuracy of the intelligence available.  Straw 
asserts that intelligence agencies in a most states including Russia France and 
Germany, believed Saddam Hussein possessed WMD.481  The argument was 
over how far Saddam Hussein was cooperating with UNMOVIC and whether 
diplomacy still could work.  The British government was of the opinion that 
Hussein was never going to fully comply.  UNMOVIC reports stated that no 
significant new evidence was being produced by the Iraqis and they were still 
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being stopped from interviewing witnesses.  Through January and February 
2003 some process was made but inspectors could not “produce immediate and 
conclusive answers” as to whether Iraq was cooperating “actively and 
unconditionally with inspectors”482.  Hans Blix, reporting back on 7 March 2003 
said whilst some items remained unaccounted for, spot inspections had not 
unearthed any hidden arsenals and the Iraqis were “more or less 
cooperating”.483  The French and the Russians wanted more time.  The US, UK 
and Spain argued Iraq was not completely cooperating thus was in breach of 
UNSC1441 
 
Which goes to the next question, whether the diplomatic options been 
exhausted.  It was on this point that the other members of the UNSC disagreed 
as did the lead inspector.  From Blair’s perspective all options had been 
explored.  The actual failure of British diplomacy here was, arguably, the failure 
to convince its European partners of the case for war.  Given the diametrically 
opposed position vis-à-vis the Iraqi sanctions regime it is hard to see where a 
consensus could have been formed. 
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This failure decreased Blair’s ability to influence the Bush administration further.  
The neo conservatives in that administration had been reluctant to go to the UN 
to get the first UNSC resolution, but Blair had managed to convince Bush of the 
necessity.  The British argument was that this was desirable in order to show 
unity over action in Iraq, but was not legally required.  Saddam was clearly in 
contradiction of UNSCR 678 and thus the military action was legal.  
Furthermore, Straw writes that it was clear when writing the UNSCR 1441 
everyone knew “serious consequences” meant military action, it was only after 
the resolutions was passed that those involved started backing away from this 
position.  Ultimately, a statement from the French President Jacques Chirac, 
saying France would not support a second resolution gave the Blair government 
a way out.  Instead of challenging the statement, Straw took great delight in 
denouncing the French for blocking the diplomatic process in the UN and the 
decision was made to go ahead with military action, which was justified as legal 
under the first UNSC resolution against Iraq.   
 
In the case of Blair’s third criteria, the military resources were in place and the 
campaign planned well before the outbreak of hostilities.  In the case of the 
fourth, planning for the long haul, Blair again failed.  Blair’s and the FCOs 
concerns about planning the rebuilding of Iraq were not heard by the US 
administration.  Some of the blame for this comes from the convoluted nature 
of American politics rather than a British failing.  The decision by Paul Bremner, 
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who headed up the Coalition Provisional Authority, to disband Iraq’s security 
forces, for example, was taken without consulting the British at all, but even 
Washington got only the most “cursory consultation”484 leaving leading figures 
including senior figures livid.  Given the impact of the decision on British troops, 
and the consequences for the Iraqi population, the lack of British input was a 
massive failure on the part of the British politicians.   
 
Blair’s government did, however, succeed in establishing the basis for the legal 
obligation of the occupiers to restore law and order in Iraq through UNSCR 
1483.485  In envisaging a role for the UN in the long term rebuilding of Iraq and 
persuading the Americans of the need for this role, the Blair government held a 
consistent line.  Initial steps to establish a UN presence in Iraq were taken but 
suffered a serious blow when the UN headquarters in Baghdad were blown up 
in August 2003 only 10 weeks after UN personnel were sent in killing several, 
including UN Envoy Sergio Vieria de Mello. 
 
Lastly the question of national interest.  According to Blair confronting Saddam 
was in the national interest because ultimately not dealing with rogue regimes 
made the world a less safe place, undermining international security and 
stability thus attacking British interest.  As a number of intellectuals, politicians 
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and academics forewarned however, both the fact that Britain had been 
involved in several wars in Muslim countries and aligned itself so closely with 
American foreign policy has not made the country safer; evidence suggests that 
Britain is at much greater risk from international terrorism and home-grown 
terrorism since the Iraq adventure.486  
 
Regardless as to whether the criteria for intervention was met before the 
invasion, with no WMD found Blair increasingly spoke of the intervention in Iraq 
in terms of human rights and democratic values.487  With the growing unrest 
following the removal of Saddam’s Ba’athist regime and increasing casualties 
both Iraqi civilians and of coalition forces, this argument too was undermined.  
As the situation in Iraq continued to spiral out of control, it became clear that 
the occupiers would need to engage more with other states in the region to 
bring about stability in Iraq  
 
 
Impact on Syria  
Almost immediately upon the US declaring a War on Terror, the Syrian regime 
made the offer of intelligence cooperation with the US.  This cooperation 
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achieved little for them politically however as the US took this more or less as 
its right.  If anything, the regime became a larger target for a number of neo 
cons in the Bush Administration.  With the US setting its sights on those it saw 
to be giving succour to terrorists the Asad regime remained in the line of fire.  
According to Peter Ford, the Syrian regime felt immensely threatened by the US 
attitudes, ultimately concerned for its survival in the face of such aggression. 
 
The Iraqi conflict was a difficult challenge for the Syrian regime on a number of 
fronts.  Iraq is on Syria’s doorstep, the war brought Western forces right to the 
Syrian border.  Whilst this was not the first time Syria was asked to support 
military action against Iraq, the situation was on this occasion was significantly 
different from the previous action.  In 1991 Saddam had attacked Kuwait, a 
clear provocation and justification for the action taken against him.  The US and 
UKs rational for action against him in 2002 was much weaker; the key 
arguments for the need for action such as the nature of the “rogue” regime, the 
support for terrorist groups, the possession of WMD together with the idea of 
democratisation to secure peace and stability in the region could equally be 
levelled against the Asad regime, indeed in the US this had already begun.   
 
An additional challenge for Bashar was that by chance Syria held the non-
permanent member Arab seat at the UNSC at the time.  This meant the Asad 
regime, one that in part legitimised itself in pan-Arab terms, had the unenviable 
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task of having to vote on a resolution that could potentially lead to the military 
invasion of another Arab state.  Syria was not alone in speaking out against this 
but the fact it was on the UNSC at that time meant the Asad regime felt 
particular pressure.  When Bush, under pressure from Blair alongside members 
of his own administration, came to the UNSC for a resolution on Iraq, the 
Syrian camp was left in a difficult position.  
 
In both the UN and Arab League Syrian diplomats attempted to block 
legitimisation for the American invasion of Iraq.488  Despite Britain’s push for 
the US to take the matter to the UN, and its involvement in scripting the 
specific resolution, it was the French, with the assurance that the resolution did 
not authorise automatic military action, that persuaded Syria eventually to vote 
for UNSCR 1441.  The French wanted to know the views of all fifteen members 
of the UNSC (the Americans focussed on the five permanent members), what 
Blix required in terms of an enhanced mandate for inspections, and ultimately 
wanted to preserve the rule of the UNSC as the supreme authority governing 
international behaviour.489   
 
Both the French and the Russians were aware of the potential consequences of 
Britain and US going it alone.  Both Russia and France were concerned about 
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the precedent it might set if the Iraq war was justified on grounds of a 
developing threat, and further, what the consequence would be if two 
traditionally strong proponents of international law were seen to be willing and 
able to stretch it this way potentially undermining the rule of law in a way 
which would affect international peace and stability.  Both would undermine the 
credibility of the UNSC and thus the value of the French and Russian veto.490 
 
The importance of a unanimous vote prompted both President Chirac and Kofi 
Annan to phone Bashar persuading him to vote for the resolution, emphasising 
the importance of the Syrian vote as the only Arab country represented on the 
UNSC, and arguing that a unanimous vote stood the best chance of convincing 
Saddam of the seriousness of the situation.  The French also manoeuvred to 
ensure the vote at the UNSC was taken on November 8th, two days ahead of 
the Arab League meeting in Cairo to ensure the Syrian representative did not 
return to New York requesting further modifications.491   
 
The resolution gave Iraq a final chance to comply with all previous resolutions 
or face “serious consequences”.  While committed to opposing war, Syria 
wished to avoid the angering the “reigning superpower”492, hoping that 
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mandating renewal UN weapons inspectors would curb Bush’s push to war493 
whilst supporting the resolution would demonstrate a reasonable level of 
support to the Americans.  The Syrian regime walked a tightrope, on one hand 
trying to avoid angering America, on the other letting it be known that they did 
not support the invasion of a neighbouring Arab country.  On voting for the 
resolution Syria’s Permanent Representative to the UN stated  
“This vote also followed assurances and contacts that were made at the 
highest levels between permanent members at the UNSC and the 
leadership in the Syrian Arab Republic… We saw that the drift of the 
resolution does not allow any side to launch an attack automatically on 
Iraq.”494 
 
Despite eight weeks of negotiations the language of the resolution was 
ambiguous enough that all those voting could be satisfied.  The French, 
Russians and Chinese were assured there was no automaticity for military 
action in the resolution, with both Straw and Blair clear that serious 
consequences meant military action.  Straw would also argue that the use of 
military force was not automatic, it was reliant on whether or not Saddam 
Hussein complied with his responsibilities or not under the resolutions495.  The 
Syrians, voting in a resolution with credible reservations and at a political cost, 
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received little thanks.  Straw, reflecting on the episode, shows more 
exasperation than any understanding of the Syrian position: 
“The resolution was finally passed on 8 November 2002, at first, 
fourteen of the Council’s fifteen members were in favour.  Then Syria, a 
non-permanent member, reluctantly decided to come in with the rest.  
The Syrian foreign minister, Farouk al-Sharaa, one of the more difficult 
people I have ever had to deal with, called me.... and engaged me in 
the most contorted explanation as to why his country had taken so long 
to make up its mind”496  
More publically at the time he said that the result of active diplomacy with Syria 
had reached a much better common understanding.497  The British position, 
then, was less than accepting of differing points of view, or that the Syrian 
regime had legitimate concerns over the resolution. 
 
It was in this context that a reciprocal visit from Bashar to Britain went ahead in 
December 2002.  In the run up to this visit to London Blair explained what he 
saw as the “value of dialogue with Syria”.  Blair stated that Syria is an 
important and influential country in the region, that Britain had its 
disagreements with Syria over the terrorist groups based there, its trade links 
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with Iraq, and wanted to see greater movement towards political freedom and 
that he “strongly believes that candid dialogue is much more productive than 
no dialogue at all”.  There were areas of agreement such as voting for UNSCR 
1441, that Britain was supporting reform efforts in Syria including a British 
consultant being the main author of the Syrians IT strategy, and Britain was 
providing advice on economic reform; also the British Council was supporting 
the expansion of Syrian Universities and scholarships were being provided for 
Syrian students to take post grad courses in Britain.498  Somewhat more 
pragmatically Syria was seen as “pivotal in the looming conflict with Iraq”499 so 
dialogue was seen as essential. 
 
The decision to invite Bashar to Downing Street (and Buckingham Palace) 
provided the opportunity to press him to close down the offices of the “three 
most feared Islamist groups in the Middle East”, and to convince him to support 
a tougher stance towards Iraq.500  The visit however highlighted the acute 
difference of opinion over Iraq.  Bashar was extremely hesitant on the issue, 
despite the fact Syria have been intense rivals with Iraq in terms of hegemony 
in the region.  The fact that Syria was a non-permanent member of the UNSC 
provided a high profile, with Asad encouraged in his anti-war stances by the 
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support of France and Russia.   While there was discussion over the issues as 
Britain saw them, “Asad was more interested in supporting the Arab view and 
what he saw as a strong international consensus against war in Iraq”501.  
Therefore, he felt supported in standing up to the British and Americans 
 
Given the events taking place at the time it is unsurprising that, as Rime Allaf 
writes, Syria was unable to make the time as a non-permanent member of the 
UNSC pay off.502  At the best of times it is difficult for non-permanent members 
to make progress on significant issues, particularly those in which the 
permanent members have a stake.  With the UN facing the challenges which 
began with the September 11th terrorist attacks, Syria faced impossible odds in 
advancing its own priorities in the Council, such as the peace process, economic 
priorities, or even, warmer relations with US or any key power.  This was 
illustrated succinctly after the Israeli an airstrike on Syrian territory at the time, 
when the regime failed to garner enough support in the UN to even discuss a 
draft resolution condemning it.503 
 
In period leading up to the invasion of Iraq, Bashar made a number of what 
were considered incendiary statements as to the futility of taking that course of 
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action.  Allaf writes that the Asad regime did not “adequately read US political 
developments from 2000” and should have taken the fact that Syrian aid in 
terms of intelligence and renditions did not significantly raise support for the 
regime within American circles.504  On the eve of the invasion Bashar further 
angered Washington saying, “No doubt the U.S. is a super-power capable of 
conquering a relatively small country, but... the U.S. and Britain are incapable 
of controlling all of Iraq.”505 
 
Despite increasing alignment with American policy over Iraq, Britain held to its 
original hopes for the new Asad regime a lot longer than Washington506.  As 
stated previously the Asad regime could be accused of the same ‘crimes’ as 
Iraq, in fact, at the time the regime in Syria actually supported groups that both 
Britain and the US have listed as terrorist groups, unlike Iraq.507  The British 
attitude can be put down to the difference in how the leadership in Syria were 
viewed as opposed to other rogue regimes.  Henry Hogger, UK Ambassador to 
Syria 2000 -2003, attributes UK policy toward Syria to the fact that although 
there was an authoritarian regime in Syria at the time, Bashar showed signs of 
opening up and unlike with Hussein and Qaddafi, in Syria there seemed to be 
more collective leadership.  Peter Ford echoes this saying that for all its 
brutality the regime was nowhere near as brutal as the regime of Saddam 
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Hussein, the atmosphere in Damascus was welcoming and courteous and, 
lastly, notes the fact that Syria was a militantly secular state also played into 
the decision. 
 
In the lead up and initial few months of the war, the strength of anti-Syrian 
feeling emanating from the US administration was an issue for Britain.  The 
British government initially held a different outlook when it came to relations 
with Syria, consistently making statements to the effect that Syria was not 
“next on the list.”  Both Blair and Straw insisted that there were no plans to 
invade Syria, and that Britain would not support military intervention there, 
making statements to the Commons in March and April 2003 to that effect.  
During a visit to Kuwait in April 2003 Straw stated categorically, “There is not a 
list.  Syria is not on the list.  But Syria has a responsibility to recognise the new 
reality and come into the fold.  There are important questions that Syria needs 
to answer”.508  Likewise, Blair criticised the Syrians for “support for terrorism… 
and for not being a signatory to the chemical weapons convention”.509  Still, 
whilst clear that the Syrian regime needed to make some changes, the British 
kept to the view that the Syrian regime could be reasoned with, and the tool for 
that was diplomacy. 
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Bashar meanwhile continued his verbal attack on the Anglo-American action, 
being the first Arab state, aside from Iraq, to predict their defeat.510  After a 
stray US missile resulted in the deaths of five Syrians, Syria called for an 
emergency meeting of the UNSC, demanding an immediate ceasefire and 
withdrawal of US and British forces.511  While Britain maintained a dialogue with 
Syria for a time, it was not long before there “was quite a falling out”.512  Peter 
Ford puts it more strongly saying that there was a point, at the start of his term 
in Syria in 2003, when the British Ambassador had the best access to the 
regime in Damascus, of all the Western states, but that this was a wasted 
opportunity.  Britain was seen as the best friend of Syria in Europe by the 
Syrian government, which also thought that Britain had the ear of Washington.  
This was useful as they wanted Britain to use its influence to convince the US to 
take Syria off the list of terrorist states, and to advise Washington to cut 
Damascus some slack.  “Above all they wanted to get the Americans off their 
back and stop talking about regime change”.  Instead, the British government 
had let itself get into a situation in which it did not have much scope to pursue 
a separate policy while they were jointly occupying Iraq with America, even had 
it wanted to.  Had Britain not done so much damage to relations with her 
European partners on the run up to the war, it may have been possible to 
convince the EU to engage in a support role to the reconstruction of Iraq and 
provided a distinctly different path from the American led path, instead the 
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Europeans “washed their hands” 513 of the situation.  Rather than being a bridge 
between America and Europe, Blair had firmly stood with the US over Iraq and 
in doing so, significantly damaged Britain’s relationship with the EU.   
 
For Syria, if its foreign policy environment in advance of the Iraq war had been 
challenging then the initial success of the operation was unnerving.  The 
behaviour of the Syrian regime can be seen as a reaction to US troops on the 
doorstep and a hostile US administration in office in Washington.  A report to 
Congress noted that “Syria has walked a fine line between constructive and 
obstructionist policies in Iraq”.514  Indeed, during the period of the Iraq conflict, 
Britain (alongside the US and some other European countries) accused the Asad 
regime of a number of offences.  These included allowing jihadist fighters to 
cross into Iraq, harbouring members of the old Iraqi Ba’thist regime, supporting 
terrorism both in terms of allowing known terrorist groups to house their 
headquarters in Damascus, and in training and arming some groups, of unduly 
interfering in Lebanese affairs and in not seriously entering into a conversation 
with Israel.   
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No doubt these accusations had some merit.  The regime had indeed opposed 
the invasion and there were foreign fighters crossing its border into Iraq.  In 
this its behaviour was very calibrated in response, trying to let just enough 
fighter cross the border to make a difference but holding enough back to show 
it could be potentially useful in stopping the fighters.515  At the same time the 
British Embassy in Damascus felt the line London had taken on this was 
unrealistic, the Syrian border with Iraq was 400 miles long and it was a big task 
for them to completely prevent jihadists crossing it.  Henry Hogger suggests 
that the Syrian’s could have been supported in the endeavour by the supply of 
an electronic border monitoring system if the British government had seriously 
wanted action, while in the event London even refused to supply night vision 
goggles when the Syrian’s brought it up for discussion.516 
 
The demands for Syria to reform it behaviour and become a responsible 
member of the international community coming from London, showed little 
consideration for what were very real concerns for the Syrian regime.  Ford 
states he “often went to bat for the regime but it was a lost cause as there was 
no sensitivity in London for their concerns”517.  The allegations that the Syrians 
had chemical weapons, and demand that they give them up, failed to take into 
account that the Syrian reason for having them was in maintaining some sort of 
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strategic parity with Israel.  It was inconceivable that Asad would strike first 
with chemical weapons when Israel would “immediately go for nuclear 
retaliation”.518  Yet Blair’s government insisted in viewing them as a threat to 
regional security.  The same was true of Syrian support for the various 
Palestinian liberation groups headquartered in Damascus.  The Blair 
government only considered the militant groups in the context of the threat 
they supposedly posed to regional stability refusing to accept that without 
progress on the peace process the Syrian regime could not halt its support, as 
these were its tools in the negotiation process. 
 
The consequence of this intransigence in the US was the passing of the Syria 
Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act (SALSRA), 2004 by 
the US Congress.  Even in the US this was not greeted with universal support.  
Officials who supported the measure believed the way to get change in Syria 
was by “pressuring from within and isolating it internationally”.519  Others 
argued that the Syrians needed to be engaged with and that the act created a 
“new collections of sticks with which to beat Damascus” but “few carrots to 
encourage continued cooperation by Syrian in the fight against al Qaeda”.520  In 
fact the Bush administration held out against pressure to pass SALSRA for two 
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years, attempting to avoid limiting diplomatic options.  Only as the security 
situation on the ground in Iraq got worse, and with the suspension of 
intelligence sharing on al-Qaeda, did the administration drop its objections to 
it.521   The effects of the Act were limited, US economic relations with Syria 
were already small, the main effect war creating more anti-American feeling in 
the country, though the Syrian Trade Minister admitted to some negative affect 
from sanctions.522  The Act also demonstrated the difficulties for Blair’s 
government which advocated influencing US policy in private – it was passed 
despite reluctance from number of members of Bush’s own administration, if 
they could not bring their influence to bear from within government, the chance 
of British influence coming to bear fruit seems low. 
 
Syria, Britain and the EU Association Agreement 
It was in the economic arena that the British government had a chance to forge 
a more constructive relationship with Syria alongside its European partners 
using the Euro-Mediterranean partnership and negotiations on the Association 
Agreement.  The economic relationship between Syria and the EU was much 
more significant than that between the US and Syria, thus the signing of an 
association agreement was a much greater incentive for the Syrian regime.  In 
2004, the same year the US imposed sanctions, the total EU assistance aid, 
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mainly technical assistance, institution-building and democracy promotion, 
reached €55m.  This provided an opportunity to pursue a different policy 
toward Syria, through the EU, and very much distinct from the one being 
pursued by the Bush administration which was still persisting in its policy of 
trying to economically isolate the regime.523   
 
The Association Agreement process began well before the War on Terror was 
even thought of.  The objectives behind the Agreements were, in fact, very 
much in keeping with New Labour’s own objectives.  The Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership was launched in Barcelona in 1995, with the aim to promote 
regional stability in a region now at its borders.  The EU’s Mediterranean policy 
has three main goals: 
 The creation of an area of peace and stability based on fundamental 
principles, including respect for human rights and democracy. 
 The creation of an area of shared prosperity through sustainable and 
balanced economic and social development, and especially the gradual 
establishment of free trade between the EU and its partners and among 
the partners themselves.  
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 The improvement of mutual understanding among the peoples of the 
region and the development of an active civil society.524 
The cornerstone of the EU’s policy was economic, setting up a free trade area 
with economic and financial cooperation, though signatories were also required 
to develop democracy and the judiciary within their political system, respect 
human rights and acknowledge the role civil society can make to the process.  
The process was not tied to the peace process but provided another forum 
through which parties could meet, establishing another avenue for dialogue.  
The implementation of this at a bilateral level had been established through the 
conclusion of EU Association Agreements with the individual MENA states.  
These went much further than the cooperation agreements they were replacing 
in that they included Human Rights clauses. What was especially problematic 
for Syria is that clauses on eliminating weapons of mass destruction were 
added in at a late date and would only apply to Syria, but not Israel. 
 
The importance of the Agreements as a tool in dealing with Syria was clear to 
many involved in British foreign policy making.  The Commons Foreign Affairs 
Committee Eighth Report of Session 2006-2007 stated that Syria played a 
significant role in key areas in the Middle East and that the EU Association 
Agreement with Syria “presents a powerful incentive for Asad to remedy his 
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country’s political behaviour”.525  Yet Syria remained the only member of the 
European-Mediterranean Partnership area that had not signed an Association 
Agreement with the EU.526   
 
Syria came late to the process and only reluctantly, starting negotiations in 
1997, pursuing them half-heartedly, a signal, according to the country strategy 
paper 2002 – 2006, that the regime had remained unconvinced about signing a 
final document.  Another explanation is that this was indicative of the power 
struggle within the regime between the old guard and the reformers within the 
regime. If, as Leverett suggests, Bashar pursued the Agreement in order 
overcome the objections to reform from the old guard and corrupt elements in 
his regime and increase the pace of reform, the negotiations have not rewarded 
him for that effort. 
 
The EU Association Agreement process was a potential tool through which 
Britain could have encouraged Syria to reform.  It could have provided a useful 
distinction to the American policy at the time.  As the EU announced the 
resumption of negotiations with Damascus in 2004, coinciding with the 
implementation of SALSRA in American “Chris Patten, the EU’s commissioner for 
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external relations, noted that, while the EU shared America’s policy goals for 
Syria, “we do not share the same tactical approach”.527 
 
Whilst seemingly supporting the EU Association Agreements made with the 
Mediterranean states, however, Britain has been particularly active in insisting 
on adding new requirements to them.  Together with Germany, the British were 
particularly vocal in demanding the human rights element be at the forefront of 
negotiations.  Furthermore, at the insistence of Germany, the Netherlands and 
Britain, the EU inserted a new standard clause to the Association Agreement, 
“the EU decided that partners in its association agreements must denounce 
weapons of mass destruction”.528  This was in line with the current British 
international priorities, but both the fact that there was no move to add this 
“standard clause” to existing agreements, and timing suggested that it was 
aimed entirely at the Syrian agreement.  Some point to Washington’s influence 
as behind Britain insistence on more stringent language on non-proliferation 
though Britain has rejected this assertion.529  For its part, in its departmental 
report 2004 - 2005 the FCO states that it pressed hard during 2004 in order to 
“ensure the principles on the 2003 European Security Strategy were reflected in 
the EU-Syria Association Agreement.” 530  This identified the proliferation of 
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WMD as one of five key threats, and placed emphasis on prevention, 
committing the EU “working through the UN and multilateral agreements” to 
combat this. 531 
 
Syrian complaints at double standards can hardly be dismissed.  The criteria of 
Syria’s agreement were much stronger on a number of measures than any 
other agreement, including those measures dealing with respect for democratic 
principles and fundamental human rights, WMDs, and cooperation on Counter-
Terrorism.532  As negotiations continued additional provisions were added such 
as cooperation with UNSCR 1559, the resolution calling for all foreign forces to 
withdraw from Lebanon and all militias in Lebanon to disband, and later for 
Syria’s cooperation in the Hariri tribunal.   The moving goalposts led the Syrians 
“to think that it’s a game and ask what the next condition will be.”533  The issue 
is broader than just Anglo-Syrian relations.  Britain used an existing EU process 
to exert pressure on a particular state, on behalf of the US, arguably 
undermining the EUs attempts at engagement with its neighbours.  Hardly in 
line with the policy of being a strong contributing member of the EU. 
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Accusations of hypocrisy have also been levelled.  Already having shown favour 
to Turkey over the Ilisu dam project, New Labour, had given considerable 
support to Turkey’s bid to join the EU.  On this matter Cook had stated “the 
question of rejection does not arise”, arguing then that it would be 
“inconceivable that Britain would invoke mere human rights atrocities to block 
Turkish entry.534  This also aligned with US policy on “supporting a relatively 
low democratic threshold for Turkish EU accession”535.  Similarly, the EU 
Association Agreement with Israel had been signed and ratified despite their 
ownership of WMD, and treatment of Palestinians.  Reacting pressure it faced 
over UNSCR 1559, the Syrian regime pointed that the UNSC was “totally 
ignoring 40 or its resolutions, adopted unanimously, and another 600 General 
Assembly resolutions, all calling for Israel to withdraw from the occupied Arab 
territories and establish a just and comprehensive peace in the region,”536 an 
accusation which could equally apply to the EU.  Furthermore, in those states 
where agreements had been signed, the EU has been reluctant to act on failure 
to implement the very clauses on which the Syria agreement was foundering, 
so there had been little punishment for states that have failed to implement the 
human rights measures to which they have agreed. 
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Despite these additional measures tagged onto the agreement, Syria still came 
very closed to signing the agreement.  Negotiations reached a conclusion in 
October 2004, when the European Commission and Syrian officials initialled the 
text, though by then a combination of Damascus’s growing dispute with the 
French over Lebanon, and EU Enlargement (10 new member states joined in 
2004) left whether the EU had the will or capacity to quickly approve the draft 
was now unclear.537  For Bashar the failure, despite Syrian negotiators making 
significant concessions, to get the agreement signed was a major blow.  It also 
left the impression on the Syrian side that concessions “only resulted in 
additional demands”538 discouraging any further movement on their side to 
accede to demands. 
 
Despite not having reached an Association Agreement with Syria, considerable 
EU resources were still put into the country.  A greater role for Britain in 
pushing the process forward would have been a logical way to bring some 
influence to bear on the behaviour of the Syrian regime, and make better use 
of the resources already being contributed.  British behaviour, however, acted 
more as a block to progress in this area.  Former Ambassador Ford, states that 
“what the Syrian regime wanted from us was for us to treat them as 
respectable partners”.  Asad was disappointed, frustrated by Britain’s block to 
the association agreement the failure only strengthening the hardliners in 
                                                          
537 F Leverett, Inheriting Syria, p85 
538 Dorstal, “The European Union and Economic Reform in Syria” p17 
326 
Asad’s regime.  Furthermore, Ford states, the reasons preventing the 
agreement going forward were purely political, one being the 2003 Iraq war, a 
war that the Syrian regime vocally opposed but the main reason, critical at the 
time, was the Hariri assassination, which would have made the signing of the 
agreement “embarrassing”.539   
 
Lebanon and the Hariri Assassination 
As relations with Syria faltered over the situation in Iraq, a new crisis erupted 
for Syria in Lebanon.  As a reward for its support of the coalition in the 1991 
Gulf War, Syria’s hegemony over Lebanon had been tacitly approved by the US, 
and its allies.540  The 2001 unilateral withdrawal of Israeli troops from South 
Lebanon combined with the perceived intransigent behaviour of the Asad 
regime had significantly changed how the regional situation was viewed by 
those same powers in 2004.  When Bashar moved to extend the term of 
President Lahoud for a further 3 years, the regime had failed to recognise the 
extent to which the international context had changed, or to anticipate the 
strength with which it would be condemned.  In particular, Bashar was said to 
be blindsided at the French leading the charge on UNSCR 1559 which called for 
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“all remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon" and "for the 
disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias."541 
   
Asad’s move to extend Lahoud’s presidency was aimed to contain the influence 
of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri who had returned to office in 2000.  Damascus 
feared that he would use his influence to undermine Syrian authority in 
Lebanon, and also that he was using his own channels with the West to bypass 
pro-Syrian ministers and officials.  Extending Lahoud’s presidency meant he 
could continue to block Hariri’s initiatives in government.  Bashar also continued 
to support Hizbullah’s growth on the political scene as another way to maintain 
control over Lebanon.542  The Syrian decision to impose its will in this way was 
immediately countered by the French and Americans.  They quickly drafted the 
UN resolution, gained British support for it, and got it passed by the UNSC, 
though in doing so they gave truth to Syrian suspicions of Hariri’s influence with 
Western leaders.  The clauses in UNSCR 1559 reflected the interests of both 
France and the US; the French interest in Lebanese sovereignty and 
democratisation as a way of increasing its historical influence on the country, 
the Americans’ interest in weakening Damascus.543  It also served the interests 
of Hariri in calling for a free and fair electoral process in Lebanon, and that 
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presidential elections adhered to constitutional rule with no outside 
interference, leading the Syrian regime firmly lead the blame for it at his feet.544 
 
Tensions in Lebanon continued to mount culminating, on February 15th 2005, in 
the assassination of Hariri leaving the international community shocked.  Syria 
was almost immediately assigned the blame though there was argument over 
whether or not, or to what extent, Bashar himself knew about the attack itself.  
Almost unanimously observers called the assassination a major miscalculation 
on the part of the regime.  Equally, they concluded, that the Asad regime would 
not survive the fallout from Hariri’s assassination.  Huge demonstrations were 
held in Lebanon, people demanding Syria get out of Lebanese affairs.  Britain 
backed France and the US in demanding Syrian adhere to the terms of UNSCR 
1559.  There was a freeze on Ministerial visits, Britain agreeing “an 
‘understanding that no ministerial visits to Syria were to be carried out.”545  By 
April Syrian troops were out of Lebanon, a loss many felt the Asad regime could 
not withstand. 
 
Whilst not leading the charge, Ford says that Britain “got caught up in the 
hounding exercise led by France and the US”.  Once again, in Ford’s opinion, 
London closed its eyes to why the Asad regime felt threatened by Hariri, 
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refusing to consider the concerns they had, such as, the concern that a number 
of those in Lebanon’s government were on Hariri’s payroll.  Also ignored was 
the disquiet even among some supporters of UNSCR 1559 over the clause 
dealing with the disbanding of militias.  Some saw this as a pro-Israeli move, 
others viewed as a barrier in building national support against Syria and 
Lahoud,546 viewing the clause as short-sighted.  Even within Lebanon, there 
was uneasiness at what was seen as further foreign meddling in Lebanese 
affairs.  None of this was reflected in London’s position, Straw naming Syria as 
the prime suspect behind the Hariri assassination as early as 25th February 
2005 with no evidence at all to back up the claim.547 
 
Even as they acquiesced in the demand for the withdrawal of troops from 
Lebanon, the Syrian influence over events there did not disappear, it “merely 
opened a new page of meddling in Lebanon.”548  Syrian troops may have 
withdrawn but the Syrian intelligence apparatus and Hizbullah remained.  
Additionally, Bashar refused demands that his regime cooperates with a special 
tribunal set up to investigate Hariri’s death using Syria’s influence through 
Hizbullah to delay proceedings in every way possible.    
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The Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, while an embarrassment for Bashar, and 
most certainly a consequence of a failure to adapt to the changes in the 
international system, was not the fatal blow to the Asad regime that the West, 
including Britain, may have hoped for.  Despite not having a physical presence 
in Lebanon, Syria’s political allies including Hizbullah were still able to 
significantly delay a tribunal into Hariri’s assassination and also block the 
formation of an effective government in Lebanon.  Carsten Wieland argues that 
the necessity of withdrawing troops after the Hariri incident could have actually 
have helped the Asad regime in that, before this, it would have been hard for 
him to secure a complete withdrawal in the face of opposition from hardliners, 
“Only this unexpected turn of events made it possible and set free military and 
financial resources that were basically needed at home.”549  Given the state of 
the Syrian economy this argument might have some merit though it overlooks 
the political costs of the episode.  Still, the withdrawal of troops certainly did 
not harm the Asad regime to the extent that some had predicted. 
 
Western pressure in this arena failed to take into account of all factors and 
relationships in the region.  This is a failure that has dominated British foreign 
policy in its relationship with Syria, in which it has either failed to consider the 
wider ramifications of a particular policy (such as how its Iraq policy would 
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affect Syria as a neighbouring country either in terms of a potential refugee 
problem, or the threat the policy posed politically), or makes demands of the 
Syrian regime without considering whether the Syrian regime hold legitimate or 
relevant concerns simply because the regime itself is autocratic (such as 
demands to expel “terrorist” organisations from Damascus).  As a consequence 
of its Lebanon policy, one of the relationships Britain had been seeking to 
disrupt, that is, Syrian sponsorship of Hizbullah, in fact grew stronger.  
Hizbullah became more vital to Syria as a conduit for exerting pressure in 
Lebanon and a front for its struggle against Israel.  Rather than convincing 
Syria to tone down its support to this group, the link has been strengthened.   
 
This failure was evident as fresh violence erupted in Lebanon in July 2006. As is 
often the case the situation on the ground changed faster than any action by 
the UN.  The Israel-Lebanon war of July-August 2006 provided Asad with a 
lifeline, once again making him the “champion of the Arab street and far 
beyond” 550 as Hizbullah emerged the victor of that crisis, with Syria reflected in 
the glow.  Blair, on the other hand, was roundly criticised for his failure to call 
for an immediate ceasefire after the outbreak of hostilities.  In his speech 
calling for “complete renaissance” on foreign policy he justified his position, 
stating that the loss of civilian life there was terrible, but asking that the losses 
suffered by Israel also be considered in Gaza and from Hizbullah and that “Just 
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to complete the picture, Israel's main neighbour along its eastern flank is Syria 
who supports Hizbullah and house the hardline leaders of Hamas.”551  Once 
again Blair failed to show any understanding of regional issues, speaking in 
black and white terms of this incident and following Israeli reaction. 
 
Blair’s stated rational for not calling for a ceasefire was that it was unfair to call 
for “unilateral cessation” of hostilities, saying that a more comprehensive peace 
plan needed to be in place552.  This failed to recognise the disproportionate 
reaction of the Israelis who targeted not just Hizbullah in the South, but 
Lebanese state infrastructure and consequently civilians.  It provided further 
example of British foreign policy being identified too closely with the that of the 
Bush administration, as the US and UK moved to block a call for an immediate 
ceasefire by European and Arab countries in the Rome Summit toward the end 
of July 2006.553  This policy was also seen as being too pro-Israeli, damaging 
further British credibility and therefore influence in the region, and being out of 
step with general public opinion in Britain. 554  
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Finally, it was also out of step with the opinions held by most in the FCO, one 
official saying the Foreign Office “had repeatedly urged Israel to act 
proportionately, to conform with international laws and to avoid the appalling 
civilian deaths and suffering”555 indicating, at the very least, a rift in the 
relationship between No 10 and the FCO, and that No 10 had taken a firm lead 
in the policy being pursued in the region. 
 
The Asad regime, conversely, benefitted through its continued support of 
Hizbullah and from the added influence it gained from a strong Hizbullah in 
Lebanon.  Lebanon was and is crucial to Syria strategically, economically and 
culturally.  Trade with Lebanon, both legal commerce and illegal smuggling, 
contributed significantly to the closed Syrian economy, so without any feasible 
alternative the Syrian regime used any means it could to maintain an influence 
in Lebanon politically.556  The regime itself felt it had been justified in the 
position it had taken, that it had been “proved right about regional issues, 
regardless of its own involvement (alleged or proven) in them”. 557  It had been 
correct with its warnings over the disintegration of Iraq, its concerns over the 
threat Israel posed to Lebanon (borne out in its July 2006 campaign), and in its 
opinion that negotiation on the Palestinian solution had to be all inclusive.  Ford 
echoes this thought in pointing out that the July 2006 Hizbullah – Israel war 
                                                          
555 P Wintour, E MacAskill “Downing Street and Foreign Office at odds on Lebanon” The 
Guardian, (21July 2006) 
556 Wieland “Syria’s challenges after the election year” p234 
557 Allaf, “Open for Business” p3 
334 
was a direct consequence of the Syrians pulling out of South Lebanon, 
something which a number of people at the time predicted. 
 
As the crisis in Lebanon continued and no end in sight to the violence in Iraq 
and with the consequent toll that was taking on British servicemen and women, 
the British government began to revert back to its argument that Syria had a 
key role to play in the region generally and specifically with regard to a solution 
in Iraq.  October 2006 saw Blair send Sir Nigel Sheinwald to Damascus, his 
spokesman saying, “We all know that Syria is part of the reality on the ground 
in the Middle East and therefore it can play either a constructive or destructive 
role ... We obviously would hope that it will play a constructive role.  But in the 
end, the Syrian government will decide what it believes is in Syria's best 
interests.”558  The costs of not speaking to Syria were too high. 
 
Talks again centred on concerns over support for Hizbullah, and hopes to 
dissuade Syria from helping Hizbullah to rearm, on seeking Syrian support in 
preventing Jihadis crossing into Iraq, and on a potential breakthrough in the 
MEPP.  The latter hoped to build on Bashar’s recent called for new talks on the 
Golan Heights.  The decision to reopen the dialogue found support in the British 
establishment, a report of the FAC concluded the decision to send Sheinwald 
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was the correct one, and recommended the Government resumed ministerial 
contacts without delay (suspended after Hariri), and that the Government 
continue to support the EU’s engagement with Syria.559 
 
Britain returned to its previous position that it was necessary to have a dialogue 
with Syria much sooner than the Bush administration.  Giving evidence to the 
Iraq Study Group, a bipartisan group appointed by the US Congress and chaired 
by James Baker and Lee Hamilton, Blair stated that he supported the view that 
both Syria and Iran needed to be engaged in the reconstruction of Iraq.  
However, the US remained sceptical of British efforts to engage with Syria and 
the Bush administration deciding not to take on board the recommendations of 
the study group. 
 
Blair’s resignation from office came in June 2007.  The establishment of Gordon 
Brown’s premiership was an opportunity for a realignment of British foreign 
policy, distancing itself from the overly US-centric policies of the previous six 
years.  Brown still viewed the “special relationship” as an important part of 
British foreign policy but he did not have the same baggage as Blair.  The main 
focus for Brown was the necessity of a British withdrawal from Iraq, and the 
necessity for engaging with Syria in order to do this was clear. 
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On a visit to Syria on 18th November 2008 Foreign Secretary David Miliband 
stated: 
“Syria has a big potential role to play in stability in the Middle East.  It can 
be a force for stability or it can be a force for instability… I've been talking 
with the Syrian foreign minister about her responsibilities, Syria's 
responsibilities in the region, in respect of counter-terrorism, in respect of 
Iraq, in respect of the Middle East peace process, and we've got the chance 
now to take those discussions further forward. 560 
 
In the final years of the decade there were signs of a better relationship for 
Britain with Syria, particularly as Israel and Syria announced they had begun 
indirect talks to reach a comprehensive peace.  There were signs of a Syrian 
rapprochement with France, with President Nicolas Sarkozy meeting Bashar 
before the founding summit of the Mediterranean Union as a reward for the 
constructive role he had played in the May Doha agreement which ensured the 
establishment of a stable government in Lebanon.561  With the Bush 
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administration on the way out in the US, the British had more scope to work 
with France to bring Syria in from the cold.562   
 
Throughout 2007 the Anglo-Syrian relationship had warmed as a consequence 
of Syrian aid in securing the release of 15 Royal Navy Sailors, captured by Iran 
in March, and as Syria helped in facilitating UK efforts to secure the release of 
Alan Johnston, BBC Gaza correspondent.563  France reopening the doors to the 
EU and Miliband’s visit re-establishing intelligence links with Syria and Syrian 
cooperation in clamping down on Islamic militants crossing its borders564 built 
on this.  This reengagement was not, however, a consequence of successful 
British policy bringing about a big change in Syrian behaviour; Syria remained a 
dictatorship, remained a supporter of Palestinian militant groups, and remained 
a close ally of Iran.  The British government had returned to the pragmatic 
viewpoint that to achieve its objectives in the region, Syria was key and one 
had to secure its cooperation by respecting its interests rather than insisting 
they be abandoned to fit preconceived Western blueprints for the region. 
 
 
                                                          
562 R Beeston, C Philip, O Angus “Britain re-establishes high-level intelligence links with Syria” 
The Times” (19 November 2008) 
563 Eighth Report “Global Security: The Middle East” Government Response p22 
564 H Macleod, “Syria to share intelligence on terrorism after Miliband visit” The Guardian (20 
November 2008) 
338 
Conclusion 
When the Blair government came to power in 1997, there was nothing to 
indicate there would be any significant change to Anglo-Syrian relations, despite 
stated priorities of promoting good governance and human rights, and 
commitment to an ethical dimension in foreign policy.  The stated intent of Blair 
that Britain would play a pivotal world role, and be a bridge between Europe 
and the US also had little impact, though it strong relationships with both might 
have placed Britain in a better position to hear Syrian concerns and use its 
influence on the behalf of the Syrian regime, as seems to have been the hope 
early in Bashar’s premiership.  It also could have potentially proved a boon to 
balance American support for Israel in peace negotiations if Britain, with 
Europe, could have represented Arab concerns in a similar fashion.  Interaction 
between Syria and Britain would simply depend on the matter at hand and what 
the interests involved, there did not seem to be any reason that this would 
significantly change.  What did change was the international context following 
the terrorist attacks in America in 2001. 
 
In a practical sense, many things following September 11th, 2001 remained the 
same.  For the US the Syrian state remained labelled a “rogue state”, for 
Britain, the Syrian regime was still autocratic, one which supported terrorist 
organisations, and one which was “of concern” due to human rights abuses for 
example.  What did change was the perception of the threat this kind of regime 
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posed to international stability and security.  The immediate impact of this was 
felt in Afghanistan and Iraq, but it also dictated policy toward Syria.  
 
In this context who and how British foreign policy was made did impact policy 
toward Syria, Blair’s dominance in the process led to almost unconditional 
support for the Bush administration which inevitably set it in conflict with Syrian 
interest.  Furthermore, his personal style, tendency to see things in black and 
white seemingly affected the ability of the British government to take a more 
nuanced approach reflecting Syrian concerns, as advocated by British officials in 
situ.  Furthermore, Blair’s support for the Iraq intervention put British troops on 
the ground in Iraq, with the much larger American presence there and 
American direction there, this left little room for manoeuvre with regard to 
relations with Syria, and did not pay off with any ability to influence America 
over US Syrian policy.  In fact, if anything, America used its influence with 
Britain to help block the EU signing of an Association Agreement with Syria, 
despite Syrian commitment to making the reforms required of it by the EU. 
 
This situation was echoed over Lebanon, where Britain was once again at odds 
with Syria and seen as too close to American policy there.  While France 
pursued a similar policy in terms of removing the Syrian influence from 
Lebanon, they had something to gain from doing so, unlike Britain.  
Furthermore, France, in keeping with the rest of Europe, demonstrated a more 
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balanced reaction to the 2006 war, calling for an immediate ceasefire and 
Israel’s action disproportionate, unlike Blair who followed the US line, while 
clearly some in the FCO supported the European position.   
 
In the longer term, the consequences of the Blair’s foreign policy agenda, 
particularly over Iraq, has been of much greater significance for Anglo-Syrian 
relations, and in a much more unforeseen way.  The decision by Blair to 
produce dossiers, highlighting the concerns the government held over Saddam’s 
regime, then the distrust created by those of dossiers proving to contain bad 
information, and which never contained the provisos necessary to explain to the 
uninformed the nature of intelligence information, has made the task of 
convincing Parliament or the public of the case for war challenging.  This is 
something which had severe repercussions for David Cameron when he tried to 
convince Parliament of the case for intervention in the Syrian civil war.  The 
precedent of going to Parliament to vote on whether or not to go to war was 
set by the Blair government in the run up to Iraq.  Once this vote was called it 
made it almost impossible to see a time when a British government could go to 
war without a Parliamentary vote even though there is no legal or constitutional 
requirement for this in Britain at the moment.  This has raised the bar for any 
government trying to get approval for intervention and has had direct 
consequences for British policy toward Syria.   
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In a similar way, the intervention in Iraq which left that country in disarray, and 
saw numerous British casualties, and the fact that most of Blair’s interventions 
have been in Muslim countries has left a legacy for British foreign policy.  It has 
had an impact internationally, as even the US with its overwhelming military 
force has not been able to “solve” the problem of the Middle East, leaving the 
world’s last remaining superpower feeling vulnerable and less inclined to 
commit military resources to Middle East or European security issues.  The 
perception has grown of a world that is much less stable that it had felt at the 
end of the Cold War, and that British action in Iraq made Britain less safe and 
less secure, more susceptible to terrorism, and has even encouraged home 
grown terrorism.  This has held considerable implications for Anglo-Syrian 
relations as the Arab Spring developed into the Syrian crisis then Syrian Civil 
war.  
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Chapter 5 
The Arab Spring and the Syrian crisis 
The terrorist attacks on the US, the war on terror and following terrorist attacks 
in Europe, had changed the perceptions of the international system for many 
Western powers.  The world was now seen as less secure and less safe by 
many, with the perception of increased threats from terrorism and instability in 
regions such as the Middle East.  As the perception of the threat had grown, 
however, the misadventures in Afghanistan and Iraq had demonstrated that 
military power alone was not enough to solve the problem.  At the same time, 
the experience of those campaigns had shown the vulnerability of the US, with 
the worlds remaining, arguably declining, superpower now more reluctant to 
get involved in issues which had no direct impact on US interests. 
 
The Arab Spring occurred, then, can be seen in this context, when several 
Western powers were re-evaluating their interests and responses to 
international threats.  Broadly supportive of the peaceful uprisings, the 
response was not universal to each uprising and could be seen to be reflective 
of traditional ties and economic interests in the region.  There were also the 
security implications of supporting uprisings against regimes that were 
providing aid to American and Europe in countering the terrorist threat and 
sharing intelligence with them.   
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The British reaction to the uprising was mixed echoing the reactions of her 
European and American allies.  The Arab Spring brought British Middle East 
policy under the spotlight once again, highlighting her traditional ties to regimes 
with poor human rights records, and particularly Britain’s history of arms sales 
to the region.  This had an impact on Britain’s response to events in the Middle 
East, resulting in a confused and inconsistent policy that affected her ability to 
effectively deal with the regions uprisings.  In addition, the legacy of Britain’s 
intervention in Iraq, and Britain’s decision to take part in the joint action with 
France in the Libyan uprising, significantly impacted on Britain’s decision 
making over the Syrian crisis, limiting her policy options which had considerable 
consequences for the efficacy of the moderate rebels in the uprising against the 
Asad regime. 
 
The events of the Arab Spring took the British Government by surprise, though 
in this they were not alone.  The government was accused of being slow in 
responding to events on the ground, leading to further criticism of British 
foreign policy, and particularly the FCO.  A report by the FAC accepted that 
Britain was not alone in this.  Whilst publically welcoming the demand for 
greater freedoms, and democratic rights in the region, British policy reacting to 
the crisis echoed its existing and traditional ties to various regimes in the Middle 
East; its arguably passive, supportive reaction to the uprisings in Tunisia and 
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Egypt welcoming the change of regimes, differed from its failure to support the 
uprising in Bahrain; its decisive and aggressive support of the Libyan rebels 
contrasted with its policy of only non-military support for the moderate factions 
in Syria. 
 
The reaction to the crisis in Syria was, for many, underwhelming, and saw little 
real action in comparison to the military intervention in Libya.  Whilst other 
leaders in the region had quickly tumbled before the demands for change, the 
same was not expected in Syria.  As the Arab Spring spread across the region, 
the initial assumption by commentators, and the Syrian regime, was that the 
popular uprising in Syria would not become a violent rebellion.  There were 
several factors feeding this belief, including, Bashar’s personal popularity and 
that the Syrian leadership, despite being authoritarian, was “close to its 
people,”565 and that the regimes strong command over the military and security 
apparatus would discourage it.  When, in March 2011, largely peaceful protests 
were brutally put down by regime forces this assumption was challenged and 
public demands by Western politicians that the violence stop quickly followed.  
From here events escalated rapidly until the unrest became a civil war, (initially) 
in all but name. 
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Unlike the Libyan case, diplomats and politicians were comparatively divided in 
opinion over the right response to the crisis, unable to agree on a preferable 
outcome much less a policy that might achieve it.  Even the events of August 
21st 2013 with the alleged use of chemical weapons by the regime, though 
initially appearing to make military action inevitable as the Syrian regime had 
crossed US President Obama’s stated “red line”, failed to result in a united front 
either within the international community or with the British political 
establishment.   
 
A Short Rapprochement 
In the years preceding the outbreak of violence in Syria Bashar’s regime had 
begun to regain some international ground.  The regime had suffered in the 
fallout from the invasion of Iraq when it was accused of hindering attempts to 
stabilise Iraq; its ill-advised bungling in Lebanon, had led to international 
condemnation and UNSCR 1559.  It sunk deeper into the mire with the 
assassination of Rafik Hariri with the consequent humiliating withdrawal from 
Lebanon and the following UN special investigation.  At that time many had 
projected the collapse of the regime, with Asad too weak to withstand the 
pressure.   
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Despite predictions on the limited longevity of the regime, Asad did, however, 
manage to ride out the storm.  By 2009, Western officials could be said to have 
been almost falling over themselves to gain an audience with Bashar and his 
foreign minister, the British government being no different from its partners in 
this regard.  Once again, the geopolitical importance of Syria, combined with 
the resilience of the regime, had led Western governments to the conclusion 
that the only way forward for the region was to persuade the Asad regime to be 
a positive influence.  Hizbullah aided Syria in demonstrating its potential 
constructive role in May 2008 when it broke the Lebanese deadlock leading to 
the Doha agreement and formation of a national unity government.566  In this 
way Syria maintained its influence and showed the world it would not be 
sidelined.  Thus, when FCO official, Bill Rammell, visited in April 2009 the 
familiar topics of improving intelligence cooperation, encouraging a constructive 
relationship with the Iraqi government, of Syria using its influence with Hamas 
and Hizbullah, and using its influence with Iran,567 were all back on the agenda.     
 
Even the vaunted EU-Mediterranean Association Agreement, put on hold in 
2004 due to the concerns of some of the EU member states, including Britain, 
was again being negotiated in 2009.  This time, though, it was the Syrians 
calling the shots, requiring time to review the revisions to the agreement.  This 
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despite the fact that British and Dutch demands for special provision regarding 
human rights and weapons of mass destruction had been defeated and the 
revised version used language now standard in all Agreements568 .   
 
Some accuse the Asad regime manipulating the West’s interest in Syria without 
committing to demands for good behaviour, but economically there was good 
reason to at least review the agreement.  The Syrian economy at this point was 
beginning to see some dividends from reforms brought in by the regime.  
Further liberalisation of the economy, particularly cuts in state subsidies for 
basic goods, deemed absolutely necessary by bodies like the IMF, ignored the 
affect this would have on the average Syrian household income.569  Further, 
Free Trade Agreements were negotiated with Egypt and Tunisia despite the 
findings of a 2007 EU impact assessment.  That report estimated the 
requirements of the agreements would result in a shrinkage in the 
manufacturing sectors in both countries of around two thirds and a loss of 1.5 
million and 100000 jobs respectively.570  These kind of losses would potentially 
destabilise the Syrian regime.  Additionally, a number of members of the regime 
were substantially benefitting from the widespread corruption of the current, 
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partially reformed, economic model, and would potentially stand to lose from 
the signing the agreement with the EU.   
 
With the advent of the new coalition government in Britain relations with Syria, 
and the Middle East in general, looked to carry on in much the same way as 
they had in the preceding years.  David Cameron, campaigned on a domestic 
agenda with limited foreign policy interest at most, some would say no foreign 
policy at all.  Andrew Rawnsley, writing for the Observer, summed up 
Cameron’s policy as 1. Concentrate on domestic affairs, 2. Get out of 
Afghanistan, 3. Hope Europe does not provoke backbenchers, 4. Maintain the 
aid budget 5. Sell more stuff abroad, 6. Concentrate on domestic affairs.571  
This was the agenda, the Arab Spring was something completely unexpected 
and unplanned for. 
 
Nothing summed this up so much as the fact that, as the Arab Spring spread to 
Egypt and Cameron gave his speech which was a ringing endorsement to the 
protesters standing up for democracy, human right and freedoms, he did so 
from Saudi Arabia.  Saudi Arabia an absolute monarchy, criticised for its human 
rights record and lack of freedoms, but which Cameron was visiting, 
accompanied by various businessmen, with the express intent on getting more 
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business for the British defence industry.572  This trade mission to the region in 
February 2011 saw the Prime Minister together with the representatives of 
several arms manufacturers on the latest arms selling push by the British 
government.573   
 
Arms Exports 
The Arab Spring highlighted once more the conflicting aims of British policy in 
the region, urging peace whilst pushing arms sales to repressive regimes.  
Reportedly, “the defence industry supports over 300000 jobs across the whole 
country, and generates an estimated £35 billion per year to the British 
economy.”574  The rationale, then, for the government to maintain and expand 
this sector is clearly evident.  In April 2011 the Financial Times reported that in 
the previous two years, Britain exported military equipment to fifteen MENA 
states that could be used for the repression of civilians, although since January 
2011 160 export licences had been withdrawn.  Items sold since January 2009 
included components to military helicopters in Algeria, submachine guns and 
tear gas in Bahrain, machine guns to Egypt, grenades to Jordan, small arms 
                                                          
572 Ibid 
573 R Norton-Taylor, “Britain has allowed its weapons to be used for internal repression”, The 
Guardian (05 April 2011) 
574 Ibid 
350 
ammunition to Syria, hand grenades, sniper rifles and tear gas to Saudi Arabia 
and shotguns to Morocco.575    
 
These sales took place despite British arms export regulations brought in by 
Cook 1997, and the 1998 EU regulations he had championed.  In 2011, 
however, a cross-party committee of senior backbench MPs found that 
successive governments have been in breach of these official guidelines.576  
While a number of arms export licences to Tunisia, Egypt and Bahrain were 
revoked in the face of the popular unrest, the government approved the sale of 
£1 million worth of military equipment, including licenses for gun silencers, 
weapons sights and rifles, to Bahrain even after the violent crackdown on 
protesters.  The continuation of arm sales to known repressive regimes was 
scrutinised by Commons Committee on Arms Export Control whose Chairman 
criticised the government’s “over-optimistic approach to an authoritarian 
regime”.577  
 
In addition to arming these regimes, the British government had to defend its 
training programme for military officers from several of these countries.  From 
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2005 – 2010, three officers from the Syrian armed forces trained in Britain with 
a further two enrolled in Sandhurst and the Britannia Royal Navy college in 
2003.  In the same period 104 Bahraini officers, seven Libyan, three Tunisian 
and fifty-six Yemeni officers attended British military training colleges.  This 
pales in comparison to the support given to the Saudi national guard.  This 
included frequent courses on “weapons, field craft and general military skills 
training, as well as incident handling, bomb disposal, search, public order and 
sniper training” run by the MoD through its British Military Mission in Saudi 
Arabia.578  The government argued the training instils British values and 
morality into those attending the training,579 though in the light of the Saudi 
intervention in Bahrain, and later Yemen, where it has been accused of 
committing war crimes, this defence would seem hard to sustain.  It has 
certainly been queried in Parliament.  Jonathan Edwards, MP, stating “It is 
intensely hypocritical of our leadership in the UK...to talk of supporting 
freedoms in the Middle East and elsewhere while at the same time training 
crack troops of dictatorships”.580  More investment in bodies such as the British 
Council, the BBC World Service and, importantly, support for civil society as 
instruments of soft diplomacy have been advocated as a better use of 
resources.581    
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The sale of arms to countries with repressive governments undermines the 
argument that export licences will not be granted where they could be used for 
internal repression or external aggression.  As has been demonstrated in the 
Syrian uprising, if a regime is challenged and is determined to remain in power 
by any means possible, then whether the arms that have been sold are small 
arms ammunition, sniper rifles or fighter jets, the likelihood of their being used 
for internal repression is stronger than that of the regime in question abiding by 
previous commitments it made when purchasing them.   
 
The contradiction in British policy highlighted here can be explained as being a 
result of competing priorities and departments.  Whilst the British government 
was supportive of some of the uprisings - in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya - the 
government was remarkably quiet about the repression of protestors in 
Bahrain, and particularly the intervention of Saudi Arabia.  This lack of 
condemnation is in line with the behaviour of previous governments such as the 
Blair government’s decision to suspend the investigation into BAE systems 
relationship with the Saudi government, a decision, according to Blair, made on 
both security and economic grounds582.  It may also reflect the fact that, given 
the involvement of the Saudi National Guard in supporting the Bahraini 
government, the likelihood of British trained officers, or British equipment being 
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used in quelling the unrest cannot be refuted.  In fact, it is known that Saudi 
Arabia sent forces to help quell the unrest in British made trucks.583  A 
statement by the MoD shed further light on the rationale behind these 
decisions, as it called Saudi Arabia a “key partner in the fight against 
terrorism”.584  In terms of British foreign policy priorities, then, the maintenance 
of the British bilateral relationship with Saudi Arabia far outweighs the 
commitment to human rights and democratic values, while this commitment is 
used to justify British involvement in the affairs of other parts of the region 
where bilateral relations are not as strong—such as Syria. 
   
David Cameron has described British arms exports regulations as extremely 
robust, Britain having one of the “strictest regimes anywhere in the world for 
sales of defence equipment”585.  Despite this, British regulations have come 
under scrutiny over the sale of dual use substances to Syria.  Suspicions of 
Syrian chemical weapons production are longstanding yet, even with concerns 
that the regime would use these against elements of the population, in January 
2012 export licences were granted to a British company to sell potassium 
fluoride and sodium fluoride, known components in the making of the nerve 
agent sarin, to Syria.  The actual export was subsequently blocked by EU 
                                                          
583 Norton-Taylor, “Bahrain receives military equipment from UK despite violent crackdown” (14 
February 2012) 
584 Doward, Steward, “UK training Saudi forces used to crush Arab spring” (28 May 2011) 
585 N Morris “David Cameron defends Middle East visit insisting he WILL raise concerns about 
hosts' human rights records” The Independent (5 November 2012) 
354 
sanctions in July that year.  Vince Cable, Secretary of State for Business, 
Innovation and Skills defended the decision giving evidence to the Select 
Committee stating that “the licences were granted because at the time there 
were no grounds for refusal”.586  This at a time when the Syrian regime were 
already using brutal force against its own population in an attempt to put down 
the uprising. 
 
Scrutiny of the arms exports licensing regime in Britain falls to the Committee 
on Arms Export Controls (CAEC), comprising of members from the four 
Commons Select Committees with an interest in Britain’s arms exports: the 
Foreign Affairs, Defence, Business and Skills and International Development 
Committees.  The CAEC reviews the Governments annual and quarterly reports 
covering arms exports and, since 2011, has been highly critical of the 
government’s licensing regime, particularly over arms and military equipment 
exports to the MENA region and the failure to prevent sales to states known for 
human rights abuses.  The criticism led to a review of export licenses to the 
region and, in July 2011, the initial results were presented by Foreign Secretary 
William Hague who stated that there was no evidence of British equipment 
being used in suppressing Arab pro-democracy protests.587 
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In October that year Hague announced a number of new measures dealing with 
the monitoring of export licences, including a mechanism to enable immediate 
suspension of licensing to countries “experiencing a sharp deterioration in 
security or stability”.588  This, though, did not address the criticism of export 
licences to regimes which should not have been approved in the first place and 
added little to prevent this reoccurring.  The suspension of export licences after 
equipment had already reached its destination was criticised as too little too 
late, especially in cases where the misuse could be reasonably predicted.   
 
The reviews into government export license approvals and refusals which are 
carried out by the CAEC are, similarly, after the fact, and the power of the 
committee on the decisions taken is at best indirect.  Despite the CAEC’s role in 
examining the Government’s expenditure, administration and policy on strategic 
exports, the authority it has to question government ministers and officials, and 
even despite the government’s own commitment to transparency, the CAEC has 
so far failed to get a clear answer as to whether chemicals to Syria were 
actually shipped.  According to CAEC chairman at the time, Sir John Stanley, the 
committee also failed to get a clear answer as to why Saudi Arabia is treated 
differently than other states in the region.  Furthermore, the committee’s 
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criticism of the government is not necessarily censure of its behaviour in itself, 
rather about how open the government is about the reasoning behind policy.  
In a statement Sir John recognised the Government had “relevant and 
legitimate” reasons for the policy – based on intelligence sharing, oil, and 
British business interests – but “regret that so far the Government have been 
less than forthcoming—indeed, pretty much non-forthcoming—about the real 
reasons why they treat Saudi Arabia so differently”589 
 
The criticism was on the quality of the information being provided to the 
committee, a request for full disclosure, rather than of censure of the policy 
itself.  While the committee may provide a curb to some government behaviour, 
it has no direct power over policy decisions making, or power to hold the 
Government to account for any failings.  A former chair of FAC also reflected on 
the difficulty of the British relationship with Saudi Arabia, again not querying 
the importance of relations but rather on balancing priorities, “On one hand 
Saudi Arabia faces the threat of al-Qaida but on the other its human rights 
record is dreadful.  This is the constant dilemma you have when dealing with 
autocratic regimes: do you ignore them or try to improve them?”590  The idea of 
constructive dialogue with autocratic regimes has been reflected in previous 
policies towards Syria, the difference with the Saudi Arabian case is that the 
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economic and security implications are of a much higher priority for Britain.  
The criticism above considered the difficulties in dealing with Saudi Arabia, but 
at best called for the government be up front on their reasoning or review the 
relationship in terms of balance, the idea that the relationship continue itself 
being largely supported. 
 
Successive British governments have made commitments to regulating the arms 
trade through its own export control legislation and to the EU’s Code of 
Conduct.  Most recently this has been expressed in its ardent support for, and 
signing of, the Arms Trade Treaty on 3 June 2013.  Yet it continues to sell arms 
to repressive regimes, undermining the British stated position.  The government 
is aware of the contradiction which exists but balances the question of human 
rights against that of security of its interests, with the latter often prioritised.   
 
The Arab Spring resulted in a number of export licences being revoked, short 
term, but the overall policy did not change.  This was demonstrated by 
Cameron’s trip to the United Arab Emirates in November 2012, when a joint 
statement was issued announcing the establishment of a “defence industrial 
partnership”.  Cameron then travelled to Saudi Arabia holding discussions with 
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King Abdullah and Crown Prince Salman on potential arms sales.591  2014 saw 
the announcement that Britain was to establish a new naval base at Mina 
Salman Port in Bahrain, with construction beginning in 2015.  This further 
demonstrates British prioritisation of its economic and security interests in the 
Gulf over its concern for democratic and human rights there.   
 
In the short term, these bilateral agreements strengthen British relations with 
states with which it has long standing interests, are economically important and 
allow Britain to project influence into the region.  Further, strong defence 
relationships with these states were being viewed in the context of regional 
instability caused by the upheaval in Syria and the threat from Iran592.  Long 
term, the contradictions of this position undermines policies promoting 
democratic values, human rights and freedoms that form part of an overarching 
British interest in promoting international stability and security, and it is 
damaging if these are seen to come secondary to other interests.  They further 
add to the perception within the region that Britain, and the West generally, 
continue to act as imperial powers thus bear some responsibility for the 
longevity of the autocratic regimes that have been suppressing freedoms in 
their countries.  In the current international context this is seen by many as 
                                                          
591 T Colman, UK Seeks to Strengthen Middle East Ties, International Policy Digest, (13 
November 2012) http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2012/11/13/uk-seeks-to-strengthen-
middle-east-ties/ (Accessed 19/11/2014) 
592 “Britain secures defence partnership with UAE” The Peninsula, (07 November 2012) 
http://thepeninsulaqatar.com/news/middle-east/213415/britain-secures-defence-partnership-
with-uae (Accessed 01/01/2015 
359 
adding to international instability and insecurity, encouraging terrorist attacks 
against European powers and fuelling the jihadist movement to and from the 
Middle East, a particular concern with regard to the Syrian civil war. 
 
Syria has never signed large arms contracts with British companies like some of 
the Gulf States.  The export licences that have been approved covering 
categories including small arms and machine guns (1998) and dual use items 
cleared for sale up to, and even, during a period in which the government has 
been involved in the violent repression of its citizens (2004 – 2012).  This has 
been counterproductive to Britain’s priorities for stability and security.  Whilst 
these sales are relatively minor they demonstrate conflicting priorities, where 
foreign policy comes up against economic priorities, and where economic 
priorities do not always consider fully the short and long term security 
implications, particularly problematic in such a turbulent region. 
 
Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect. 
The willingness of the international community, particularly Britain and France, 
to intervene in Libya and then Mali has been contrasted starkly with the inability 
of the international community to form a cohesive position allowing a united 
statement on Syria, let alone agree on military intervention in Syria.  In the 
former cases there was what seemed to be decisive, swift and unanimous will 
360 
to act, while the latter saw ineffective political wrangling resulting in little more 
than a frustrated stalemate and conspicuous inaction from any Western power. 
 
It is tempting to contrast the policy in terms of why Britain reacted differently 
to very similar events in two MENA countries.  This oversimplifies the decisions 
made by Britain, and indeed, Britain’s international partners.  For a start, the 
decision to intervene in Libya was not as straightforward as it may have 
seemed, and the success of the intervention continues to be disputed as the 
situation in Libya has deteriorated rapidly since Qadhafi was removed.  The 
problems faced by policy makers over how to support the uprisings in Libya and 
Syria have surface familiarity but in reality there were significant differences.  
British ministers have often called for a “whole Middle East policy” or a region 
wide approach but, in practice, British policy can hardly be said to demonstrate 
this, either in decisions made by different Whitehall departments, or in 
consistent application of policy across the different regimes in the region.  
British policy is very much a lattice work of bilateral relations and diplomacy 
based on mutual and national interest.  The differing responses to the individual 
uprisings across the region reflect this.  Here, Britain can indeed be said to 
“present an unpredictable face to the world”593, an accusation very close to that 
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which British diplomats and officials have been known to direct at the Syrian 
regime.   
 
The intervention in Libya was hailed, by some, as the first successful use of the 
UN Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle.  Certainly the main proponents of 
the intervention in Libya, Britain and France, took their draft resolution to the 
UNSC, gained support for it (not unanimously since five members of the council 
Brazil, Germany, India, China and Russia abstained from the vote) and with the 
legal backing from UNSCR 1973 staged a military intervention in Libya using 
NATO forces, resulting in the Qadhafi regime being overthrown.  The difficulty 
here is that this was not what the resolution authorised.  UNSCR 1973 legalised 
intervention in Libya under Chapter VII, called for an immediate ceasefire and 
end to violence, imposed a no fly zone and authorised “all necessary means” to 
protect civilians and civilian-populated areas though, significantly, it barred a 
“foreign occupation force”.  To enable it to pass, like many UN resolutions, the 
wording was kept deliberately vague but, as seen with Iraq, such ambiguity can 
lead to member states “interpreting” resolutions to their own satisfaction.  
Ultimately this does organisation no favours, particularly when Western states 
then use these resolutions to launch military action.  So it proved in the case of 
Libya, which in turn, held serious consequences for Syria and even for the 
future of the concept R2P itself, with some believing the principle now dead. 
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Whilst the Libyan example has been touted as a successful application R2P it is 
arguably not a genuine example of the principle.  Justin Morris, writing in 
International Affairs, 2012, argued that the R2P principle hardly factored in the 
UNSC when the Libya resolution was being discussed.  He notes that in the 
official record of deliberations over UNSCR 1973 there is little to support 
assertions that R2P played a major influence, only France and Colombia actually 
referred to the concept, and deliberation by Britain and US little referenced it 
being more concerned with other considerations and interests.594  
 
For the Libyan example to be considered an instance of the successful use of 
the R2P principle then it must fit certain criteria.  The principle sets out three 
specific responsibilities: 
1. The responsibility to prevent (this being the most important) 
2. The responsibility to react 
3. The responsibility to rebuild 
When considering military intervention four measures identified:  
1. Right intention 
2. Last resort 
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3. Proportional means 
4. Reasonable prospects 595 
Whilst Britain and France may have reached the outcome they sought from 
advocating military intervention through to carrying it out, they have been 
accused of failing to live up to these responsibilities.  This clouded opinion on 
the Libya intervention and consequently harmed the formulation of any united 
international reaction to events in Syria.  
 
It could be argued that the “responsibility to prevent” is a principle which the 
international community has already largely failed in by the time the UN is 
considering involvement in a crisis.  Many conflicts have moved to the acute 
phase before there is any momentum in the international community to get 
involved, especially internal conflicts where long standing notions of internal 
sovereignty still hold sway.  There still remains a responsibility to prevent 
further escalation but the failure to get involved in the initial stages of a conflict 
combined with the unwieldy nature of getting international agreement in a 
timely fashion, especially when there are other interests involved, makes this 
task more difficult.  In the case of a number of the states involved in the Arab 
Spring, for instance, the responsibility to prevent should have impacted on 
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decisions to sell arms to repressive regimes, or to prop up autocratic leaders in 
the name of preserving stability, or because security and intelligence 
cooperation was prioritised.  Rather than condemning Qadhafi’s behaviour in 
Libya, the years immediately prior to the uprisings saw British politicians 
working to improve relations with the dictator, renewing ties and increasing 
trade links, and the British government had approved arms exports to the 
regime widely known for its human right violations and repression.   
 
Yet even more contentious is the principle, the responsibility to react.  This 
does not necessarily dictate the use of military intervention, there are certainly 
other tools the international community should consider before military 
intervention including using diplomatic channels, mediation, and sanctions.  
Military intervention is just one of the tools, though for a military intervention to 
go ahead it must meet the four measures described above.  Judged against 
these measures the Libyan intervention has come under some criticism.   
 
UNSCR 1973 authorised use of force to impose a ceasefire and to protect the 
civilian population.  As the NATO bombardment of Libya continued many began 
to question the real reasons behind the intervention, as journalist Simon 
Jenkins put it “Britain is blatantly sponsoring one side in a tribal civil war, and 
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the mission has passed from civil protection to backing a territorial rebellion”596.  
This bombardment contrasted with the British position on Syria, Hague in that 
instance calling on Bashar to “do the right thing”, and in a statement to the 
Commons, called for the “violent repression to stop, for individuals to be held 
accountable for the violence, for President Asad to respond to the legitimate 
demands of his people”.597   
 
Whilst undoubtedly the intervention in Libya saved Benghazi, continued aerial 
bombardment in populated areas made it difficult to argue that the purpose 
was only to protect civilians – there is no such thing as a truly surgical strike.  
Use of aerial bombardment in built up areas adds to the argument that the 
allies failed to satisfy the third measure, proportionate means.  As, increasingly, 
it became clear that the goal of the operation was regime change, it 
undermined the “right intention” measure, providing ammunition to those 
arguing that the British and French true interests lie in Libyan oil and getting rid 
of Qadhafi, a leader they viewed in much the same light as Saddam Hussein.  
Additionally, since the goal of regime change was not mandated by the UNSCR 
but was clearly an aim of the allies, the legality of the whole operation was 
open to question.  What certainly did bring legality into question, being a clear 
breach of the arms embargo imposed by the resolution, was the admission by 
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NATO Secretary General Rasmussen on 5th September 2011 that he knew 
France had supplied arms to the rebels.598  
 
The Russians also argued that once the allies embarked on their military 
campaign, they failed to take any of the opportunities to bring to an end the 
bombing and resume diplomatic options because they were intent on regime 
change.  Another criticism was that not enough consideration of other means 
was deployed, such as the provision of purely humanitarian aid, and that the 
military option should never have been agreed.599  Thus the second measure, 
military action as a last resort, was brought under scrutiny.   
 
Lastly it is questionable whether the idea of reasonable prospects was ever 
really tackled.  On the basis of what the UNSCR authorised, NATO forces 
arguably had the capacity to accomplish the mission, establish no fly zones and 
protect civilians.  Yet clearly the intent was regime change, presumably the end 
aim was the installation of a moderate, friendly democratic government 
bringing stability to Libya.  Here there was less evidence the operation had 
“reasonable prospects”.  Much like Iraq, while the removal of the old regime 
was achieved, the killing and fighting continued.  The country was plunged back 
into crisis, with oil production almost entirely stopped and the government 
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losing much of the country to militias.  Damningly, not only has NATO action 
failed to stabilise Libya, but it has failed to prevent instability spreading with 
Mali’s descent into chaos plainly linked to the Libyan conflict.  The decision to 
launch a military campaign also had implications on a practical level for any 
similar intervention in Syria, as even had there been the will, the capacity of the 
allies to do so was severely reduced by the Libyan campaign. 
 
The responsibility to rebuild is often overlooked by those planning intervention.  
Blair did at least attempt to discuss this with regard to Afghanistan and Iraq, 
but the Bush administration did not want to listen – that fact did not prevent 
Blair joining the war effort.  As exemplified in Iraq, Afghanistan, and most 
recently Libya, rebuilding is no small undertaking but is vital for the long term 
success of intervention.  In fact, the immediate success of military intervention 
has been undermined by the political failure to effectively support the rebuilding 
process.  In Iraq, failure to plan for rebuilding in advance led to the immediate 
dismantling of the security forces, a major contributing factor to the ensuing 
violence after Saddam’s removal from power.  In Libya the lack of forward 
planning contributed to the displacement of the transitional government, with 
the tribal militias all but taking complete control of the country and its oil 
resources.  Even if the intervening powers spend time planning for 
reconstruction after regime change, their plans may be rejected by the newly 
installed, legitimate, government adding further complexity to discussions of 
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intervention.  This is particularly an issue in countries in which the stability of 
the newly installed government may be undermined if it is seen to take support 
from former imperial powers.  Such deliberations form the discussion on Syria, 
where the additional fear of the “wrong” group gaining the advantage in a new 
government has also caused concern. 
 
The NATO operation in Libya exposed additional weaknesses for Britain.  
Despite the Americans deliberately taking a back seat, avoiding being 
associated with another war with an oil rich Muslim country (something perhaps 
the British should have considered), without the logistical support from the US 
the operation would never have got off the ground.  Indeed, without the 
Americans the aerial bombardment would have ceased long before it actually 
did since the Europeans ran through their missile stockpile and had to buy more 
from the US.  This appears to validate Blair’s realisation after the Kosovo 
campaign that in order to carry out military operations of this sort the US must 
remain engaged.  It also means Britain will not act in Syria without America as 
an ally, as the Europeans did not have the capacity to carry out the kind of 
operation that would have been needed in Syria at that point.   
 
Even had the Libyan intervention lived up to all the expectations of R2P, one of 
the fundamental questions remained unresolved, i.e. when to apply the 
principle.  In the case of Libya, the Arab League was the regional 
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representative which referred the case to the UN requesting the establishment 
of a no-fly zone in March 2011.  The legitimacy of this group, mainly autocratic 
and repressive regimes, calling for intervention in the name of human rights 
and civilian suffering is itself questionable, though their interest in regional 
stability was a reasonable concern.  Queried as to whether there were plans for 
similar intervention in Syria in August 2011, FO Minister Alistair Burt said the 
situation was not like Libya where the Arab League asked for western 
intervention.600  Not setting criteria on when to apply R2P was a barrier to its 
use in the Syria setting. 
 
In the Syrian case, there was a marked reluctance to intervene from the 
beginning.  The lack of will for military intervention in Syria stands out in 
comparison to Libya.  Far from setting the precedent humanitarian intervention 
under R2P, the Libyan intervention proved fatal to hope for intervention in 
Syria.  On a purely practical level, as the Syrian unrest escalated the attention 
of the international community was firmly fixed on the Libyan campaign.  More 
importantly, the recriminations resulting from what many, crucially Russia and 
China, saw as mission creep in Libya, made it impossible to agree a resolution 
on Syria through the UNSC.  Finally, the consequences of military intervention, 
both the unsanctioned action in Iraq 2003 and the UN authorised in Libya, 
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served as warnings -- the continuing instability in both these states could 
potentially be even worse in Syria. 
 
The Syrian Crisis 
Simply comparing the situations in Libya and Syria as like for like distorts the 
complexity of the issues involved in the Syrian case.  Bashar al-Asad, at this 
time, was not viewed as the same kind of leader as “madman” Qadhafi, hence 
a succession of British diplomats had tread a path to his door over the past 
decade (although with conspicuous gaps in diplomatic relations) in the hopes of 
engaging the Syrian regime.  Since becoming president, Bashar had been 
courted by the West as someone who could be reasoned with and supported to 
bring about change, and indeed someone who actually wanted to pursue 
reform.  Thus, despite early signs of the regime using brutal means to crush 
protests, the British government was willing to give credence to the half-
hearted concessions of the regime.  
  
When the unrest began Bashar was still regarded as a popular leader.  Huge 
televised rallies were held by supporters of the regime, and though by no 
means spontaneous, pointed to mass support in at least some regions of the 
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country.601  Estimates in May 2012 put his popular support at around 30%.602  
Even after years of bloody warfare, during which fighter jets and chemical 
weapons were used against the population, it is unclear just how much support 
the regime retains.  This being so, it was much harder to immediately disclaim 
Bashar’s position as a legitimate leader of the Syrian people.  In addition, 
Bashar has played off the different sects and factions within his population 
successfully to, if not preserve his popularity amongst them, at least convince 
them that his survival is essential to preserve their own communities.  This has 
continued whilst the crisis has become increasingly violent, with some 
communities fearful of their fate should Bashar fall, with evidence of sectarian 
killing, and gross violations of human rights against different sects, being 
confirmed. 
 
The idea of the popular leader, separate from the more unpopular regime, 
certainly was a frustrating factor in dealing with the regime even prior to the 
crisis, and a tool Bashar has used to his advantage.  Praise for any reform 
enacted during his presidency has fallen to Bashar, criticism for the slow pace 
of reform, and behaviours that were less than satisfactory, often placed on 
“hardliners”.  This protected him from some of the more severe criticism of his 
regime, for example, after the Hariri assassination, when suspicion fell on the 
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Asad regime but though not necessarily on Bashar.  Ivor Lucas, Ambassador to 
Syria 1982-84, suggests that Bashar is “a front man for a junta consisting of a 
hard core of the old military, security and intelligence fraternity which will never 
surrender...I do not believe that he is the man in charge, or that anything 
significant would happen if he were to disappear tomorrow.  Hence the cry 
“Asad must go” which seems to be the constant refrain of the Establishment in 
London as well as that of the Syrian opposition is in my opinion irrelevant.”603   
 
The doubt over whether or not Bashar is “in charge” held even while many of 
his father’s old guard have been removed and been replaced by Bashar’s allies, 
achieved reasonably early in his presidency.  This tactic of keeping other 
governments guessing as to who makes decisions, and how decisions are made 
within the regime, has helped Bashar’s statesmanship.  Hague, having visited 
Bashar in January 2011, exemplified this the following April when he 
condemned the violent crackdown against protestors and told Asad to respond 
to the demands of his people, yet still stated “you can imagine him as a 
reformer”.604  Thus, leaders have been unable to decide, at least initially, on 
who and how to approach events in Syria as it was not immediately clear there 
was actually a “mad man” to remove, another Hussein or Qaddafi, or , 
conversely, if removal of Bashar would even address the problem. 
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Practically, British policy makers saw other differences in the Syrian situation.  
There was a lack of clarity over the situation on the ground, no singular 
opposition group, while in Libya a cohesive coalition which could be supported 
in fighting the regime, quickly emerged.  Syria, long-time ally of Russia and 
Iran, had a real military defence capability adding to concerns that any 
intervention would be protracted and costly, with potential costs also in terms 
of soldiers’ lives, something that domestic audiences would not support.  The 
military in Syria was not comparable to that of Tunisia and Egypt (liable to 
defect), Bashar having filled many of the top posts of his armed forces with 
Alawites whose loyalty was to the regime.605  Any likelihood of an internal coup 
within the government was similarly weak, with the core regime appearing 
strong, his chief advisers being all Alawite, a number of them being relations.606  
This being so, the survival of one, is the survival of all.   
 
The regime had strong allies in Russia and Iran, and it was hard to predict their 
reaction to a military intervention.  British military analysis of the Syrian crisis at 
this stage almost consistently advised against a Syrian intervention, certainly 
they have stressed in no uncertain terms the probable hazards.  They 
underlined the significant differences in the resistance they would meet from 
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the Syrian regime as compared to the case of Libya or Mali.   There would also 
be severe consequences in terms of civilian casualties in the event of military 
action with targets being in heavily built up areas.607 
 
The reluctance of the West including Britain to intervene in Syria from the 
outset was more than clear.  Hague made several statements throughout 2011 
and 2012 saying that there were no plans to intervene in Syria.  Within Syria, 
too, there was fear, not hope, in the general population over possible military 
intervention, many mindful of the consequences intervention brought for Iraq 
and Libya.  Only once it was clear the regime was not going to be easily 
removed, and its repression became more brutal, did demonstrators call for 
intervention.  The Arab League, reflecting on the Libyan experience, initially 
refrained from going to the UN to request intervention, attempting to find a 
solution themselves.  They began negotiations with the Syrian regime, and sent 
an observation mission, signalling both their unease with what they had seen as 
mission creep by the NATO powers in Libya, and also their own national 
interests in using Syria to increase their own regional influence. 
 
The last difficulty with intervening in Syria was the potential consequences of 
the fall of the Asad regime.  Unlike in Libya where the overthrow of Qadhafi 
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was not seen to present a great threat to the stability of the region608 the 
overthrow of Bashar could potentially throw the whole region into chaos, unrest 
spreading across its borders and in particular into Lebanon.  A worst case 
scenario of Islamists gaining power and the impact of that with regard to Israel 
was also a grave concern.  
 
The Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy queried Oliver Letwin 
MP, Minister of State, Cabinet Office why there was intervention in Libya but 
not in Syria.  Letwin who attempted to clarify the British position, saying that 
while many of the accusations made of the Qadhafi regime could be made of 
the Syrian one.  The decision not to intervene was not based on the lack of 
capacity to do so but that: 
“the circumstances that made it possible to do so successfully in Libya 
are not, in our view, present in the case of Syria: it is not possible to get 
a United Nations resolution of the same kind; there is not the same 
regional backing for action; and so forth. So we are judging, case by 
case, not just what it would be good to do but what it is possible to 
achieve.” 609 
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This succinctly summarises the main elements in how the Syrian case was 
viewed differently by the British Government.  Further to this it can be argued 
that the Libyan campaign was supposed to be easy and short yet it actually 
highlighted the weaknesses of NATO.  With the costs of Libya coupled with the 
economic crisis and pressure on European budgets including defence spending, 
the budget has to be considered a restraining factor in British policy toward the 
crisis.  The Libyan operation exposed the deficiencies in European defence 
spending, and its reliance on the US to enable it to carry out this kind of 
operation.  The cost of carrying out another, open ended, military operation in 
Syria whilst the European economy was in crisis would have been a hard sell for 
European governments. 
 
 
A lack of strategy? 
The unrest in Syria began March 6th 2011 with the arrest of fifteen children in 
Dera’a after they had been caught writing anti-government slogans on a wall.  
Subsequently demonstrations were organised with demands that the children 
be released and for reform.  Bashar eventually intervened promising an 
investigation and the children’s release, but the demonstrations had already 
spread to other cities including Aleppo and Damascus, and the government had 
                                                          
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/joint-committees/national-security-
strategy/nsscollatedevidencefinal.pdf (Accessed 05/05/2014) 
377 
lost control sending tanks and helicopters to seal off Dera’a on 22 March, 
resulting in what protestors called a massacre by security forces on the 23rd in a 
final attempt to control the riots.610  The use of brutal repression and the return 
of the children with obvious signs of torture only fanned the flames of the 
protestors in their demands for reform.   
 
To counter anti-regime protests, pro-regime rallies were organised for the 29th 
March with Bashar making an address to the Syrian nation on the 30th.  Rather 
than addressing demands for reform, his speech blamed the unrest on outside 
influences, a message he has consistently used throughout the uprising – and 
one that has come to have an element of truth to it as the crisis has gone on.  
Patrick Seale calls this an opportunity missed: had Bashar announced an end to 
the state of emergency, freeing of political prisoners and Human Rights 
activists, a trial of the corrupt elements in the regime, curbing security forces 
and allowing new political parties to form, he may have been able to stem the 
tide.611    
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The British reaction to the brutal use of force by the Syrian regime was to 
condemn the violence and press Bashar to deliver on the demand for reform.  
At the end of April 2011 Hague stated:  
"The Syrian government has failed to heed repeated calls by the international 
community for restraint.  As I have stressed it is vital to respond with reform 
not repression.... We will continue to work with our partners to ensure that 
those responsible for the violence are held personally to account...In this 
context, I welcome the EU's decision last night to accelerate work on 
targeted measures against those responsible.  The United Kingdom will again 
be in the forefront of pushing for such measures."612 
 
The commitment of the British government was to work within the existing 
international framework toward pressuring the Syrian regime to reform, at the 
same time ministers consistently stated that there would be no military 
intervention.   
 
As the unrest continued, Bashar did announce some reforms whilst continuing 
the brutal repression of protestors.  Meantime Western policy hardened, both 
the US and EU imposing sanctions in May against key members of the regime 
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initially, then including the President himself by the end of May, signalling a 
belated recognition that Bashar could not be treated as separate from the 
regimes “hardliners”.  By mid-August 2011, Cameron and other Western leaders 
had joined President Obama in his demand for Asad to step down, Deputy 
Prime Minister Nick Clegg stating on the 22nd, that Asad was irrelevant to the 
country’s future.613  
 
The demand for Bashar to go was clearly an acknowledgement that in using 
such violence against his own people, he had lost legitimacy to rule and, even if 
he could be persuaded to reform his regime, it was unlikely the demonstrators 
would accept him remaining as president.  Even if the orders for the violent 
suppression of the uprising originated with others in the regime as had been 
the initial suspicion, then again, the legitimacy and effectiveness of Bashar 
became questionable.  He would not be able to make the reforms needed 
therefore there was no reason for him to remain.  Either way the demand failed 
to recognise that the removal of Bashar, did not necessarily equate with the 
removal of the regime, key members of which may be equally responsible for 
the brutality seen since the beginning of the uprising. 
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A major stumbling block in the Syrian crisis was the lack of a clear opposition to 
back against the regime.  By the end of August 2011 this situation had also 
changed.  The Free Syrian Army announced its formation toward the end of 
July, followed by the formation of the Syrian National Council, later (November 
2012) unifying with other groups to form National Coalition for Syrian 
Revolutionary and Opposition Forces.  Britain saw a role in supporting the 
opposition to organise, then in providing it with non-lethal aid e.g. surgical 
equipment, body armour for non-combatants.  Later discussion moved to 
arming the rebels.614   
 
Having a clearly defined opposition group, one Britain recognised as “a 
legitimate representative of the Syrian people”, UK decision makers were still 
facing a number of obstacles.  United under a common banner, the factions 
within the SNC were slow to reach a common position for the future of Syria, 
being racked with internal divisions from the beginning.  How representative, 
thus how acceptable, its membership was in representing those fighting inside 
Syria was also questionable, as a number were Syrians who had been living in 
exile for some time.  Indeed, a number of Islamist groups fighting in Syria 
quickly declared that they did not regard the coalition as representative.  
Clearly the outcome the government wanted to promote was for the more 
                                                          
614 L Loveluck, “What’s non-lethal about aid to the Syrian opposition?” Foreign Policy (20 
September 2012) http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/09/20/whats-non-lethal-about-aid-to-the-
syrian-opposition/ (Accessed 22/11/2014) 
381 
moderate elements of the opposition to overthrow Asad and form a 
representative democratic government in Syria.  According to Peter Ford, a 
number of people told the government that the idea that Bashar would fall was 
simply wishful thinking.615  Now, adding to this difficulty, was the policy of 
supporting a coalition that was not considered representative of all groups, with 
the potential difficulties that could create firstly, in any attempts at negotiating 
a comprehensive ceasefire; secondly, in supporting the group to form a 
representative government should Asad go; thirdly, in how to deal with the 
third grouping of mainly, Islamist groups, that was not part of the SNC, refused 
to be represented by it and was not the faction Britain wanted to see take over 
the governance of Syria. 
 
With no intention of staging a military intervention to enforce regime change 
both the US and UK working with the EU, turned to sanctions to try to force a 
resolution of the crisis.  With the lessons of the 1990s Iraq sanctions regime 
learned, perhaps, sanctions have targeted specific members of the regime only, 
though there have also been arms and oil embargos.  With little economic 
interests in Syria the US sanctions were more about making a statement.  EU 
sanctions, however, had considerable impact given that Europe is the main 
importer of Syrian oil.  Still, while Syria has allies in Iran and Russia prepared to 
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provide both arms and finance to prop up the regime, the sanctions were not 
enough to reach the desired conclusion.   
 
An EU arms embargo was placed on Syria in May 2011, with further restrictions 
imposed in January and June 2012 including on equipment used for monitoring 
and intercepting telecommunications and goods that might be used for the 
manufacture and maintenance of equipment that could be used for internal 
repression.616  As early as November 2012, however, there were indications 
that the British government was reconsidering the issue of arming the 
moderate rebels.  Thus within two years, the EU lifted the arms embargo in 
May 2013, whilst fighting was ongoing.  The decision to do so was not a unified 
decision, 25 out of 27 member states were against it, with the Guardian 
reporting, “A meeting of EU foreign ministers descended into recrimination with 
a vast majority against lifting the arms embargo, but Hague blocked a 
compromise deal.  Austria, the biggest opponent of the British aim, reacted 
bitterly stating that the EU negotiations had collapsed and the Europe-wide 
sanctions regime would collapse at midnight on Friday.”617  Britain then was 
central to the collapse of the arms embargo on Syria. 
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Hague argued his case in the Commons, stating that would increase pressure 
on the regime and provide Britain with flexibility “to respond to continued 
radicalisation and conflict”.  He also stated that Britain had yet to provide arms 
to any side in the Arab Spring, and no decision had been made to do so now, 
reassuring the Commons that any action would be within the limits of national 
and international law.  According to Hague Britain and France were united in 
the belief that lifting the embargo was essential to the diplomatic effort, making 
it clear all options were open.618  On a number of levels this decision 
undermined the broader goal that the British and French had in mind, that is, 
strengthening the moderate rebels.  One difficulty for the politicians was, once 
the arms embargo was lifted and the weapons shipped, the “right” rebels to 
give them to were not easily identifiable, nor was there any way to prevent 
more radical groups simply taking them from the less organised moderates.  
Lucas described the mainstream military faction at the time, the Free Syrian 
Army, as shambolic.  According to Lucas, the most successful faction was 
Jubhat al-Nusra, an Islamist militia increasingly infiltrated by foreign militants.  
On this basis, he states, the idea of arming them is unwise as “there is no 
telling where the arms would end up”. 619   
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Even with the arms embargo lifted providing the rebels with arms could 
potentially have breached Britain’s own exports controls, particularly the criteria 
specifying the requirement of the consideration as to whether the equipment 
would: 
- provoke or prolong armed conflicts or aggravate existing tensions in the 
destination country  
- be diverted or re-exported under undesirable conditions620 
Another legal concern was that, by arming and/or training the rebels, the British 
government would have risked breaching of Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter on 
the threat of use of force since the opposition was not the recognised 
government of the Syrian state, there was no UNSC authorisation, and at that 
point, it would be very hard to argue the case that the British government was 
acting in self-defence.621  A further legislative constraint was the potential that 
Britain could be held accountable for human rights abuses committed by groups 
using British supplied arms.622  Though it was instrumental in the embargo 
being lifted, the British government made no immediate move to provide arms 
committing, instead, to review the situation in August.  The uncertainty over 
just which groups to arm and growth in Islamist groups likely an important 
factor in this decision. 
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This apparently confused policy making had several detrimental effects. Claire 
Spencer, writing in Prospect Magazine, queries the lack of consideration as to 
the potential fallout from the decision to lift the embargo. 623  The moderate 
rebels, now looking for more international support, gained the impression they 
were about to receive it, and were emboldened to maintain their non-
negotiating stance against the government, derailing the prospect of a peace 
conference, something the British government had been working hard to 
support.  In the end they were left, once again, with no real practical support.  
The radical elements, already better armed and organised than many of the 
moderate groups due to the support provided from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and 
Turkey, were strengthened; even worse, some moderates were beginning to be 
radicalised; the exact opposite to what Britain and France had wanted to 
achieve.   A surge in fighting by both the Syrian forces and Hizbullah could also 
possibly be attributed to the decision. 
 
Pushing through an unpopular decision by, in effect, vetoing the extension of 
sanctions also did not signal unity in the EU, and somewhat undermined British 
criticism of Russia and China doing the same thing in the UN.  More importantly 
the decision damaged British overall aims, and left the moderate rebels in a 
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weaker position.  Certainly, the lack of follow through after lifting of the 
embargo left some groups feeling betrayed by Britain which could affect long 
term relations if these moderate groups gain power (which was Britain’s policy 
objective), particularly when taken alongside a failure to prevent the large scale 
humanitarian disaster that the Syrian civil war has become. 
 
The British attitude toward the oil embargo followed a similar pattern.  
Sanctions on oil were established to increase financial pressure on the regime 
which was reliant on oil production making up ¼ of government revenues.624  
Again, by May 2013, the EU was reviewing its position on the blanket ban it had 
placed on oil.  The decision to ease these sanctions on oil was much less 
debated and the British government’s position was supportive.  Lifting the 
embargo provided much needed revenue to the opposition who had taken 
control of the oil fields.  At the same time, though, it exacerbated tensions 
between rebel groups who fought each other for control of the oil fields, playing 
into the hands of the Asad regime.  The oil fields soon fell into the hands of the 
most anti-Western factions, Jabhat al-Nusra and later ISIS.  
 
Arguably, the EU was trying to apply smart sanctions, however, their attempts 
strengthened the wrong groups.  The Guardian reporting that lifting sanctions 
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had heightened fighting for control over oil pipelines and wells in areas held by 
the moderate rebels, resulting in consolidation of control over this key resource 
ending up in the hands of jihadist groups, it led to the further displacement of 
Sunni tribes, violently on occasion, and consequently the infighting between 
opposition groups eased the pressure on regime forces in the north and east of 
the country. 625   Again the planned outcome, for the moderates to be able to 
access more resources, was not borne out by the situation on the ground. 
 
The Red Line 
Nadim Shehadi argues that Bashar used chemical weapons to poison the 
debate on intervention in Syria.  Before July 2012 the regime had not even 
admitted to possessing them.  Having acknowledged their existence, the regime 
gave a statement saying that they would not be used to quell the unrest, 
implying that they would be used against any external threat, and giving 
assurance that the regime was working to ensure rebel groups would not gain 
access to them.  Consequently, the debate turned into one about WMD and 
intervention triggering a reassurance from the Americans that they held no 
intention to intervene unless the Syrian government crossed the “red line.”  
Implicitly, then, Shehadi writes that the message to Bashar was that the regime 
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could continue their brutal campaign of oppression with impunity so long as 
they used only conventional weapons.626  
 
Whether or not Shehadi is correct in this judgement is difficult to assess.  What 
is clear is that the use of chemical weapons on 21 August 2013 seemed to 
change the debate once again.  International outrage at the alleged use of 
chemical weapons in a rebel held suburb of Damascus and the obvious crossing 
of Obama’s “red line” seemed to make military action inevitable.  Britain 
together with 32 other governments requested that the UN investigative team, 
already in Syria, be allowed access to the site in order to confirm that chemical 
weapons had been used627.  However, within days of the attack, and even 
before the Inspectors were given permission to visit the additional site, Hague 
was warning that the delay in getting the inspectors to the site could mean 
“that the evidence had been tampered with, degraded or destroyed in the five 
days since the attack”.628 . 
 
Pre-empting the UN report into the alleged use of chemical weapons, 
information was provided to media saying that UK intelligence agencies had 
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clear evidence of the regime’s use of chemical weapons, and that Britain had 
tested samples from other sites that had proved positive for presence of the 
nerve agent Sarin.  Taking this information together with credible evidence of at 
least fourteen other cases of chemical weapons use, Cameron presented a 
motion to the Commons to support intervention in Syria, condemning the action 
and appearing to open the path for military intervention.629  The motion was 
watered down to garner more support from Labour and backbenchers.  Thus, it 
did not give the Government the power to approve direct military action without 
further referral to Parliament yet still failed to garner enough support to pass. 
 
In trying to demonstrate that the case for intervention in Syria was different 
from the one presented to Parliament by Blair before the Iraq war, Cameron 
failed in just about every aspect.  Fraser Nelson writes that the presentation of 
the case could not have highlighted these similarities more, a government not 
waiting for a UN weapons inspection report “because it believes it knows” that 
Asad has WMD, the presentation of an intelligence dossier, and secret legal 
advice630.  As to Parliament, its narrative that it had already been “tricked” into 
supporting the Iraq war, this was a reminder they did not need.  What they did 
want was more quality information and this they did not receive. 
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Cameron requested advice from the Attorney–General as to the legality of any 
potential action, stating that whilst the best route would be a Chapter VII 
resolution it “can’t be the case that this is the only way to have a legal basis for 
action”.  The advice given by the Attorney General thus set out the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention as a legal basis for action.   Once again this raised 
the spectre of Iraq in using humanitarian justification as a way to get round the 
need for UNSC authorisation, though this is not unique.  FCO Minister, Lady 
Symons told Parliament,  
"There is no general doctrine of humanitarian necessity in international law. 
Cases have nevertheless arisen (as in northern Iraq in 1991) when, in the 
light of all the circumstances, a limited use of force was justifiable in support 
of purposes laid down by the security council but without the council's 
express authorisation when that was the only means to avert an immediate 
and overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe.....”631  
David Cameron argued that any response the British government considered 
would be “proportionate”, but there was no consensus on what a proportionate 
response was.  A number of MPs simply disagreed on any military intervention 
on the grounds that the civilian costs would be both unavoidable and 
unacceptable. 
                                                          
631Lady Symons quoted in J Rozenberg, “Syria intervention: it may not be wise.  But using force 
may be lawful”, The Guardian, (28 August 2013) 
391 
 
The Government failed also in laying out clearly the purpose of any military 
response to the chemical attack.  Many analysts contended that limited air 
strikes, the proposal being discussed, would not have significantly disturbed the 
balance of power on the ground and would hardly have resulted in the fall of 
the Asad regime.  Therefore, the desire to intervene seemed little more than 
punitive action, hardly humanitarian in nature.  Henry Hogger argued that the 
decision not to intervene was the right one and that there was no military 
solution to the situation.  The intervention would only have resulted in 
additional civilian suffering. 
 
That the Syrian regime was behind the August chemical attack was widely 
accepted though German intelligence agencies suggested that Bashar did not 
personally order the attack.  This gave credence to those arguing Bashar may 
have been holding back elements in his regime from using the weapons before 
this attack632.  The scale of the attack, the target, the trajectory of the missiles 
all indicated that the attack was carried out by regime forces.  The British 
government also claimed to have evidence of 14 other smaller uses of chemical 
agents though the evidence that the regime was behind these was less robust.  
There were reports of rebel groups being found with small amounts of chemical 
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agents633 making it more difficult to allocate blame for the smaller attacks.  The 
lack of clarity over who was responsible for which attacks fed into the debate 
over what the appropriate response should be. 
 
Even with evidence of chemical weapons use, this did not provide automatic 
legal authorisation for military intervention in a sovereign nation.  Without 
UNSC authorisation the legality of intervention in a sovereign state is up for 
question, and even here if, as previously discussed, when the authorisation is 
not explicit, the legality of action may be contested.  Furthermore, the options 
for military action had not changed from when they had previously been 
discussed and dismissed.  If the British government intervened on humanitarian 
grounds, there would be an associated expectation that measures to protect 
civilians would be taken such as a no fly zone.  This carried the risk of being 
targeted by a working Syrian air defence system, and so the weight of potential 
loss of life and equipment.  Establishing a buffer zone would require ground 
troops potentially providing a large target not only for regime forces, but for 
Hizbullah and also jihadist groups.  This was not something being proposed nor 
was it supported by the British government. 
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The disquiet over the Government’s case was evident in the questions being 
asked of the Government in the lead up to the Parliament vote.  Shadow 
foreign secretary Douglas Alexander queried the government objective asking, 
"Is it a broad objective of changing the civil war or trying to remove (President) 
Bashar al-Asad or is it a more limited objective of trying to degrade his 
capability to use these weapons with impunity?".634  Labour insisted that no 
decision should be made before the UN report was published.635  Conservative 
Norman Tebbit echoed some of these concerns, querying how the action would 
improve the situation of the Syrian people, asking for clarification on how, 
exactly, any action would contribute to peaceful settlement of the crisis.  The 
only certainty, in his view, was that proposed action would worsen British 
relations with Russia and increase hostility to the West in the region, thereby 
creating further risk to other British interests in the region.  Finally, he 
questioned who would be strengthened by military action in Syria, the 
moderate rebels or the extremists, and what this would mean for the people of 
Syria.636  The government in attempting to make its case, had failed to 
adequately address what many MPs saw as major issues in their argument. 
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The debate in parliament highlighted the weaknesses in the government’s 
position.  Former Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, also queried what the action 
would achieve but made further point, based on experience perhaps, that it 
was easy to begin a military mission but not as easy to end it.  Former Defence 
Secretary Liam Fox “ridiculed” the idea of arming the rebels, asking how British 
interests would be served by potentially aiding a jihadi victory in Syria.637  The 
government’s task was as much to overcome the legacy of Iraq as make its 
case for action in Syria.  Parliament being reluctant to sanction military 
intervention in a crisis in which there were no clear British interests at stake, 
the goals were unclear, the prospects for success were not only poor, but it was 
unclear what exactly “success” was in this scenario, and where there was no 
clarity over an exit plan from a potentially protracted operation. 
 
Opposition to the Government’s call for action in Syria was not confined to one 
party but cut across all political boundaries.  For those who may have 
supported intervention on humanitarian grounds the proposed action did not go 
far enough, indeed it would likely have left Syrian civilians in a worse situation.  
The timing of the vote, before the UN report was published, could be seen 
potentially as undermining its credibility, as it pre-empted its findings and 
recommendations.  Lastly the rush to call the vote in Parliament before an 
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adequate case could be presented combined with the memory of how the case 
for Iraq was presented, played into the vote going against the government.   
 
Peter Ford described the vote in Parliament as “historic” and that it has “cast its 
shadow forward.”  Parliament showing a brief moment of independence against 
a clearly strong inclination in Whitehall in favour of intervention, set a new 
benchmark.  Clearly it was a blow to the government.  Ford suggests that in its 
Syria policy London was being swept along by America.  However, the 
government had no choice but to call a vote due to pressure from the strength 
of feeling in the press and public.  The episode was a big failure in British 
foreign policy, it got it wrong when it predicted the early fall of Bashar then 
faced a humiliating defeat in Parliament costing, Ford suggests, William Hague 
his post as Foreign Secretary.  If British policy was more concerned with helping 
Syrian civilians rather than removing Bashar, he suggests, it should have 
stopped the rhetoric and drum beating, lifted sanctions which only hurt Syrian 
civilians remaining in the country and stop hindering the efforts of the Syrian 
army to tackle any insurgents.  He further pointed to the hypocrisy of the 
government encouraging armed opposition against Bashar on one hand whilst 
criminalising those who have travelled to join that opposition on their return to 
Britain.638 
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The desire to “do something” about the situation in Syria was palpably strong in 
the FCO.  Disappointment over the defeat of the government vote, however, 
was felt much further afield.  Reflecting on the episode, former FCO Minister, 
Alistair Burt, stated that the no vote left the mainstream opposition forces in 
Syria “absolutely devastated”, and Britain’s government “knew exactly what 
would happen if there was not a strike against Asad over chemical weapons.  
He goes on.”639  The vote, Burt stated, also potentially limited foreign policy 
options further as ministers were left unclear as to what exactly the Parliament 
vote had ruled out, that is, whether intelligence cooperation or logistical support 
in the event of a US led intervention was still permitted or whether it require 
seeking approval from Parliament again.  Like Hague, some observers think 
Burt also lost his position in the FCO over the failure of the Syrian vote in 
Parliament.640  
 
The Government failure in presenting a case for military intervention in Syria 
that would appear significantly stronger and more robust than the case Blair 
presented to Parliament before Iraq, clearly contributed to the no vote.  Claims 
of conclusive proof of the Syrian regimes guilt in ordering the use of chemical 
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weapons and claiming to have robust intelligence before the UN weapons 
inspectors had time to conduct their investigation, calling for Parliament to set 
in motion the path to a military intervention, and the request for and 
publication of a legal justification for a military intervention before the UNSC 
had received, studied or made any decision based on a report from its own 
investigators echoed, for many, the run up to Iraq.  Additionally, the wording of 
the motion which stated that the government commitment to following the UN 
process “as far as possible to ensure the maximum legitimacy for any such 
action” echoed Blair’s justification of intervention, his belief that if the moral 
obligation to intervene was apparent but the will of the UNSC was lacking, then 
this should not prevent the international community taking action.   
 
The British criticism of the stalemate in the UNSC over the Syria crisis was 
strong, possibly adding to the fears of some MPs that Britain might act without 
UN approval if they voted for the government’s motion.  Hague condemned the 
UNSC having not “shouldered its responsibilities,”641 berating Russian and 
Chinese vetoes.  This could be seen to damage the credibility of the 
organisation though his frustration was no doubt genuine.  More harmful, 
however, was the apparent willingness to repeat the mistakes of the past as 
feared by those MPs who voted against the government’s motion on the basis 
                                                          
641 “Syria Crisis: Diplomacy has not worked, says William Hague”, BBC News (26 August 2013) 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-23840065 (Accessed 26/08/2013) 
398 
that they wanted assurance that no military action would take place without a 
UNSCR.   
 
The result of British reaction to the crisis was that the message to the Syrian 
opposition was inconsistent.  British support and statements encouraged the 
moderates to stand their ground but lack of practical support meant that they 
did not have the means to do so.  Pushing for an end to the EU arms embargo 
in the hopes of strengthening a moderate opposition raised expectations that 
Britain would supply those groups with arms, and discouraged them from 
taking part in peace negotiations.  The failure to follow through, based on fears 
that jihadist opposition groups might obtain these weapons, resulted in those 
same jihadist groups strengthening their position both through military gains as 
they were better equipped than the moderates, and through the disillusioned 
fighters from moderate groups joining the jihadists.  This give the impression 
policy makers are merely reacting to individual events rather than formulating 
effective policy with clear, achievable objectives.  Endorsing the idea of a “red 
line” followed by the failure to act after the line was crossed further damaged 
Britain’s reputation in the region and fuelled the growth of Islamic groups in 
Syria.  This played into Asad’s narrative of the crisis, and ran counter to British 
interests. 
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The British government failed, throughout, to articulate a cohesive policy, a 
clear plan of action, a precise objective and desirable outcome which 
contributed to its failure to convince enough MPs to support its motion in 
Parliament.  Following the Parliament vote many suggested that the British 
appetite for intervention had gone, yet a 2014 YouGov poll found 60% of the 
public would support British military action in Iraq against ISIS.642  Another 
found a majority of respondents felt Parliament should have full powers in 
authorising war or military involvement643.  This suggests that any British 
Government recommending intervention in future will have to build a high 
calibre case in order to convince Parliament and the public to support it, not 
that the British public is against intervention, and introduces a larger domestic 
element into the process of making foreign policy.  
 
Foreign intervention in internal conflict has not proven to have stabilised, or 
even been effective in stopping the killing, in the examples of Iraq, Libya and 
Mali.  Lessons from these cases should be applied to Syria.  If military 
intervention remains an option then consideration of the likely consequences, 
planning to mitigate the worst consequences and, most importantly, planning 
for the rebuild, ensuring that the will, resource and skills are available once an 
action is over, is essential.  If not, then for Britain the best option in the Syrian 
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case is to continue with the provision of humanitarian assistance while 
searching for a negotiated solution, using diplomacy and including all relevant 
parties whilst preparing for the eventual cessation of hostilities in Syria and the 
possibility that not only will Britain still have to deal with Bashar but that that 
might now be the best outcome for British interests. 
 
Conclusion 
When the events of the Arab Spring began, the international community was 
still dealing with the ramifications of the terrorist attacks in America and the 
wars which followed.  Following its misadventures in Afghanistan and Iraq, the 
US was less willing to involve itself in similar interventions in which it had little 
national interest at stake.  With its focus moving to the Asian pacific region, the 
Middle East was seen as a European concern, America no longing willing to play 
global policeman. 
 
Britain, too, recovering from the legacy of previous decades seemed to have 
resumed its realpolitik approach to international affairs.  At the same time the 
perception of threat to British security, particularly in terms of terrorist activity 
remained high, largely related to continuing instability in the Middle East.  This 
being so, British foreign policy reverted to traditional ties and interests, 
bolstering security in the region through arms and defence agreements with 
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friendly regimes.  Despite this Britain was taken by surprise with the outbreak 
of the Arab Spring, and its lack of consistency in its approach to the different 
uprisings across the region can be traced back to traditional ties and 
agreements, and its security priorities which have led some observers to accuse 
British policy makers, at best, of being inconsistent, at worst, of being 
hypocritical. 
 
British policy makers taken by surprise by the Arab Spring were further wrong-
footed by the Syrian crisis, having assumed that Bashar’s popularity combined 
with his effective security apparatus would prevent any unrest.  They made 
further mistakes when they assumed Bashar would be quick to fall, and have 
consistently failed to follow rhetoric up with action.  This has contrasted with 
their action in Libya which had been quick and decisive in comparison.   
 
One thing that has been consistent in British foreign policy behaviour, however, 
is Britain’s view of the importance of Syria with regard to stability in the region, 
and the perception of the Syrian regime as being different than those in Iraq 
and Libya.  Both these elements served to colour initial thinking on how to react 
to the Syrian crisis.  Without the Asad regime in place to maintain stability, the 
fear was Syria would collapse, and this would spread across its borders.  This 
fear was underscored initially in that there seemed to be no singular opposition 
group that the British could back in the way they had in the Libyan operation.  
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It continues to be a concern as the moderate opposition, now backed by 
Britain, faces opposition not just from the Asad regime but also Islamist groups, 
groups which are now causing unrest in neighbouring countries.   
 
The perception that the Syrian regime was different from Iraq and Libya, led to 
the slow British reaction to the brutal repression by the regime.  It may also be 
the reason behind the quick turnaround in British demands that Asad must go, 
and the assumption that Bashar would be quick to fall.  Again there is an idea 
of weakness here that has been seen before in British thinking toward Syria.  
For example, after Bashar was forced to order the withdrawal of Syrian troops 
from Lebanon, a number of observers thought he would not survive the 
humiliation.  It also is similar to the assumption that Bashar would be more 
susceptible to pressure to reform or concede on peace talks as he was not as 
strong a leader as his father.  These assumptions have been proved time and 
again to be wrong, and in the case of the Syrian crisis failed to take into 
account that for Bashar and the regime this really was about survival, or the 
strong ties between the regime leadership and significant elements of the 
security and military apparatus. 
 
Lastly the British response to the Syrian crisis has to be seen as a legacy of all 
interventions preceding it, particularly in the light of failures in Iraq and Libya.  
The Libyan operation affected the debate over intervening in crisis in a number 
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of ways, in a practical sense it distracted attention away from Syria as the crisis 
there was in its initial stages; it demonstrated that even when the European 
powers in NATO took the lead in an operation they could not act without 
American logistical support, so there would be no involvement in Syria without 
American backing; the, arguably, liberal interpretation of the UNSCR authorising 
action by NATO gave Russia and China cause to block any similar resolution on 
Syria, and Russia, a Syrian ally, used this criticism effectively; lastly, the 
situation in Libya had significantly deteriorated since the allies intervention, with 
ongoing loss of life and warring militias, and some commentators were querying 
whether the Libyans were really better off for the intervention.  This scenario, 
for many, undermined the principle of R2P, making it unlikely an operation in 
Syria could be justified in this way.   
 
The legacy of Iraq was even more significant.  The Syrian situation was seen as 
more complex than the Libyan one, more on par with Iraq, if not potentially 
worse.  Arguably a simple aerial bombardment would have little impact raising 
the spectre of a long, protracted operation with British boots on the ground, 
once again enmeshed in a Middle East conflict from which they could not 
withdraw.  As with Libya, ongoing troubles in Iraq led many to question the 
value of intervention, with the likelihood that the situation would be made 
worse for civilians.  Yet, for Syria, perhaps the most significant factor from Iraq 
on British policy was the precedent that it set in taking the vote for intervention 
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to Parliament, with the standard for evidence and intelligence to back a case for 
intervening having been raised incredibly high.  Ultimately this blocked a British 
government from agreeing on military intervention in Syria.   
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Conclusion 
Overview Neoclassical realism and British foreign policy 
The past century has seen Britain decline in status from a Great power of the 
19th Century, with all the capacity and resources of empire, to a European 
power operating in a bi-polar then unipolar world system.  During that time 
Britain foreign policy makers have had to manage Britain’s decline from power 
then establish a different kind of world role for Britain, more accurately now 
described as one of several European powers, or perhaps a medium level world 
power.  This process has been predicated both on the reality that British 
interests are international, and also on the perception that Britain should have a 
world role, its status as a member of numerous multilateral organisations, but 
particularly as one of the five permanent members of the United Nations, 
cementing this perception. 
 
Neoclassical realists consider a state’s power position as the primary 
determinant – the constraint or enabler of its foreign policy over the long run 
which can certainly be seen to underpin an explanation of Britain’s “managed” 
decline of power and its seeking of alliances to maximise its security.  At the 
same time, in the immediate and intermediate term this objective reality is 
filtered through elite perceptions of the state’s power position and their notion 
of its interests and roles which determines how it reacts to specific 
circumstances and which policy position it adopts.  In this sense British political 
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elites chose to react to its declining power position by refusing to withdraw 
from its global interests and roles.  Having a global role was deemed as central 
to British identity, thus the policy options available centred around maximising 
Britain’s power potential.   
 
Thus Britain has maintained interests and a role in the Middle East throughout 
this century.  Its foreign policy there has reflected a need to protect its 
interests, which has resulted in a strong ongoing relationship with the largely 
autocratic regimes of the Gulf states, particularly highlighted in its defence and 
economic relationship with these countries.  While the benefit of maintaining 
these relationships has been explained by proponents in government in terms 
of their importance to Britain’s wealth and security, Britain could be accused of 
hypocrisy in its failure to condemn these regimes in the same way as they have 
condemned the Syrian regime, e.g. notably over the repression of reform 
movements in Bahrain.  This has added to the narrative of terrorist groups in 
ways seen to have weakened the security of British interests, as seen in 
Lebanon in the 1980s. 
 
In parallel, the perception that Britain has a world role, and a moral 
responsibility both due to its history in the Levant, and as a member of the 
United Nations, has kept policy makers in Britain engaged in the MEPP.  Here, 
though, they battle a legacy of betrayal and suspicion directly impacting on 
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Britain’s ability to implement policy in the region even today.  Equally, while 
there has been a perceived moral obligation to be involved in the process, there 
remains the tendency to see the issue through a Western lens, limiting the 
process to a consideration of just the Palestinian issue, or seeking to forward 
the process through speaking to more moderate or “friendly” regimes or 
agencies.  This has often resulted in a failure to take into account the legitimate 
complaints or demands of the Syrian regime, such as Israel not being held to 
UN resolutions, or even to consider how proposals being put forward might 
affect Syrian interests, such as demands they stop supporting “terrorist” groups 
which they view as legitimate resistance movements; consequently, talks have 
run up against predictable resistance. 
 
There are a number of factors that can be seen to have impact on British 
international behaviour as it has pursued its interests and role, particularly the 
way in which Britain has attempted to maximise its power capabilities through 
coalition making.  As the British capacity to project its own power to protect the 
national interest has diminished, Britain prioritised two central relationships as a 
way to “punch above its weight”.  Central to this are Britain’s relationship with 
the EU and its “special relationship” with the US, yet, simultaneously, these two 
relationships are also a source of tension and constraint on UK options.  
Attempting to balance these alliances has directly affected British decision 
making and British leaders have had varying levels of success in doing so.  Blair 
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stated that there was no inherent competition between maintaining the special 
relationship and being at the heart of the EU, rather being strong in Europe 
meant being strong in the US with one relationship strengthening the other.  
Certainly a number of different US administrations have encouraged UK 
membership of the European Union, advocating the UK have a strong role in 
the institution, Obama being the latest president to express his opinion on this 
matter.  John Major also recently expressed this in a lecture he gave at 
Chatham House saying that the US expects Britain to use her influence in the 
EU to represent the views the UK and US share, and that further it the US links 
with the EU weaken then so will the links between the US and Britain.644 
 
One factor underlying the American interest in the UK role in the EU is a desire 
for the UK to lead the EU in taking a greater role in the European defence and 
security, relieving the US of that role.  The Libyan intervention is a 
demonstration of the desire of the US for Europe to take a more central role in 
protecting its interests and security in its immediate neighbourhood while at the 
same time its practical limitations in doing so.  There crucial assumption in 
America’s support for British membership, however, is that a UK that is at the 
heart of Europe will convince the EU to take a position in line with the American 
one.  This is based on the idea that the UK and the US share common values 
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and interests which might be the case generally, but has not always resulted in 
a common approach in how to achieve these objectives regarding specific 
issues.  This contradiction has been evident in British foreign policy in the 
Middle East on numerous issues.  From approaches to the MEPP, the Iranian 
nuclear programme, the Iraq war to its Syrian policy, British policy has 
alternated between taking a more American path or more European one.   
 
Neo-classical realism argues that a state’s response to its international 
environment is filtered through the policy making process.  A number of 
internal factors have affected how Britain pursued in international interests over 
the last century.  One factor that has been particularly important has been the 
ongoing struggle between the Office of No 10 Downing street and the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office for primacy in the area of foreign policy making.  
Two of the most powerful positions in the UK government have traditionally 
been that of the Prime Minister and that of the Foreign Secretary (the third 
being the Chancellor).  The British Prime Minister has played an increasingly 
larger role in international affairs as the number of international summits and 
meetings for heads of states has grown.  In the UK this tendency has been 
exacerbated by the fact the foreign policy has traditionally sat in the hands of 
the executive with much fewer checks and balances than in domestic policies.  
The personal inclinations of prime ministers, particularly Margaret Thatcher and 
Tony Blair, towards centralisation of power, combined with a distrust or 
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disregard of the Foreign Office have also played a role.  The impact has been 
fewer dissenting voices in foreign policy making, and less debate over what 
really serves the national interest.  Further, factors which have demonstrably 
had impact on the role of the prime minister in foreign policy making in the 
Middle East is that a leader is likely to have a bigger role in policy making over 
issues perceived to be of high national interest, and when there is an 
international crisis.  Both these factors are often the drivers when it comes to 
British Middle East policy, making consideration of the prime minister’s role 
crucial.   
 
Domestic constraints on British foreign policy have traditionally been weak.  
Gradually however these are becoming stronger, partly a consequence of the 
information age making it easier for the general public to access information on 
international affairs and also in increased demands for all democratic 
governments to be more transparent.  Britain’s unwritten constitution enabled 
Blair to increasingly side-line traditional branches of government, such as the 
Cabinet and the Foreign Office when it came to making foreign policy.  
However, the decision to go to war in Iraq and the fallout from that decision 
has in some respects reversed the trend.  Whilst inquiries into the war, to date, 
have not found the government guilty of deliberately misleading Parliament and 
the public, they have been damaging in their criticism of the informal processes 
Blair was using in government at the time, making it unlikely that this will soon 
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happen again.  Furthermore, the publicity surrounding these inquiries may 
serve as a further constraint on government behaviour as the increased 
likelihood of being exposed to public scrutiny makes robust policy making a 
necessity.  Indeed, the impact of these inquiries may already have been seen in 
the vote by MPs over whether to intervene in Syria in 2013, sceptical public 
opinion constraining MPs willingness to vote contrary to their constituent’s clear 
wishes. 
 
Government behaviour has been subject to the scrutiny of parliamentary sub 
committees for some time now.  These, like public inquiries, are limited in their 
scope, in that they’re generally looking at foreign policy that has been enacted 
already, and are limited in the number of foreign policy issues they can look 
into in any one-time period.  However, they benefit from the increased demand 
and expectation of transparency by the public and the expansion in 
communications making it easier for them to publish their findings and reports 
and consequently easier for the public to access them.  It is difficult to judge 
how this impacts the executive’s behaviour with regard to Syria but British 
responses to the Arab Spring and the situation in Syria are being monitored and 
queried in FAC reports. 
 
A longer lasting consequence of Blair’s premiership is the decision to take the 
vote over whether to go to war in Iraq to Parliament.  Regardless of the 
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ultimate outcome of the decision to go to war itself, the vote set a precedent, 
and while there is no constitutional requirement for it to do so it seems unlikely 
a British government would go to war without allowing Parliament to vote on 
the decision first.  This has had direct consequences for Anglo-Syrian policy 
with the vote in the Commons coming out against intervening militarily in the 
crisis there.  Making the decision on military action subject to parliament makes 
it more subject to public opinion.  Supportive of those who argued that the 
failure of the Syrian vote was simply down to the fallout from the Iraq 
campaign and the British public being war weary, recent polls have found a 
majority would support military action in Iraq against ISIS.  The expectation for 
a robust and high quality case with clear aims and objectives is key however. 
 
In a number of ways then internal factors both shape the way in which the UK 
perceives what its interests are and then shape the policies it pursues in order 
to secure its interests.   
 
Impact on Anglo – Syrian Relations 
Extending this neo-classical realist approach to the analysis of British foreign 
policy towards Syria, focusses analysis on how these factors impacted on the 
decisions taken and the consequences for the Anglo-Syrian relationship.  
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 While Britain has little direct national interest in Syria, Syria is a key state 
in the Middle East.  It is a consequence of Syria’s strategic geographic position 
that has brought it, periodically to the attention of UK policy makers as they 
have pursued its wider interests in the Middle East.  Syria is a state that has 
suffered historically from both local and international meddling in its affairs, and 
its history, in the Syrian perception, is one of external encroachment into Arab 
lands, and affairs, since the time of the crusades to the present Israeli 
occupation of Arab lands.  British foreign policy is a central facet of this 
narrative, in particular its imperial legacy in the shape of its role in the Balfour 
Declaration and Sykes-Picot agreement.645   
 
British national interests in the Middle East, broadly defined, have not changed; 
that is British interest in regional stability and the security of access to natural 
resources.  What this has meant, in terms of policy direction and short term 
interests however has been impacted by how British governments have reacted 
to events in the region, and its perception of security and threat at any given 
time.  This has affected Anglo-Syrian relations as Britain has pursued policies in 
the Middle East which have challenged or threatened Syrian interests.  These 
include attempts by the British government to carry out what it sees as 
obligations over the MEPP, or fighting international terrorism, or where British 
policy has been influenced by its prioritising the “special relationship”, such as 
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Lebanon and Libya in the 1980s, or the War on Terror and conflict in Iraq in the 
2000s. 
 
 A number of internal factors influence precisely how Britain has 
responded to Syrian linked issues.  For a large part, the formulation of that 
policy has been tightly in the hands of the executive, particularly in the case of 
military intervention, but other forces have had impact over both the process 
and the application of policy.  It has long been accepted that the executive has 
far more freedom in the arena of foreign policy than domestic yet recent events 
with regard to the Syrian case has shown this can no longer be taken for 
granted.  British capacity to manoeuvre with regard to the current crisis for 
example has been limited by Parliament voting against military action there.   
 
Chapter one demonstrates a number of the factors described above.  Britain 
fought two world wars to preserve her status as a world power and protect her 
interest, whilst trying to prevent Germany’s growth as a great power.  Peace 
time saw Britain working assiduously to shape peace agreements to her favour.  
British activity in the Middle East reflected this.  Agreements made during war 
time were made on the basis of what was necessary to maximise resources to 
fight the war, they were further complicated in that they were made by 
different agents, who were given a remit for pursuing these different 
agreements with little coordination as to the promises made.  British policy in 
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the interwar period was about preserving British access to resources and 
limiting the influence of other great powers in the region.  Following the Second 
World War, the policy pursued again was one of limiting the influence of other 
great power rivals, which underlay Britain’s support for Syrian independence 
from France.  Further, the realisation that Britain’s capacity to project its 
influence in the region had significantly diminished, combined with the fear of 
Soviet incursion, led Britain to connive with friendly regimes, such as the 
governments in Turkey, Jordan and Iraq, in order to counter the threat and 
protect its interests, and also to the view that America must play a key role in 
the region.   
 
These events were significant to the Anglo-Syrian relationship and marked the 
beginning of what would be an antagonistic relationship between British 
governments and Syrian regimes.  They also marked a pattern where Syrian 
interests were not acknowledged or were not seen to be a priority for British 
decision makers.  Ultimately in the period after World War Two this worked 
against the British, as the assumption that Arab interests must coincide with 
British interests, led to British interference in Syrian affairs. This backfired and 
ultimately led to the failure of the Baghdad Pact, since Syria’s decision not to 
join, but to back Egypt’s opposition to the pact was instrumental in its demise.  
Neoclassical realism helps in the analysis of this period in that it both explains 
Britain’s drive to preserve the balance of power in the region, firstly in its 
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interaction with the Arabs then latterly in its attempts to draw the US into the 
region as security against the perceived Soviet threat.  Yet, it adds to 
understanding of the foreign policy itself, as it gives weight to the policy making 
process.  The recognition by policy makers that Britain no longer had the power 
capacity to maintain its presence in the Middle East during the first half of the 
20th century, did not lead to an immediate withdrawal, rather to an attempt to 
manipulate regional politics in the Levant to its advantage and to draw the US 
into the Middle East to contain Soviet influence.  British policy was dictated both 
by the perception elites held of the threat of the SU to its interests in the 
region, and thus the need to balance that by drawing in the US, but also by the 
perception of British elites that Arab regimes would naturally see their interests 
to be in line with Britain’s.  This brought Syria directly into British foreign policy 
makers sights, as it was central to the creation of a Western backed line of 
defence. But policy makers failed to recognise that Syrians did not believe their 
interests would be served by British policy, cementing an antagonistic 
relationship. 
 
By the time Thatcher came to power, the period described in chapter two, 
Britain had completed its withdrawal from the Middle East.  In terms simply of 
relative power, it may have seemed that British interests would be best served 
by maintaining this distance.  Here the mechanism for maximising British 
power, its alliances, was central to its policy-making.  Several factors would 
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draw it back into the region, following policies that in many ways seemed 
detrimental to its interests there.  While the period seemed to start positively, 
with British leadership in the creation of the 1980 Venice declaration appearing 
to indicate willingness to pursue a European approach to the Middle East, the 
prioritisation of the Atlantic alliance, given that the US was seen as central to 
combating the spread of Soviet influence in the Middle East and more generally 
as guarantor of European security, dragged Britain into disputes in the Middle 
East that directly brought it into conflict with Syrian interests. 
 
Overall, a number of analysts would say that British interests in the Middle East 
were not served well in this period, and certainly the policy pursued was 
detrimental to the Anglo-Syrian relationship with a consequent four year break 
in relations.  Here studying the unit level variables of policy making, particularly 
the role of the Prime Minister, is essential to understanding the policy of the 
time.  The role of Margaret Thatcher in foreign policy making was significant, 
and its impact was felt more deeply as, not only were key British interests at 
stake such as stability in the Middle East, and US involvement there, but Britain 
had to react to a number of crises such as Israel’s invasion of Lebanon and 
various terrorist attacks, the importance of these issues and the crisis situation 
making sure Thatcher would take a tighter grip of foreign policy in response.  
Again analysing unit level factors prove central to explaining British foreign 
policy here.  The maintenance of its alliances was central to maximising British 
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power capacity, but the significant relationship for Britain in terms of the Middle 
East was Britain’s relationship with the US.  It was this that dragged Britain 
back into Middle East conflicts, as a show of commitment to that relationship. 
 
For Syria this was significant.  Thatcher’s black and white take on international 
events, her commitment to the US alliance, her distrust of Soviet influence in 
the region and her suspicion of the FCO, which might have advised a more 
cautious approach to events, all put British policy on a collision course with 
Syrian interests.  British policy embroiled it in Lebanon and in support of the US 
raid in Libya, putting it directly at odds with Syrian interests.  Britain’s too close 
alignment with the policy of the Reagan administration led it to fail to 
adequately take into account legitimate Syrian concerns over Israeli 
encroachment into its sphere of influence in Lebanon.  There was a failure to 
understand the Syrian perception that those groups Britain and the US labelled 
“terrorist” were seen as legitimate resistance groups, further exacerbated by 
the tendency to see all terrorist groups as the same.  As long as there was no 
equal pressure on Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories, particularly 
the Golan Heights, there could be no question of the Syrian regime ending its 
support for what it saw as groups resisting Israeli occupation.  Even in its 
approach to the MEPP, something in which Britain and Syria may have found 
common ground, British policy makers were limited by the insistence that it 
must run complimentary to US efforts (restricting the sense in which the UK 
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could “balance” US excessive support for Israeli policy).  Further, by giving 
central roles to the PLO in the Venice Declaration, or inviting a Palestinian-
Jordanian delegation to London, as a way, as Damascus saw it, of excluding 
Syria (owing to its Soviet alignment) from the peace process, the two Western 
powers challenged the Syrian role as Pan-Arab champion, and the Syrian 
concept that settlement of the peace process was something bigger than simply 
a settlement for the Palestinians. 
 
The lack of understanding of Syria’s interests during the Thatcher period, 
combined with a strong Prime Minister determined to make a stand against 
terrorism would see a complete break in relations with Syria despite significant 
elements of the UK government who disagreed with this course of action.  Here 
British policy would be distinct but not in a positive way.  While there was 
immediate solidarity with the British in the aftermath of the Hindawi affair, 
given Syria’s importance to key issues of the day such as the hostage situation 
and Lebanon, it was soon evident it was the Thatcher government which was 
left behind and isolated in Middle East issues, much to the detriment of British 
interests.  Despite this, it took the resignation of a Prime Minister before the 
relationship could be repaired. 
 
In many ways the Blair era, considered in chapters three and four, 
demonstrates many of the characteristics of the Thatcher era yet initially there 
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did seem to be some ground for hope that the Anglo-Syrian relationship would 
become warmer.  With no crises ongoing, and no overarching threat in the now 
unipolar world, there was potential for a more normalised relationship.  As such 
a UK government willing to engage in constructive dialogue potentially could 
have forged a new relationship.  
 
Neo-classical realists hypothesize that states which are politically and 
territorially secure are more likely to pursue objectives with less direct links to 
pure national interests.  In this sense there is less constraint on their behaviour, 
these states pursue ideological goals as ends in themselves, an impact felt 
more when foreign policy making is highly centralised in government.  The Blair 
government faced a world that had changed significantly from previous periods, 
with Britain now pursuing its policies in a unipolar world, and for Western 
leaders the primacy of their style of government established.  The lack of an 
existential threat to Britain, could be seen to have impacted on the thinking of 
political elites now the question being asked not “what must we do”, to “what 
shall we do.”646  
 
As Blair’s role grew in foreign policy decision making, his perception about the 
moral obligation on nation states to intervene in conflicts on humanitarian 
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grounds, where there are no obvious national interests became more important 
for British policy, illustrative of the impact leader’s perceptions have on foreign 
policy making particularly in the British system of government, and in Blair’s 
period the increasing centralisation of decision making on foreign policy. 
 
Blair’s government saw a brief moment of hope for a new relationship with 
Syria.  As previously discussed, perceptions within the political elite saw Britain 
committed to a global role, and also viewing commitment to the MEPP as a 
moral obligation. Under Blair, a commitment to promoting good governance 
and international stability further fostered a reengagement of British interest in 
the MEPP and also support for the EU Association Agreements as a way to 
promote economic liberalisation as a route to political change in the region. 
Both initiatives, potentially paved the way for a more constructive relationship 
with Syria.   
 
Yet even initially some traditional characteristics of British foreign policy 
impacted decisions: thus there was the somewhat confused approach to the 
Ilisu Dam project which illustrated that discrepancies and inconsistencies 
continued where different foreign policy priorities competed with each other, in 
this case economic interests, pursued by the DTI and supported by Blair, 
overriding concerns for human rights and the environment. This project also 
showed the difficulties where the Foreign Office sets an overarching priority for 
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foreign policy behaviour but another department leads on the ground with its 
own priorities taking precedence. 
 
Before long, moreover, 9/11 and the War on Terror changed the international 
context dramatically, with the UK growing closer to the US, and the Americans 
increasingly taking an anti-Syrian stance.  Again, the significance of how the 
perception of the international system had changed was significant, particularly 
the concept of threat.  Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the elite perception 
was that rogue regimes posed an unacceptable threat to international stability, 
and that not supporting the US in defending against that threat was 
inconceivable.  In this, Blair’s role in foreign policy making was vital to 
understanding British policy.  Britain’s participation in Iraq was in direct conflict 
to Syrian interests.  With this change, Blair’s increasing control over British 
foreign policy, his inclination to intervene, and his over identification with US 
foreign policy now became issues for the Syrian regime, and voices within the 
UK policy process advocating a more moderate approach were not heard.  At 
the same time, it restricted the British government’s ability to pursue a different 
policy with Syria even had it wanted to and even impacted on EU efforts to 
forge a different path.  British foreign policy behaviour was also not constrained 
by its membership of multilateral organisations.  In matters of vital interests, 
the primacy of its security relationship with the US overriding the constraining 
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potential of British commitment, for example to the norms and values of the UN 
in the face of what the British executive saw as a key threat to security. 
 
Crises in the international arena can have the effect of exacerbating existing 
tensions in British foreign policy.  The Iraq war of 2003 highlighted the impact 
on British policy of taking an overly pro-American line, damaging Britain's 
standing in the European Union and limiting its options to pursue an 
independent policy in the region, particularly with regard to Syria.  This 
impacted not only British bilateral relations with Syria, but limited options within 
the EU as American pressure prevented the signing of the Association 
Agreement with Syria, thus, missing an opportunity to advance reform in Syria.  
While other EU partners joined Britain in requiring additional clauses be added 
to Syria’s Association Agreement, there is no doubt that having troops on the 
ground in Iraq with the Americans restricted Britain’s ability to act 
independently of US policy. 
 
Lastly, the recent crisis in Syria has shown, once more, a number of 
weaknesses in British foreign policy, many of them echoing the history of 
Anglo-Syrian relations.  This in part is the legacy of the Blair government.  It 
has cast its shadow over the present governments ability to intervene in the 
conflict – both in the general reluctance to get involved in another messy war in 
the region and practically, in setting the precedent of having to take the vote to 
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Parliament in the first place.  British political elites, in a more uncertain world 
context, whilst still adhering to the concept of a British role in world politics 
once again questioning what that role is, and what capacity Britain has to 
deliver on its world role.   
 
The reluctance of the British government to extend support to the Syrian 
uprising can be seen as reflecting the fact that with little direct interests there 
Britain is unwilling to expend resources, economic or human, in order to help 
militarily.  Further, its recent experiences with intervention in the Middle East - 
in Libya, Iraq and Afghanistan - has made decision makers sceptical of the 
impact such military intervention could have.  Urgency to act has only really 
come recently as a result of the influx of refugees to Europe, with the impact 
that might have among the electorate.   Significantly, despite its membership of 
important multilateral institutions such as the UN and the EU and its “special 
relationship” with the US Britain has failed to make any particular impact in its 
attempts to help bring the crisis to an end.   
 
Final Summary 
Neoclassical realism shares a number of central assumptions with other realist 
theories, such as that the state remains the most appropriate unit of analysis, 
that the international system is anarchic and fundamentally states relations are 
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defined by competition for scarce resources in the absence of an external 
arbiter, and that power is the essential tool that states have in that competition, 
particularly the power of material capabilities.  
 
Neoclassical realism argues that a state’s relative power in the international 
system drives its foreign policy.  This can be seen to help explain British foreign 
policy over the past century, a central aspect of which has been its decline in 
power from being a great power to a European power, and, simultaneously its 
attempts to preserve its remaining power capacity through alliance-making.  
This helps provide an understanding of British foreign policy in the Middle East, 
a region in which it is essentially interested in preserving stability in a way 
which ensures its access to resources there.  The Middle East is considered a 
region of vital British interests; Britain is perceived to have both a historical 
relationship with the region that makes it well placed to “understand” Middle 
East issues, and a moral obligation to it as a result of this historic relationship; 
finally, the Middle East region, as a result of British involvement in creation of 
the modern middle east structure, is unstable and prone to crises which 
inevitably draw it to the attention of policy makers in London. While the UK has 
little direct interests in Syria itself, it is through its wider involvement in Middle 
East issues that most Anglo-Syrian interaction has occurred, and often set the 
interests of the two states in conflict with each other. 
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Neo-classical realism’s value added compared to other realist theories is that it 
does not consider there to be a direct logical connection between the nature of 
the system and how states behave.  While it still holds that power, interests 
and alliance-making are central to this behaviour, it accepts that at the state 
level the perceptions and ideas of decision makers factor into foreign policy 
behaviour. 647  Thus Britain’s international behaviour can be explained in part by 
changes in the international system, as it has declined from being a great 
imperial power, to a European power.  As it has pursued alliances to enhance 
its power this has also impacted on British behaviour. 
 
Neoclassical realism argues that a state’s relative power in the international 
system drives its foreign policy alongside its relative power.  This can be seen 
to help explain British foreign policy over the past century, a central aspect of 
which has been its decline in power and, simultaneously its attempts to 
maximise its power capacity through its alliances.  This has aided in 
understanding the various interactions in the Anglo-Syrian relationship 
throughout this period since, while the UK has little direct interests in Syria, it is 
through its wider involvement in Middle East issues that most Anglo-Syrian 
interaction has occurred, and often set the interests of the two states in conflict 
with each other. 
                                                          
647 Kitchen “Systemic pressures and domestic ideas: a neoclassical realist model of grand 
strategy formation”. P140 
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A central aspect of this has been the impact of the executive in the making of 
British foreign policy.  As a result of the key perceived importance of the Middle 
East and the periodic crises that erupt there, decision making on Middle East 
policy has often been concentrated in the executive, and particularly as the 
British system has been inclined to centralisation, this has focussed on the 
prime minister; as such their preconceptions and world views have influenced 
British foreign policy in the Middle East to a great degree.  Where the Prime 
Minister’s position has been relatively strong, such as in the Blair and Thatcher 
periods, rather than a nuanced world view, this has often resulted in issues 
being considered in fairly black and white terms.  This has complicated the 
Anglo-Syrian relationship, as legitimate Syrian opposition to British policy is 
conceived as simply the intransigence of an autocratic regime, and has been 
given little weight in British thinking.  The lack of direct British interests in Syria 
has also meant that there have been fewer important dissenting voices in the 
British political elite to project moderating influence on British policy direction 
toward Syria. 
 
The importance of Britain to Syria has often been in her alliances.  Britain has 
established these alliances in order to defend her declining power position and 
protect her remaining interests in the region but its capacity to utilise these 
alliances effectively has been seen to be constrained by its need to balance its 
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essentially economic alliance with the EU and its American alliance, one seen 
primarily as important in security terms.  The failure of Britain to balance these, 
often linked to the executive’s belief in the primacy of the “special relationship”, 
has, on numerous occasions, brought British interests into conflict with Syrian 
regional interests, and limited the effectiveness of the EU in pursuing 
alternative policies which could have resulted in more constructive Anglo-Syrian 
relations. 
 
Anglo-Syrian relations, initially defined by British involvement in the creation of 
the modern Middle East state system, have continued to be defined in the 
broader context of British interest in the region.  British interests in the Middle 
East have persisted even after Britain’s withdrawal from the region, and its 
pursuit of them since has involved working through alliances.  Neoclassical 
realism provides an explanation for this behaviour, in terms of Britain’s attempt 
to mobilize the power to protect its national interests, but also shows how the 
policy process is essential to understanding British behaviour, taking into 
account elite perceptions both of what these interests are and how best Britain 
can achieve them. This adds a layer of understanding as to why foreign policy 
outcomes do not always conform with what would be predicted purely in terms 
of the pursuit of the national interest. 
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